

HOW MAINE VIEWED THE WAR, 1914–1917

BY EDWIN COSTRELL

Originally published in 1940, as the United States once more evaluated possible involvement in global conflict, "How Maine Viewed the War, 1914–1917" looks backward to Maine on the eve of World War I. Author Edwin Stanley Costrell (1913–2010), through a study of newspaper coverage of the years 1914 to 1917, provides a thought-provoking account of a Maine people wrestling with ambivalence over US involvement in the Great War; of a citizenry seeking to reconcile ethnic diversity with national unity; and of a nation divided over pacifism, militarism, isolationism, and internationalism and increasingly moving toward war with Germany. Costrell was born in Bangor and earned a BA in English in 1938 and an MA in History and Government in 1939, both from University of Maine. After serving in the US Army during World War II, he earned a PhD in History and International Relations from Clark University in 1949. Thereafter, he worked as a diplomatic historian for the State Department from 1949 until his retirement in 2002, and authored numerous works on foreign relations.

• • •

PLEASE NOTE that this is an abridged version of the original publication. To conserve space and match the style of our journal, we have removed content, including some front matter and many details within the original footnotes. We have also added photographs to contextualize content. We invite you to view the full-text original by visiting www.MaineMemory.net/WWI. Please also note that this article includes rhetoric considered subjective, pejorative, and derogatory by modern standards, and rhetoric which reflects an era of heightened nationalism and xenophobia. Invaluable for understanding Maine attitudes toward US involvement in WWI, it also holds up a mirror to modern rhetoric, compelling readers to consider the historical roots of America's ongoing search for national identity.

This article is reprinted with permission from the University of Maine Press. It first appeared in The Maine Bulletin (Vol. XLII, No.8) University of Maine Studies, Second Series, No. 49.

Preface

INVOLVED IN the issue of American public opinion on 1914–1917 is that vitally important question: Why did the United States enter the World War? And the further question: What forces can be expected to press the United States into war again? It is because of these questions that the present study was undertaken.

Whatever the war-making force to which one may give primacy, it is certain that the force represented by public opinion cannot be relegated to an insignificant position. Certainly, during the World War, neither the British nor the Germans ever made the mistake of ignoring the American public. Wellington House, the British war-time propaganda agency, even indicated, in 1917, that, because of public opinion, an American declaration of war at the time of the *Lusitania* crisis might possibly have brought civil strife to the United States. The German and British ambassadors in Washington constantly watched the fluctuations in public sentiment and the English cabinet received weekly—sometimes bi-weekly—reports on it. Even the Wilson administration gave many indications of its very real concern for public opinion, as when the president made his early appeal for neutrality in thought as well as in action. Similarly eloquent were the memoranda of Secretary of State Lansing, who declared at the beginning of 1916, for instance, that Wilson must not act until the people were aroused and ready. When Wilson did finally act, the government was convinced it had the public's support.

Clearly, if, under certain circumstances, the public comes to be one of the forces making for war, then it is to the interest of those seeking to maintain peace to prevent the development of such circumstances. Forbidding Americans to enter war zones is one essential move in that direction. Steps to prevent a war boom are another. Strict observance of international law, cooperation with the other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and the counteracting of belligerent propaganda are other necessary precautions. But whatever the peace program which may be championed, it cannot be effective, ultimately, unless it is founded on a clear understanding of the probable reactions to war activities elsewhere in the world. If it is assumed in advance that the public will be opposed to war under all circumstances, then vital measures necessary to keep the nation out of war will be overlooked. Studies of public opinion are essential, therefore, as guides to the directors of American foreign policy and to those who would keep it in the paths of peace.

Introduction

With Europe again at war and with eastern Asia in almost a chronic state of strife, the American people are seeking desperately for some immunizing formula that will keep the United States at peace. Already millions of citizens, many of whom believe the nation entered the World War contrary to the popular will, have decided that the formula should include, among other ingredients, a constitutional amendment forbidding Congress to draft men for overseas military service until authorized by a national referendum. Investigations into the munitions industry, orators such as that noted rebel from the militarist ranks, Major General Smedley D. Butler, and pacifists of all types have convinced numerous citizens that the United States went to war in 1917 simply because J.P. Morgan, the du Ponts, and others with similar interests in industry and finance had decided it should. And they believe that if the question of war or peace is referred to the people, this capitalist influence will be greatly weakened, thus rendering war less likely.¹

They may be right; Congress may be highly susceptible to war-mongering influences, but the writer has come to suspect that the people as a whole may be quite as much in need of immunization as are their representatives. The results of an investigation into Maine public opinion for 1914 to 1917—to be summarized herein—indicate that the people are not always capable of resisting the fever of battle. The inhabitants of Maine wanted war in the spring of 1917—and wanted it fervently. This sentiment could hardly have been exceptional. While the Middle West, as Maine newspapers admitted in those years, was more pacific than the East, it cannot be said with certainty that even that section of the country was definitely opposed to the American declaration of war. However that may be, other sections of the country were not equally pacific, and, if Maine is at all typical, the states along the Atlantic seaboard were decidedly pro-war.²

Evaluating Public Opinion


But how can it be proved that the people of Maine wanted war so fervently? How can public opinion be gauged? The problem is certainly difficult, especially when it involves pre-Gallup poll years; yet it is not insoluble. As a matter of fact, discriminating research in only the chief agency for expressing opinion, the daily newspaper, can yield extremely valuable

information as to the state of the public mind—so much, indeed, that the writer dares to base this study on the assumption that the newspapers of Maine reflected public opinion in Maine.

Despite the virulent indictments of the press handed down by Upton Sinclair, George Seldes, Harold Ickes, and other prominent journalists and public figures, and despite the unqualified rebuke the electorate in 1936 administered most editorial writers, the newspapers of the United States most of the time do roughly represent the views of their readers, especially in matters of foreign policy. Obviously all the subtle differences of opinion do not receive headlines, nor does any one newspaper reflect the ideas of the community, but taken as a whole, the press of any one state can usually be said to express the broad opinions of its inhabitants. How otherwise can one explain the fact that a map of about 2,200 American newspapers indicated practically no Republican dailies were being published in the solid Democratic South and practically no Democratic dailies in the solid Republican states? As Walter Lippmann has said, “the Press is bound to respect the point of view of the buying public. The newspaper can flout an advertiser, it can attack a powerful banking or traction interest, but if it alienates the buying public it loses the one indispensable asset to its existence.”³

It must be conceded that the newspaper is not a clear mirror of public opinion. Each daily has its own constituency and need only concern itself with the views of that constituency. Just as in the South the Hearst papers “speak the language of the Klan, and in New York that of the Catholics and Jews,” so within any one state the newspapers will curry the favor of their particular groups of readers. But it is to be observed that in the average community the readers of any one newspaper usually include a diversity of elements in the population. The editor hesitates, therefore, to speak out unequivocally on many controversial issues. He tends to “gyrate back and forth, straddle the fence, and try to be all things to all people.” In addition, he tends to be timid in expressing his views on happenings of the day and to lag behind both the news column and public opinion. Moreover, once a newspaper has definitely committed itself on an issue and “honestly evoked the partisanship of its readers, it cannot easily . . . change position.” To do so would offend those who formerly might have been indifferent.⁴

But it is even more difficult for the editor *not* to change his position when the people have changed theirs. An excellent example of just this sort of shift was provided in Maine during the World War, when the *Lewiston Evening Journal*, apparently in response to popular demand, re-



versed its attitude on the vigor with which the United States should press its case against Germany. The average newspaper is inordinately sensitive to criticism, is quick to perceive its own faults, and generally hastens to redirect its steps whenever public opinion appears to be headed in another direction. Perhaps the late Count Johann von Bernstorff, German ambassador to the United States from 1908 to 1917, was correct in saying that “the American daily papers are more important as a medium for influencing public opinion than as a mirror for reflecting it,” but by and large they certainly do reflect it. For “the only pressure to which editors as a whole yield,” as William Allen White has observed, “is the pressure of the *mores* of the time, the pressure of the generally accepted stereotyped conceptions in all fields of thought.”⁵


This can be said even more emphatically with regard to the newspapers of Maine, since they cannot be charged, as are metropolitan dailies, with representing only urban dwellers. The dailies of Maine circulate among rural and semi-urban people and therefore reflect a composite of rural and urban opinions.⁶

On the other hand, the problem of ascertaining from newspaper files the dominant sentiment in Maine during the World War is made somewhat more difficult by the necessity of relying almost exclusively on the news and editorial columns and on the infrequent cartoons. None of the six newspapers examined for this study—two of them, the *Bangor Daily Commercial* and the *Daily Kennebec Journal* (of Augusta), were studied for the state’s reactions to the major crises in German-American relations, and four of them, the *Lewiston Evening Journal*, the *Bangor Daily News*, the *Portland Express-Advertiser*, and the *Portland Daily Press*, for the entire period of American neutrality—published a letter column regularly, or even frequently. And the *Daily Kennebec Journal*, which had the nearest approach to one, and the *Portland Daily Press* confessed to a censorship which makes their fitful letter columns practically worthless.⁷

But while a modern, unfettered letter column would be useful, it is not absolutely essential to the discovery of fundamental Maine ideas. The news, the cartoons, and especially the editorials should suffice.

German Propaganda

Still further complicating any research into the World War ideas of Maine and the nation, it may be argued, is the enormous propaganda with which the Allied and Central powers flooded the United States. Yet any-



Immediate Origin of Foreign Front-Page *Bangor Daily News* War Dispatches for Tri-Monthly Periods

one who is acquainted with the endless reams of propaganda and disguised advertising which, even in normal times, descend daily upon the editor's desk knows he is more immune to the efforts of war propagandists than is the community at large. If he differs to any extent from the man in the street, it is in being less credulous, not more. Any atrocity story which appeared in the editorial columns, then, was surely duplicated by scores of others which made the rounds *via* the gossip route. Any emotional condemnation of German torpedoings which the editor may have penned was in all likelihood mild compared to the outbursts of the average Maine citizen holding forth on a street corner or in a forbidden barroom. The roar of World War propaganda was important, therefore, not so much for its effect on the editorial as for its effect on the attitude of Maine citizens. The editorial was affected primarily by the propaganda backwash.⁸

First in the field, apparently, were the Germans, who set up a propaganda organization under Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, former secretary of state for the colonies. This organization, the German Information Bureau, directed its attention to the newspapers of the United States. It got news

stories over the wireless, translated passages from the German press, and summarized this information in a news sheet which was released periodically to some five hundred newspapers. Besides directing these activities, Dr. Dernburg wrote magazine articles, sent letters to newspapers, delivered speeches, and kept in contact with the directors of the American press. At first assisted only by M.B. Claussen, New York press agent of the Hamburg-American line, and Dr. Alexander Fuehr, the interpreter for the German Consulate-General in Yokohama, he later employed the noted American writer, William Bayard Hale, who was assisted by two young New York journalists. Still later, two German government officials, Dr. Mechlenburg and Dr. Plage, were added to the staff.⁹

From these activities Ambassador Bernstorff sedulously tried to keep the German embassy separated. At first he had endeavored, by means of interviews and by releasing dispatches from Germany, to explain the German standpoint to the American people, but he ceased when the adverse reaction convinced him his efforts were fruitless and even dangerous to him personally. Thenceforth he kept "aloof from these [propaganda] matters." So that "the official activities of the Embassy might in no way be compromised," the press bureau propaganda was deliberately conducted, except for some conferences, as a private enterprise. Bernstorff did, however, employ the usual subterranean propaganda methods to advance the German cause, maintaining close contact with influential American newspaper men.¹⁰

Of considerable value to the German propagandists were the large German societies in the United States and the German-American newspapers, which at the outbreak of the war took up the German cause "unhesitatingly and as one man." Their influence, however, was restricted largely to the German-speaking population, so that it was found necessary to subsidize small pro-German sheets and to buy control of the *New York Evening Mail*. This maneuver did not meet with the expected success, since the *Mail* was soon recognized as a German organ.¹¹

More important to the German cause were the ten papers of the Hearst syndicate, which were anti-British and, if not blindly pro-German, at least friendly to the German side. Count Bernstorff, in a long report to the German foreign office in December, 1916, penetratingly observed: "The papers named are based on a sound American policy, but with their sharp anti-British tendency do us much more good than papers with admitted pro-German bias." Circulating in all parts of the country, they influenced elements in the population which the regular German propaganda agencies could never hope to touch.¹²

The Germans also capitalized on the anti-British attitude of the Irish-

Americans and the anti-Russian attitude of the Jews, and they sought the attention of serious students by publishing numerous books and pamphlets. The pamphlet propaganda, conducted by Dr. Hale and Dr. Dernburg, was extraordinarily successful, but the pro-German books were matched about ten to one by pro-Ally volumes and had only little influence.¹³

The primary objectives of the German propagandists were, first, to picture the German cause in a favorable light and center public attention on "the fundamental injustice of the English encroachments" and, secondly "to keep the United States out of the war." Considerable energy was expended, by emphasizing the "immoral" and "unneutral" character of the American shipments to the Allies, in an effort to persuade Congress to embargo all arms shipments. When Congress nevertheless turned down an arms embargo proposal in the spring of 1915, the German propaganda bureau redoubled its efforts and German patriots resorted to direct action which did incalculable damage to the German cause in the United States.¹⁴

Americans were not slow to recognize the German hand behind any movement, and invariably the movement suffered as a result. The American peace movement might have made considerable headway had not the Germans associated themselves with it. And the effort to obtain a munitions embargo might eventually have succeeded had it clearly been only an "American" effort. As it was, the German propagandists certainly did not advance and probably injured their own interests. The American newspapers, even before the *Lusitania* was sunk, never tired of expatiating on an enormous propaganda program being directed by Germany. And when Dr. Dernburg, Dr. Konstantin Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, and Dr. Heinrich Albert, who succeeded Dernburg as propaganda director, committed the series of blunders which set the first two packing, they discovered what amounted almost to knockout blows to all German propaganda efforts. Count Bernstorff, in November, 1915, recommended the suppression of most of the propaganda agencies, which was done, and he "adopted the principle . . . of leaving the propaganda to our American friends, who were in a position to get an earlier hearing than we, and in any case understand the psychology of the Americans better than the imperial German agents." By 1916 not a single strictly propaganda organization was maintained by the Germans in the United States.¹⁵

Allied Propaganda

The Allied propaganda in the United States was as effective as the German propaganda was ineffective. The seeming disadvantage of getting

it under way more slowly turned out, in the end, to be a definite advantage, for the Allies learned how not to do the work. The Germans had made almost every blunder possible and had antagonized those whom they sought to convert. They had been blunt, obvious, tactless. Not so the British. Learning from the experience of others, they “always maintained a profound reticence about their propaganda activities in the United States. . . . In fact, so careful were [the English propagandists] to avoid any outward display or action that the published letters of the British ambassador to the United States during the hectic months from August, 1914, to April, 1917, reveal not one mention of their names.” The British allowed Americans themselves to enter the spotlight on behalf of the Allies. They indirectly assisted the leading American newspapers. They made capital out of the publicity which the United States ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, gave the terrible Armenian massacres. They seized upon favorable literature spontaneously produced by Americans, paid for its printing and then circulated it in all quarters. Thus did Samuel Harden Church’s *The American Verdict on the War* and James M. Beck’s *The Evidence in the Case* attain their wide distribution. Another skillful move on the part of the British was to personalize much of their propaganda. Americans in England were induced to write letters to their friends at home, favors were done American visitors, unusual courtesies were shown American correspondents. Sir Gilbert Parker himself, who was in charge of American publicity, corresponded “with most of the American *Who’s Who*.”¹⁶

The wisdom of these tactics was early evident. At the same time that the Maine press took the German propagandists severely to task, it proceeded in blissful unawareness of the extensive propaganda activities being carried on by the Allies. And when, in December, 1914, it did obtain some inkling of an English propaganda organization in tended to present the Allied case before all neutral powers, the *Bangor Daily News* warned: “To imitate the Germans and bombard us with letters, appeals, distinguished signatures would do more harm than good. . . . The English can best show their confidence in their cause by letting it speak for itself.” To the French, a year and one-half later, following re-appropriation by the Chamber of Deputies of a fund to defend France against calumny, the *News* addressed a similar warning. “Not the least cause of the sympathy, friendship and admiration for the French people shown here in the past two years,” it said, “has been the absence of anything like French propaganda in America.” Throughout the succeeding months the *News*, and other Maine dailies, assumed that the English and French *were* in truth letting their cause speak for itself.¹⁷

Yet the extent of Allied propaganda in the United States was truly amazing. That of the British, who bore the chief responsibility for presenting the Allied case, has been graphically summarized by Sir Gilbert Parker in part as follows:

Practically since the day war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity. I need hardly say that the scope of my department was very extensive and its activities widely ranged. Among the activities was a weekly report to the British Cabinet of the state of American opinion, and constant touch with the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in England. I also frequently arranged for important public men in England to act for us by interviews in American newspapers. . . . Among other things, we supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller States of the United States with an English newspaper, which gives a weekly review and comment of the affairs of the war. We established connection with the man in the street through cinema pictures of the Army and Navy, as well as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc.; and by letters in reply to individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspaper of the State in which they lived, and were copied in newspapers of other and neighboring States. We advised and stimulated many people to write articles; we utilized the friendly services and assistance of confidential friends; we had reports from important Americans constantly, and established association, by personal correspondence, with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States, beginning with university and college presidents, professors and scientific men, and running through all the ranges of the population. We asked our friends and correspondents to arrange for speeches, debates, and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the war. Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to great numbers of public libraries, Y.M.C.A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs, and newspapers.¹⁸

Weekly or bi-weekly attempts to determine the effect of these propaganda activities were made in the recently discovered *American Press Résumé*, a series of confidential reports prepared by Sir Gilbert's staff for the enlightenment of the cabinet and of the more important propagandists. The *Résumé* detailed the accomplishments of the propaganda organizations, analyzed the press, and presented reports of individuals who were seeking to gauge American public opinion.¹⁹

Because England had more friends and funds in the United States,



University of Maine Faculty of Instruction march in World War I parade, date and photographer unknown. Image courtesy of Special Collections, Raymond H. Fogler Library DigitalCommons@UMaine, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/univ_photos/3145/, accessed 15 June 2018.

the other Entente powers were content to rely chiefly on her propaganda efforts, which naturally helped them as much as they did Great Britain. Italy did little. Russia was played down, or whitewashed, to conciliate the Jews. Belgium let her misery speak for itself. France likewise profited in the United States from her military reverses, which were interpreted as evidence that Germany had prepared for the war. But France also did some active propaganda work on her own account by spreading in emotion-charged words the story of German satanism. "The Germans," Dr. Lasswell has pointed out, "were never able to popularize so striking an epithet as 'Hun' and 'Boche' and their clumsy exhortations to hate or their sneering references to the 'All-lies' were much less powerful and invidious. The French vocabulary had powerful words like humanity and democracy, which reverberated with a tremendous clang abroad."²⁰

It was not only powerful words that the French had. They also possessed a social, political, and cultural affinity with the United States which made it receptive to their propaganda. American affinity with England was even more pronounced, owing largely to use of the same language. Only in the Middle West and West were Americans comparatively allergic to Allied propaganda. Charles Seymour goes so far as to say, indeed, that propaganda success "seemed to depend not upon the skill or activity of

the propagandists so much as upon the national penchants and sympathies of the various regional groups. If the pro-German idea had little success in the country as a whole, it was not because pro-Ally interests subsidized news writers, but because opinion did not approve the German idea."²¹

British Control of the Cables

Fully as important as the out-and-out propaganda material issued by the Allies was Great Britain's virtual control of American news columns. American newspapers were caught unawares by the war and could draw on no previous experience in covering such a subject. They had to ape the English press, "not because Northcliffe owned American newspapers, but because at first it was easier to buy English correspondence, and because, later, it was easier for American journalists to read English newspapers than it was for them to read any others." The *New York Times*, for example, obtained much of its war news from the *London Daily Chronicle*. Moreover, the leading American papers employed British newspaper men.²²

The real basis for England's domination of the American news column, however, was her control of all the cables between Europe and America. This she acquired at the beginning of the war simply by cutting one cable. Only the mails and the inadequate wireless remained as means for the transmission of information from Germany to the United States. As a result, since news is not news unless it is fresh, the war picture which Americans obtained was pretty much that which the Allies, who exercised a rigid censorship, wanted them to obtain. G.A. Schreiner, who was in London for the Associated Press, estimated that in the spring of 1915 "nearly three-quarters of the dispatches written by American correspondents in Central Europe" were killed by the British censors. An examination of the front-page datelines which appeared in the first issue of every month of three Maine dailies from August, 1914, until America's entry into the war, discloses that of 387 dispatches from Europe and Asia, only 40, or slightly under 10 percent, were sent from a Central power and did not pass through an Allied or neutral city. Only 11 were transmitted from neutral states. Only 36 of the Berlin dispatches went directly across the ocean, while 19 went by way of London or Paris. London alone transmitted more than 70 percent of the total news stories.²³

A survey of *Bangor Daily News* datelines, calculated for a six-day period once every three months, shows even more emphatically how one-sided was the news Maine residents were reading. Of 205 front-page news

stories from the two embroiled continents, only 11 made the last leg of their voyage from one of the Central powers and only three from a neutral state. As a matter of fact, the Berlin dispatches which were sent *via* London or Paris outnumbered those sent directly to the United States by more than two to one.²⁴

This situation prevailed not only during the first months of the war; it persisted to the very end. The percentage of dispatches sent from Allied as against those sent from Central and neutral powers underwent but little variation from one year to the next. According to the figures in the graph, entitled "Immediate Origin of Front-Page Foreign War Dispatches in Three Maine Dailies for Monthly Periods," only 12.4 percent of the European and Asiatic dispatches in three Maine dailies for the first issue of every month from October, 1914, to March, 1915, came directly from Central or neutral countries. For the same six-month period in 1915–1916, the percentage was 14.7 and in 1916–1917, 16.4, a variation for the three periods of only 4 percent.²⁵

The few stories that Germany did send directly to the United States with some semblance of speed traveled by wireless to Sayville, Long Island, NY, and to Tuckerton, NJ. The German stations at these places, built before the war, were not opened to the public until after the war had got underway. When French stockholders asked for an injunction to close them immediately, the American government dismissed the suits and took over their management under an executive order authorizing the navy to take such action if necessary to insure against alleged neutrality violations. Supervision was difficult, it was explained, and by having naval operators instead of commercial operators man the keys, the government could keep a better eye on material going out. But all this served to hamper transmission in the already congested stations. Atmospheric conditions also impaired the service, interrupting contact with the United States after the *Lusitania* sinking and on other critical occasions.²⁶

Besides the stories wirelessly sent directly to the news agencies and newspapers, several news items from the Central powers came to the editorial desk rather quickly when the Austro-Hungarian and German embassies released wireless messages which they had received from their foreign offices, but this source of news became unimportant upon Count Bernstorff's noticing the resentment his activities were arousing.²⁷

The far-flung network of Allied propaganda, though largely passed over, did not go entirely unobserved. The Associated Press early called the attention of its readers to British control of the cables and to the rigid censorship being exercised. William Randolph Hearst, who was angered by

the British boycott of the International News Service and by the exclusion of Hearst publications from Canada, advertised the facts to the limit of his ability. The Maine press, moreover, repeatedly emphasized the propaganda character of the atrocity tales which were being circulated, although it was not averse, in times of excitement, to printing those very tales as if they were reliable reports and to including them in general indictments of the Teutonic program.²⁸

Maine's Views on Foreign Policy

The background for Maine's approach to the war was a through-and-through Republican outlook on national and foreign affairs. The state was hostile to organized labor, favored high tariffs, and thought in narrow, regional terms. It favored Republicans for state and national offices, and it blamed Wilson for the 1914 business recession. But as in the nation as a whole, this traditional Republicanism was tintured in 1914 with a sort of liberalism that expressed itself in attacks on the trusts, on finance, and on the munitions makers, who were actually accused on one occasion of trying to prevent America's entry into the war. It permitted vigorous advocacy of women's suffrage. It even allowed praise of Judge Ben Lindsey and condemnation of Rockefeller and Hearst.²⁹

In matters of foreign policy, too, Maine observed party lines closely, but in this connection the state's Republicanism was tintured more with ignorance than with liberalism. It had little conception of America's European, Asiatic, and Latin American policies, and when the war began it gasped momentarily in dazed bewilderment. Then it crawled back into its shell of indifference. Samuel Untermeyer, the New York lawyer who spoke throughout Maine in 1916 in behalf of the Democratic ticket, described the attitude of Maine citizens at that time in part as follows:

They appear to know little about our foreign policy and to care less just now. . . . I was dining with two apparently very intelligent men here last evening. They were both fully informed on local issues. One was on a speaking tour, but had no conception of any phase of the Mexican or European question. The other summed up the situation by saying that 'Our people down here don't think they ought to take any backwater from them damned Mexicans,' and that was all he knew about Mexico.³⁰

Imperialistic Tendencies

To the extent that opinion was crystallized on questions of foreign policy, however, Maine tended to be slightly imperialistic. The nations to the south of the United States, to which much attention was given throughout the World War, as in all times of crisis, were regarded as racially, culturally, politically, socially, and commercially inferior, if not barbarous. To quote the *Bangor Daily News* of December 23, 1915, “a plain Yankee who [knew] little about our Latin neighbors . . . [thought of South America] vaguely as given over to Indians and ‘greasers’ and actuated mainly by the spirit of revolution.”³¹ Of the Mexicans, Maine had an even worse opinion, owing in part to the turmoil prevailing there during most of the Wilson administration. That more than 80 percent of the Mexican people were Indians of primitive stock was pointed out by the *Lewiston Evening Journal*, which went on to say:

The Indian is shiftless and lazy. He does not want land and would not cultivate it even tho it was (sic) given as a present. he herds with his class in villages and studiously avoids anything that even savors of work. Instead of a land problem it is an Indian problem. The knowledge of this fact also disposes of another fallacy. Mexico is generally spoken of as a Latin country; but Indians have no Latin blood. True, the ruling classes are of Spanish blood, but their number is comparatively small. The native Mexican is much like our western Indian, treacherous, lazy and opposed to everything pertaining to modern civilization. In view of this fact, the difficulty of framing and sustaining a republic may easily be seen. The men of Castilian blood are intelligent, energetic and haughty, but they are in a small minority. They are the only ones fit to rule; but with such a mass of ignorant native Indian revolutions are easily started. . . . To expect such a people to maintain a republic is an act of folly of which we should not be guilty.³²


Maine therefore disapproved of Wilson’s refusal to support Huerta’s *de facto* government against the Constitutionalists. The state was not interested in democracy for Mexico, or in freedom and independence for Mexico; it wanted a strong-man government that would be able to maintain order and deal in a responsible manner with the United States. Yet there was confusion confounded with regard to the nation’s Mexican policy both in Maine and in Washington. The *News* observed, with reference to the Vera Cruz incident, that a people the United States formerly had reviled because they submitted to the Diaz dictatorship, it now was trying to sub-

jugate because they were waging a struggle, ostensibly at least, for civil liberty and self-government. "It is strange doctrine that our American conquerors are teaching," said the *News*, "an amazing repudiation of American principles."³³ Yet this same paper two years later was to remark:

The Mexican . . . lacks the instinct for self-government. . . . He lacks even a tradition of political responsibility. . . . He lacks training, because never . . . has he been treated as a citizen. . . . So Mexico, with the props of absolutism removed, sinks into anarchy. Her government doesn't fit her people, and her people don't know how to frame a government that would fit them.³⁴

Sentiment for intervening in Mexico grew rapidly. Even the *News*, which had roundly denounced Hearst for seeking to stir up war and had attributed his inflammatory articles to selfish motives, executed a complete about face. Although on June 8, 1914, it had said: "There will be no war with Mexico, as much as Mr. William R. Hearst of New York, Hon. John E. McLain and General Otis of Los Angeles, Cal., may desire rapine and bloodshed," by June 8, 1915, one year later to a day, it did not hedge about declaring: "If everything else fails, there remains the final resort of armed intervention." Throughout the World War years, except when the nation was being stirred to patriotic support of Wilson, Maine newspapers condemned his policy of "watchful waiting." They wanted firm and decisive action. But they did not desire the annexation of Mexican territory; nor did they desire unilateral action if the leading South American countries would agree to cooperate with the United States in settling the Mexican difficulties.³⁵

Toward other neighbors also Maine favored a policy of firmness. When the United States prepared in 1914 for armed interference in Santo Domingo, the *Lewiston Evening Journal* launched into a criticism of the "meaningless [watchful waiting] policy hitherto pursued" and asserted: "Intervention is not attractive to the administration but no other solution is suggested by the American interests whose rights and property in the little republic are being endangered by present conditions." When its sister republic, Haiti, came at last "under the practical receivership of the United States," the *Journal* described the development as a triumph for dollar diplomacy, but insisted in spite of this that the new situation was better than the old. A similar arrangement in Santo Domingo had been working well, the *Journal* declared. And when Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan sought senate approval of a treaty which provided, in part, for an apology and payment of \$25,000,000 to Colombia for Theodore Roo-



sevelt's rather inconsiderate treatment of that nation, Maine rose in righteous indignation and denounced the gesture as a "wholly unwarranted act of national abasement." With complete consistency, too, the state demanded the maintenance of a firm hold on the Philippines.³⁶

Counter-Imperialistic Tendencies

Yet Maine was not entirely dominated by nationalism. It was not given over to hysterical flag waving and jingoistic heroics. Far from it. Had not the revered school textbook of the Yankee's childhood, Haven's *Moral Philosophy*, taught him that a good man's first duty was to God? Had he not learned that his duty to his country was only second, with that to his family trailing behind? Certainly he was patriotic, but more important, he was Christian, and he knew, for instance, that "a cultured and Christian civilization [did] not consider the display of our glorious emblem in 'good form' on the Holy Sabbath."³⁷

Not being fanatically nationalistic, the Maine Yankee in 1914 and

early 1915 also was not militaristic. He knew vaguely that the United States had not fought a major power since the War of 1812, that it had not been in danger of invasion at any time in the decades following, that it had never been embroiled with Germany, France, or Russia, that diplomacy had sufficed to settle the Venezuela controversy, and that its foreign wars of the past century had "consisted of two conflicts with Mexico and a war with a third-rate European power." A week prior to the fatal war crisis he still could see no danger of war which would justify a large army and navy. Not that he was opposed to preparedness, of course; not that *he*, of all persons, was pacifistic. Rather, he was for a military establishment "adequate" for the national needs; he was for that "strength [which] insures peace"; and when the United States that winter obtained the army reserve which military strategists had long demanded, he was glad. But he was wary of the jingoes. He looked upon a proposed bill to give military training to all males above ten in school, college, or seminary as an idiotic aping of "the folly that has ruined Europe." He regarded most articles on America's "unpreparedness" as "too silly for serious consideration." He frowned on efforts to "magnify force at the expense of justice," to "glorify military autocracy at the expense of democracy." Most unequivocally, he was against scrapping non-military traditions for the extreme chauvinism of Europe.³⁸

While the pacifist of this preparedness-pacifist attitude could not survive the shocks of Germany's recurrent submarine campaigns, it died hard. The *Lusitania* disaster was electric in its effect, but in itself it was not sufficient to change attitudes which had hardened through the years. Preparedness editorials appeared by the dozen. The *Lewiston Evening Journal* interrupted an anti-war campaign to say it wanted one hundred more submarines in a hurry. Yet there was no desire for endless, hysterical military preparations. The *Journal* said Colonel Roosevelt was "as unsound on 'preparedness' as he is generally sound on social and real community interests," and would only recommend "a thousand protective submarines." Most of the other Maine dailies wanted more preparedness, but none made extreme demands.³⁹

In October, after excitement over the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* sinkings had diminished, the Maine Federation of Women's Clubs, at the final session of its annual convention, refused to endorse a resolution recommending "through preparedness for national defense." Two months later the State Grange gave an even better indication of what the *Portland Express-Advertiser* called "anti-preparedness" ideas by adopting, with but few dissenting votes, a resolution against compulsory military training in the col-

leges and against any military training in the high schools. Within another month Payson Smith, state superintendent of education, told a convention of the Cumberland County Teachers' Association that he was opposed to military training in high schools and grammar schools, not because he was against preparedness, but only because it would overburden the schools.⁴⁰

While these resolutions and speeches demonstrated Maine's opposition to militarism, they also were an indication of the extent to which the state and nation were preoccupied with the question of national defense. This deduction is confirmed by reference to the editorial columns. Throughout these months innumerable editorials appeared which advocated preparedness—but not “excessive” preparedness. Most opposed to the extensive strengthening of America's forces were those of the wavering *Lewiston Evening Journal* and the *Lewiston Sun*. Most vigorous in support of such action were the two Portland dailies. The newspapers as a whole, however, recommended enlarging both army and navy, but expressly opposed a tremendous standing army and a navy as large as that of Great Britain.⁴¹

As the weeks passed by, preparedness sentiment grew. On March 11, 1916, the *Literary Digest*, which had conducted a nation wide press poll, reported that five out of six Maine journals could “see no danger of militarism in increasing our Army and Navy for adequate defense,” and that the *Portland Express-Advertiser*, the *Bath Times*, the *Biddeford Journal*, the *Portland Daily Press*, and the *Auburn Free Press* all proposed elaborate programs for increasing America's military forces. Only the *Skowhegan Independent Reporter* thought the nation's authorized strength sufficient for a standing army, and even that organ wanted it supplemented by “at least a million men of the citizen-soldier type” and a navy “just large enough to protect continental United States, including the Panama Canal and Alaska.” The *Lewiston Evening Journal*, too, spoke up for greatly increased military strength, although it continued to oppose all suggestions for universal military training. The *Express-Advertiser* and *Bath Times* were firmly in favor of such training. By January 15, 1917—that is, just before announcement of the submarine campaign which drew the United States into war—the *News* noted that universal military training was “coming to be generally accepted [as a] . . . necessary evil.” Militarism has arrived.⁴²

This opposition to militarism during most of the war years was not the only anti-imperialist tendency observable in Maine. Equally significant was a belief that the Monroe Doctrine should be converted into a pan-American doctrine. The proper method of dealing with the Mexican Civil War was to refer the problem to the major nations of the Western Hemi-

sphere, many Maine citizens believed. The proper method of insuring Colombia's neutrality during the war was by joint action with, say, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Let there be a pan-American protectorate over disorderly countries such as Mexico and Haiti, and let the United States resort to unilateral action only if the other nations refused to cooperate.⁴³

As the war progressed and the United States became more and more apprehensive, Maine showed increasing concern for the successful development of pan-Americanism. Maine citizens wanted a solid block of twenty-one American republics to stand athwart the ambitious path being blazed by German militarism. And when it became apparent America was going to enter the war, they cast their eyes anxiously southward suddenly decided that the United States should be generous with Colombia, and found ground for declaring that "German aggression [was] forging the new weapon of Pan-Americanism and turning it against herself." The United States, seemingly, must man this weapon.⁴⁴

But all Maine citizens did not stop there. Many, looking beyond pan-Americanism, saw a vision of internationalism, saw a Hague Court that was "a fact instead of a sentiment." Rather than a police force only for the Americas, they envisioned a police force for the world. Rather than war by the United States over the *Lusitania*, they wanted united action by all neutrals. Some went so far as to suggest that the Monroe Doctrine be scrapped, because it was inconsistent with America's role as a world power. Most citizens, however, clung to this instrument while at the same time approving programs for international action such as that advocated by the League of Nations to Enforce Peace.⁴⁵

Maine was moved, then, by conflicting forces: imperialism, pan-Americanism, internationalism, and the desire for moderate military strength. The dominant attitude, apparently, was slightly imperialistic, even among those most ardently in favor of pan-Americanism; for implicit in this developing doctrine was the conviction that the United States would dominate any pan-American organization that might be set up. Why, otherwise, should the South American nations refuse to join the United States in restoring order in Mexico? Quite another matter was the advocacy of internationalism. To the extent that Maine citizens sincerely wanted an effective Hague Court they were anti-imperialistic, but there was room to suspect that in any conflict between internationalism and the Monroe Doctrine, most of them would favor the traditional American policy. The widespread opposition in the state to any suggestion of militarism, until war was imminent, likewise is a sign of pacific intentions—toward the major powers. Whether it betokened similar intentions toward all of America's weak neighbors is open to doubt.⁴⁶

Reaction to the War

The Maine Yankee approached the summer of 1914 with only one serious problem worrying him—the business recession. True, the Mexicans were engaged in their usual civil war, and were creating difficulties in Texas and California, but this did not disturb him greatly, except perhaps, to arouse his imperialist tendencies. As for other foreign nations, so far as he knew, they were proceeding in their normal course. The British were having their usual set-to with Irish rebels and were rehashing the question of home rule. The suffragists were continuing unabated their agitation at home and abroad. The French were experiencing one of their periodic scandals, which made excellent reading.

Then at the end of June some duke or archduke or prince—or something of that sort—was assassinated, but who cared to read about that when Madame Caillaux's assassination of a Paris newspaper editor had made so much more exciting a story? And the news of anti-Serbian riots was stale stuff anyway. When weren't the Balkans and Austria having riots?

During most of July the foreign news continued to revolve mainly about the Mexican imbroglio and Irish home rule and, later, madame Caillaux's trial. On July 25, however, following the dispatch of Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the European crisis hit the front page with a bang, competing with stories about fighting in the streets of Dublin and juicy developments in the Caillaux scandal. In the *Portland Express-Advertiser*, *Lewiston Evening Journal*, *Bangor Daily News*, *Bangor Daily Commercial*, and *Daily Kennebec Journal* it was the lead story. The *Portland Daily Press* still considered Ulster developments of greater news value. From then on the larger crisis held the spotlight.

Optimism as War Comes

Yet Maine was not unduly perturbed. It had already made up its mind that large scale warfare was impossible in that day and age. The *News* on March 2 had expressed confidence that Andrew Carnegie's \$2,000,000 peace fund would "bring society rich returns." One month later the *Express-Advertiser* had criticized a proposal to neutralize the spas on the ground that "the international conflict of which Dr. Kisch speaks does not seem to be imminent, and the spas may be immune from hostile operations for some time to come." Archduke Ferdinand's assassination obviously had not been considered any cause for alarm, and the average citizen of Maine had joined the *Lewiston Evening Journal* in questioning "whether

any of the great rulers of the world could summon his own subjects to the field of battle in an unjust war." Had not "twelve million socialists in the civilized world . . . arrayed themselves in hostility to war?" Had not international conflict become so costly that the bankers of the world "would refuse to again finance an unjust war?" Had not the one Penn or Fox of a century and a half before been replaced by "a score of men like Rothschild and Carnegie," around whom was encamped a mighty peace army? And finally, had not war become a luxury which "only the peasant state [could] any longer afford?"⁴⁷

So Maine looked upon the developing war crisis with relative complacency. "You may impede and clog the march of universal democracy for days or centuries," opined the *Bangor Daily News* as late as July 30, "but never since Christ was born in the Manger was the outlook for the universal brotherhood of man brighter than it is today." Remarkd the *Portland Express-Advertiser* on the next day: "It is still unthinkable that five great countries of the world will cut their own throats in a cosmic catastrophe such as is threatened. The cost would be too colossally large. They will not dare to incur such a disaster, greater than anything in history." This optimism, and even more, Maine's ignorance of Europe, was underlined in the *News*, the *Express-Advertiser*, and especially the *Daily Kennebec Journal* by an amazing sparsity of editorial comment on the crisis. Even weeks after the hostilities had begun, perusal of the *Kennebec Journal's* editorial columns would hardly have betrayed the fact.⁴⁸

Somewhat more consciousness of world events was shown by the *Bangor Daily Commercial* and *Portland Daily Press*, both of which discussed the war at some length from the very beginning and were not so slow as their competitors in grasping the serious implications of what the *News* even on August 5 was calling a "war scare." The *Journal*, too, showed a solid grasp of the situation and in its very first editorial on the crisis, which did not appear until July 29, foretold a "universal" war if Germany acted with Austria.⁴⁹

Even after the major powers had entered the war, Maine retained much of its optimism. Perhaps it had been wrong in believing that war could not come, but certainly there was no questioning that it would not be prolonged. Modern warfare was too intense to be waged for very long. There was now "more fighting in a week than there used to be in a year." Even when the newspapers on occasion said the war would not be short, they did not indicate precisely what they meant and seemingly did not have in mind a war that would last as long as the World War actually did last.⁵⁰

Spontaneous Pro-Allied Reaction

Maine's first reaction to the shot which generated the war was one of sympathy for the aged Franz Joseph. "One after another of his own household have either committed suicide or been stricken down by the blow of an assassin until he sits, like another Niobe, desolate and alone," said the *Journal* with all the pathos it could muster. Similarly, the *News* expressed hope that the sentiment of pity would someday cause assassinations to cease, and went so far, indeed, as to suggest the tragedy was a sign of too much democracy.⁵¹

But no sooner had it become evident that war was coming than sentiment changed. While Serbia continued at first to receive little sympathy, Austria-Hungary obtained still less. Franz Joseph changed, in the eyes of the *Journal*, from "another Niobe" into an "Austrian despot," and it accused him of seeking "to dominate the Balkan peninsula" even if to do so meant bringing on a "conflict that [would] stagger humanity." The *Kennebec Journal* broke its long silence on the explosion to assert that Austria had been "watching for an excuse upon which to sweep down and obliterate" Serbia. The *Commercial* spoke forth similarly. To the *News* the spectacle of "small and weak Serbia defying the might of aged and haughty Austria" stood forth as an inspiring incident in the battle between right and wrong and in the spread of the new democracy it had so recently called into question.⁵²

The chief responsibility for the spreading holocaust, however, was laid at the door, not of feeble Franz Joseph, but of powerful Kaiser Wilhelm. In the very editorial in which it attacked Austria's aims, the *Journal* pointed out that Germany held the key to world war, said Kaiser Wilhelm long had believed it would eventually come, and declared that if he thought the moment propitious he would "doubtless precipitate the conflict" in spite of all diplomatic moves. A few weeks later on its front-page cartoons was to show the woman "Civilization," being trod underfoot by the soldier, "Germany," as he sought to grab the globe, which was revolving just beyond his outstretched arm. This conception of the war was the one held by the average Maine Yankee from the very outset.⁵³

Background for Anti-Germanism

It was a conception which could not be attributed to propaganda, for it reigned supreme in Maine before any of the propaganda machines had

begun to operate. Neither could it be attributed to England's cutting of the German cable, since England did not enter the war until after Maine's pro-Allied bias had already forcefully expressed itself. Primarily it was the product of a predisposition to oppose Germany, for Maine in 1914 frowned upon Germany's autocratic institutions, disliked her vaunted militarism, and coupled her with Japan as a potential enemy of the United States.⁵⁴

The background for this hostility lies in the story of German-American relations which for nearly half a century had been marked chiefly by "mutual misunderstanding," caused by the clash of German and American economic imperialism. While all the minor incidents in the clash were not known to the average Maine citizen, they had nevertheless given him, in the course of time, a deep distrust of the German empire. And then, too, he was vaguely aware of a few of the more recent and more important incidents between the two powers, especially of the quarrel between Admiral Dewey and Vice-Admiral von Diederichs at Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War. Stories on the argument were still appearing in the newspapers, and proud veterans of the brief war probably were giving it even wider verbal circulation. The bombardment of Fort San Carlos in 1903 in connection with British-German-Italian pressure on Venezuela also had taken place recently enough for those fairly well posted on national and world affairs to remember it as another count against Germany. In the years immediately preceding the war, it is true, relations had improved, largely because of the Kaiser's efforts, but not sufficiently to remove the fundamental distrust of German motives which earlier relations and German militarism had instilled.⁵⁵

Ties with the Allied Powers

Toward the British and French, on the contrary, there was a feeling of friendship. England had given the United States moral support in the Spanish-American War, had quickly deferred to the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan dispute, and in turn had received the assistance of the United States in her far eastern diplomacy. During Theodore Roosevelt's administration, in fact, relations had become so cordial that it seemed almost as if no jolts could altogether upset them. France likewise had avoided friction with the United States; and ever since Germany in 1870 had imposed on her what to American eyes was an unjust indemnity, and ever since the humiliated nation had set up the Third Republic, American sentiment had been overwhelmingly favorable to her. Toward Russia and

Japan Americans were not so favorably disposed, but these powers were not sufficiently heavy a liability to destroy the nation's pro-Allied bias. Moreover, France and England, in the popular mind, were the Allied nations that figured most prominently in the war.⁵⁶

Another reason for Maine's spontaneous pro-Allied reaction was its cultural, social, and political affinity with France. One of the most pathetic phases of the war, as Maine saw it, was the damage it was causing French culture. "Think of all these educated Frenchmen of great talent whose lives will be wiped out, who will fall in their tracks as wheat before the reaper," mourned the *Express-Advertiser* in discussing the enlistment of authors, painters, and sculptors. "Think of the value their talent is to the world, to its refinement, to the development of higher instincts in its people." Socially, Americans had mingled with the French to a considerable extent, had visited France in large numbers, had participated in their numerous functions. Politically, they felt a kinship which went back to the days of Lafayette; and the *News* expressed a common sentiment when it spoke of the Statue of Liberty as representing "the plain people of the two freest nations on earth."⁵⁷

When England entered the war, these factors, as well as ties of language, blood, and commerce, entered the picture even more prominently. "I have never, during the whole of the eight years of my official activities in Washington, met one Secretary of State who had mastered any other language than English," observed Count Bernstorff a few years after the war. It was natural, therefore, that Americans should be well read in the works of English immortals, of Shakespeare and Shaw, of Dickens and Thackeray. Moreover, their social relations with the British were close, they had the same basic political institutions, and they recognized that America's prosperity was dependent on the continuance of trade with the British empire. Fully as important as any of these factors, however, was the consciousness of a common racial descent. Anglo-Saxons are not obsessed with the same exaggerated race pride as that of the Teutons, but nevertheless they do possess a definite sense of racial unity. Hyphenated Americanism during the World War, therefore, was not restricted to the Germans. This was demonstrated with particular force in 1914 by a short *Bangor Daily News* editorial which is worth quoting in its entirety.⁵⁸ It follows:

Anglo-Saxon to Win: It would certainly be a world-crime, if not a universe-crime, to see the present cruel and senseless European war end in six weeks or in six years from now in the practical extinction of the



Rockland, Maine, actress Maxine Elliot (1868–1940) engaged in refugee relief work in Belgium, c. 1915. Photograph by John R. Freeman & Co. *Diana Forbes-Robertson Collection*. Image courtesy of Special Collections, Raymond H. Fogler Library DigitalCommons@UMaine, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/spec_photos/189, accessed 15 June 2018.

Anglo-Saxon race from this earth. . . . Civilization has too much at stake. The Anglo-Saxon race is OUR race. The blood which flowed in the veins of Richard the Lion Hearted; also the blood which flowed in the veins of William Shakespeare; it was intensified, and not cooled a particle by the admixture of Norman blood. The Plantagenet race is the inheritor of fame. The English race is the dominant race on two hemispheres. The mere suggestion that the English-speaking race shall EVER PERISH from earth is far too horrible for modern civilization to contemplate.⁵⁹

The existence of this feeling is rendered understandable by noting the astounding proportion of Maine residents who were born in the British empire or were born of parents who were born there. Of Maine's population, 30 percent consisted of persons of foreign birth or foreign parentage, and of this group Canada alone had contributed nearly 70 percent, 30.8 percent being French Canadians and 37 percent of other Canadian stock.

England herself had contributed more than 5 percent. The two other members of the Triple Entente, Russia and France, had together contributed only a little above 3 percent. On the other side of the ledger was Germany with only 1.3 percent to her credit and Austria-Hungary with only .6 percent. The situation can be grasped quickly by glancing at the accompanying chart, based on figures in the 1910 Census.

One of the most interesting facts brought forth in this chart is the heavy Irish representation—more than 10 percent—in Maine's foreign population; for it explains the principle source of such pro-German sentiment as did manifest itself in Maine. This is not to say that the Irish as a group favored the Central powers but only that a heavy proportion did so. It can be safely said, at any rate, that there were more anti-British, pro-German Irish in Maine than there were German and Austrian residents. But obviously they could not swim successfully against a current caused, in part, by the presence of so many Canadians, English, and Russians.⁶⁰

Reaction to Attack on Belgium

This current underwent terrific acceleration when Germany boldly violated Belgian neutrality. The American is essentially sentimental and tends to side with the underdog. Nothing will win his sympathy quicker than the spectacle of a nation fighting bravely a battle she knows she must lose. When Belgium offered stiff resistance to the powerful German military machine, American sympathy and moral support at once radiated to her. Maine newspapers wrote eloquent eulogies, retold many of the more gripping atrocity stories, and rushed into the campaign for sending of American aid to the afflicted nation. Even the governor appealed for contributions for Belgian relief, and act by which, according to the *News*, he placed himself "on record as among the Christian rulers of America."⁶¹

The negative reaction to the invasion was still more powerful. The Kaiser was unrestrainedly attacked and the humbling of Germany vigorously demanded. The *Journal* looked forward to a German attack on America if the Allies lost, warned the people to prepare to meet the "oncoming hosts," and accused the Kaiser of having deliberately brought on the war in order to become "the undisputed master of the world." A peace that would leave him any power to fight again was unthinkable. The *Daily Press* righteously declared, with reference to reports that he was about to make a peace offer, that "of course" there must be an indemnity for the destruction in France and Belgium plus the return of Alsace-Lorraine,

and then added: "but are they all that the Allies would demand and are they all they should demand?" For certainly the Allies could not afford "to accept territorial concessions or a money indemnity and give Germany a chance to recuperate from the disaster." At the very least, the Kaiser must be shorn of all dangerous powers. It is little wonder, then, that the *Literary Digest*, in its poll of November, 1914, to determine American sympathies in the war, found Maine "almost entirely in favor of the Allies." American ties with England and France, pre-war friction with Germany, the attack on Belgium, the immediate successes and evident preparation of the Central powers, the saber-rattling, militaristic traditions of Germany made this inevitable.⁶²

For Strict Neutrality

However pronounced might be their sympathies, the people of Maine wanted none of the European war and breathed satisfaction at America's geographic isolation. A cartoon in the *Lewiston Evening Journal* two days before the appearance of its first editorial on the crisis described accurately what seemed to be the state's attitude during the succeeding weeks. Entitled "Some Relief," the cartoon showed Uncle Sam, who had been observing the war clouds hanging heavy over Europe, looking back over his shoulder and remarking, with a smile, "Seems good to be just a bystander." Other Maine papers soon thought so too, and they warned those who might be otherwise inclined, to let America *remain* a bystander. They were confident she could, with the aid of geography, democratic institutions, and the Monroe Doctrine. "The swell from the great battleship, 'Europe,' will be felt," said the *News*. "But it will not hurt us. It need not even break over the sides. There's nothing the matter with the boat that we are in. Straight and strong, well-seamed, well-caulked, well-timbered, with reasonable guidance it will bear us safely and prosperously through."⁶³

Concern for International Law

With reasonable guidance? What, perchance, might that be? Manifestly it meant first of all a policy of strict neutrality, of close adherence to international law. That, of course, raised another question. What was international law? No one could answer with finality. Did it permit the submarine type of warfare, the blacklisting of neutral firms, the use of poison

gas, the bombing of London? Did it permit neutrals to make war loans, to transfer the registry of foreign ships, to sell supplies and munitions to belligerents if only one side could obtain them? The newspapers speculated, pressure groups argued, and international law experts gave conflicting views at great length. A people that had been indifferent to happenings abroad and had given little attention to such nonsense as rules of warfare now found itself confronted with an intricate problem that was to occupy its attention much of the time throughout the war years.

Maine newspapers speculated on the problem along with the rest of the nation, showing considerable disagreement on some points of policy, considerable unity on others. On the question of war loans they tended to hedge. They did not care to express themselves in favor of such loans, but on the other hand were not definitely opposed to them. To illustrate, the *Bangor Daily News* in October, 1914, praised the State Department's disapproval of war loans by American bankers, saying the United States should "not contribute a penny to help fight foreign battles," then in November supported the government's policy of permitting the extension of credits to belligerents, even if used in part "to pay for munitions of war."⁶⁴

The argument over transfer of German ships to American registry saw Maine considerably divided. The *News* was firmly in favor of such transfers, looking upon them as a legitimate means of increasing American commerce. The *Daily Kennebec Journal* and the *Portland Daily Press*, on the other hand, were just as decidedly opposed to them—because they would menace "the peace of the nation" and would "practically subsidize foreign shipping." On the whole, the issue received much more attention and aroused much more argument than did the question of war loans.⁶⁵

Of all the positive policies followed by the government, the most hotly debated in the nation as a whole and the most vigorously and unitedly supported in Maine was that of selling supplies and munitions to whatsoever nation cared to purchase them. This policy was based on precedents dating back a hundred years, and Maine's editors thought that any reversal of it while a war was in progress might be considered an unneutral act by the adversely affected powers. These, of course, would be the Allies, whose control of the seas enabled them to obtain enormous supplies and at the same time prevent shipments to Germany. It was therefore natural that Germany should protest American sales; but her protests found no response in the Maine breast. Maine was convinced that international law both permitted and required the selling of supplies and, in addition, was actively interested in the United States doing whatever it could within the limits of neutrality to help the Allied cause. Noting that Germany was

"the one nation that 'got good and ready' for hell," the *Journal* reasoned: "It follows that it is the bounden duty of the United States to exercise its rights to the utmost as a neutral, to sell to all comers . . . Kaiserism cannot be arrested without giant powder." Other Maine newspapers reasoned in precisely the same manner.⁶⁶

Nor did Maine consider it unneutral for the United States to protest the deportation of Belgian workmen to Germany, which had aroused hot indignation throughout the Pine Tree State. More than that, stretching the concept of neutrality to its uttermost limits, the newspapers demanded continued insistence on the point and clamored for protests on other activities of the Central power which did not impinge directly on the interest of the United States. Long before the deportations were undertaken, the Maine press called for protests on the invasion of Belgium and on the gruesome atrocities allegedly committed there. Protests over the Turkish massacre of Armenians were also considered in order, and the *Journal* recommended the United States emphasize its disapproval by recalling the ambassadors to Turkey and Germany. Yet when the Allies violated the neutrality of Greece little reason for an American protest was perceived.⁶⁷

Criticism of Unneutral Acts of Pro-Germans

Although pleased at the great distance which separated the United States from Europe and opposed to any clear forsaking of American neutrality, Maine did not ignore the difficulties of escaping entanglement. Many shoals clearly were in the course which the ship of state must ply, and not the least of these were the bitterly partisan groups in the United States. The activities of the pro-Allied groups, of course, were directed toward maintaining uninterrupted the flow of American supplies and munitions, which were so valuable to the successful prosecution of the Allied campaigns. Later, too, they sought to bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. The pro-German groups, on the other hand, wanted to curtail the flow of supplies and to prevent American entry into the war.

But it was the pro-Germans who were attacked for attempting to compromise American neutrality. Pro-Allied activities were largely passed over. The reasons for this were quite obvious. For one thing, as was brought out in the preceding chapter, Maine was predisposed in favor of the Allies and therefore was prone to overlook pro-Allied activities which, if conducted by pro-German groups, would have aroused a storm. In the second

place, the activities of the pro-German groups immediately hurt American interests. In the third place, their activities assumed a spectacular and violent form.

Remote as Maine was from the center of activities in the United States, it did not escape its share of conspiracy rumors. Excitement ran high in November, 1914, when search was conducted for a hidden wireless station near Bar Harbor allegedly being operated by Germans. It was never discovered and probably never existed. There really was a wireless station at Deering, however, and Maine newspapers displayed headlines about British charges that Germans were using it for purposes of war. Spies were even said to have found their way into the Maine woods, and it was alleged that they were “engaged in making surveys of the country surrounding the different places where they are staying—some of them in the guise of summer tourists.” Most spectacular of all occurrences in Maine, however, was the unsuccessful attempt of Werner Horn, a misguided German patriot, to blow up the international bridge at Vanceboro, over which he thought Canadian supplies were being sent to American ports for shipment to England. It created quite a sensation but was not taken too seriously.⁶⁸

These local incidents served but to increase passions aroused by plots and violence discovered elsewhere in the nation. Pro-Germanism came to be linked with conspiracy and law-breaking. The forging of passports for use by returning German naval reservists and of clearance papers for vessels that allegedly took supplies to German sea raiders was regarded as sinister and heinous. The bombing of American munitions plants was looked upon as an intolerable violation of American laws. And all significant pro-German activities—the outfitting of ships, the fomenting of strikes, the committing of sabotage—were denounced as efforts to destroy American neutrality.⁶⁹

The newspapers of the state definitely associated the German and Austrian governments with these activities and repeatedly demanded that their agents, even their ambassadors, be given their walking papers. The dismissal of Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen was applauded as “a direct rebuke to the militarist statesmen of Berlin who have not scrupled to disregard American sovereignty and ride rough-shod over American rights.” Dismissal of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador was likewise hailed. Towards Count Bernstorff opinion fluctuated. At one moment Maine wanted him sent home forthwith; at the next it exonerated him from most charges. Being the German ambassador, however, whatever his behavior, he was always regarded with some degree of disfavor.⁷⁰

The attitude toward Allied agents was in sharp contrast. The writer,

in all the Maine newspapers that he examined, failed to observe a single attack on a representative of an Allied power. Moreover, the *News*, anticipating charges of discrimination when dismissal of Ambassador Dumba and Dr. Dernburg was followed by that of Boy-Ed and von Papen, took pains to contrast Allied and German activities, declaring flatly that no Allied nations or diplomatic representatives had been found subsidizing disloyalty and crime in the United States.⁷¹

Increase in Nationalism

The charge of attempting to compromise American neutrality was directed not only at government agents; it also was made against an element in the huge German-American population. True, it was offset by frequent editorials which praised Americans of Teutonic origin as loyal citizens of the United States, but there was an underlying suspicion and resentment which flowered into bitter attacks whenever it was scratched even slightly.⁷²

This criticism of the German-Americans was primarily the product of a powerful nationalism which the war stimulated. Unqualified loyalty was demanded of all groups, and an unflagging campaign was waged against hyphenism of every character, whether German-American, Anglo-American, Irish-American, Italian-American, or what not. But throughout the war it was the German-Americans who were considered most guilty of divided allegiance. "The attitude of an element of German-Americans towards the government of the United States is in marked, painful, and even disquieting contrast with the wholehearted allegiance the Germans of 1861 gave to Lincoln," declared the *Journal*. The injudicious satisfaction which some German-Americans expressed over the sinking of the *Lusitania* immediately inflamed anti-German-American passions, and subsequent efforts of certain German-Americans and Irish-Americans to hold the votes of their respective groups over the president and Congress as a club with which to enforce what they considered to be a policy of neutrality were intensely resented. The *News* accused Jeremiah A. O'Leary, head of the American Truth Society, "a professedly neutral, pro-American organization (composed chiefly of Irish-Americans and German-Americans) . . . of introducing an alien issue into American politics, and attaching to one of the great political parties what has become [*sic*] to be known as 'hyphenism.'" Even worse, he dared to boast of it. The Jews, on the contrary, were praised for declaring themselves solidly behind

the government in any national emergency that might arise, an attitude induced in part by the Allied whitewashing of Russia in order to counteract the inclination of anti-Russian Jews to side with the Central powers. "Are the non-Jewish German-Americans prepared to make so straightforward a declaration?" asked the *News*.⁷³

Back of the anti-hyphen campaign was a profound fear that the racial disunity of the United States would seriously divide it in the face of national danger, a fear that Americanism would be sacrificed in the clash between the national groupings within the United States. The attachment of alien groups to a party was dangerous to the nation, the *News* declared with reference to O'Leary's boast. "It means, if it succeeds, the division of the American nation for the first time along alien lines." Let the German-Americans reciprocate the disgust in which their fatherland held them by dropping the hyphen and placing America first, advised the *Daily Press*. And the same kind of advice was addressed, with less vigor, to the other hyphenated Americans.⁷⁴

Placing America first, as Maine saw it, meant keeping out of the war and advancing the cause of general peace by preserving democratic institutions in the Western Hemisphere. "The larger work we have been doing is to have kept intact and in good working order a great space of earth's surface devoted to democratic ideals and to the liberties of men," explained the *Express-Advertiser*. "In that we have performed a less showy but a service comparable in value to the service that England is performing for civilization. We may not be fighting for civilization, but we are living for it and working for it and keeping it alive." Specifically, this meant keeping German submarines out of American ports, letting Great Britain force Ecuador and Colombia to refrain from unneutral acts, exercising close supervision over German wireless stations in the United States, and so forth. It did not imply any move to curtail arms shipments to belligerents nor any hesitancy unofficially to declare American sympathies. Neither did it forbid offers to mediate.⁷⁵

Insistence of Respect for American Rights

If the people of Maine were concerned lest the United States fail to preserve its neutrality, they were much more concerned over its violation by belligerent powers. Violation of federal laws by foreign agents in the United States was serious, but not so serious as the international law violations of the Allied and Central powers which affected the nationals of

neutral states. The United States, as the only major power not involved in the war, naturally was looked upon as the leader of all neutral nations, as the leader among the powers battling for international law, with American neutrality at stake. A typical view was that of the *Lewiston Evening Journal's* cartoonist, who pictured the United States as a prize fighter labelled "Battling Neutrality of the U.S." receiving a hard blow in the face from a gloved hand labelled "Fighting Countries."⁷⁶

Throughout the war there was clamor in Maine over violation of American rights, and insistence that they must be vigorously maintained against both England and Germany—if necessary, with force. "We want peace," declared the *News*. "But 'peace at any price' is a despicable motto. And those who maintain that the United States should yield all its rights at sea without a struggle, if struggle appears to involve the slightest possibility of an ultimate appeal to arms, are preaching a despicable doctrine." The *Daily Press* drove home the point that there are things "worse . . . than war." "We will work and pray for peace but above and beyond that we as a people will seek to maintain the honor of this nation and preserve the freedom for which our fathers paid in their precious blood."⁷⁷

This insistence on respect for American rights was more than a matter of legality and honor and freedom, however; equally, it was a matter of commerce. Maine saw innumerable opportunities for profit from the war which a disregard of international law by the belligerents would curtail or destroy. The United States "must be the great source of the food supply that is to feed the warring nations, whose productivity will be greatly dwarfed," remarked the *Commercial* on August 5, 1914. "Our task is cut out for us and the wheels of industry throughout our borders will hum in a manner never known before." This was precisely what did happen. Wages rose, productivity increased, and the United States undertook to supply Europe with both the weapons of destruction and the means of sustenance. But this trade was subject to the hazards besetting a war-torn world. Huge sections of international law were cast to the wind, and the exporter did not know when his goods left port whether they would arrive finally at the bottom of the ocean, in the hands of a non-purchasing power, or at the place for which intended. It was with good reason, then, that Maine insisted that United States maintain the neutrality without which American industry could not operate at capacity and back up with the threat of force its demands that the belligerents observe at least the undisputed points of international law.⁷⁸

Maine was not slow in perceiving that American prosperity was closely tied to the trade with England. As a result, although the newspa-

pers did denounce the British blacklisting of American firms which did not meet Allied favor and did accuse England of trying to steal American orders and did condemn her extensions of the blockade principle and of the contraband list, they did not manifest the anger towards England which characterized American relations with the Central powers.⁷⁹

One of the most frequently emphasized points in relation to the war and American prosperity, especially in Maine, was the fact it provided American industry with absolute protection. Not only could established American industries formerly unable to compete with foreign producers now might be set up. Moreover, Maine itself, besides deriving benefit indirectly from the general incidence of prosperity in the nation, experienced direct profit from the increased shipping at the port of Portland and from the diversion of tourist trade from Europe to the vacation states, of which Maine was one of the more important.⁸⁰

These opportunities for gain from the war, the threats to them, and the problem of how best to take advantage of every profit-making possibility received as much attention as any other phase of the struggle. Maine gloated at the sight of the United States shifting from the ranks of the debtor to those of the creditor nations, at the development of greater self-sufficiency, at the opportunity of capturing the South American market, and at the necessity of building a large merchant marine. The question of a merchant marine, especially, came in for much attention; and some citizens levelled criticism at Wilson for seeking a government-owned merchant marine, while others criticized the legislators opposing his suggestions, because they were holding up a necessary program.⁸¹

Between the British and German violations of American rights an enormous difference was perceived by all the newspapers in Maine. "The dispute between us and Great Britain is an arbitrable question," said the *Daily Press*, "and if we cannot settle it between us it might easily be referred to an unprejudiced board of arbitrators. But there is no arbitrating the issue with Germany." Great Britain was guilty of "larceny," as the *News* expressed it, but Germany was guilty of outright "murder." A humanitarian issue was involved which made it vital that Germany be taken to task before the United States concerned itself very seriously with any such gross matter as the damage Britain was doing to American commerce. It was the old, but very real, distinction between human and property rights. That was why, when the United States addressed its first protest in the war to the British government, the *Express-Advertiser* voiced regret it had not been over something more glorious than trade: "a word of warning could as well have been addressed to Germany on the subject of sowing floating

mines, on the bombardment of unfortified towns, and on the destruction of monuments of religion and of art." This was even before the submarine issue had arisen to plague the administration. When it had arisen, it became the duty of the American government to protect first the lives of its citizens, secondarily their property.⁸²

Fluctuations in Anti-German Temper

No people is capable of sustained tension or emotion. The violent anti-German reaction to the opening of hostilities, while it was immediately intensified by the drive into Belgium, soon spent itself and gave rise to a deep skepticism that engulfed Allied accounts of the war. Attacks on Central powers largely disappeared. Atrocity stories frequently were dismissed as "bogie" stories.⁸³ In addition, the German case was examined, German merits were recalled, and Allied faults were uncovered. This development was illustrated graphically by the following *Bangor Daily News* editorial, quoted in full:

Germany is Calm: America does not take kindly to militarism, Prussianism or any of the relics of the Dark Ages which seem to have drawn what is otherwise the most progressive, finely cultured nation of Europe into the black disaster of war. That is only natural. Our whole inheritance is against it. We stand with Schiller, Goethe, Beethoven; not with Von Kluk [*sic*] and Prince Frederick William. . . . But have we given Germany the benefit of the doubt? Have we believed the best of the great poets, philosophers and musicians of the 19th century? It is only now that sober second thought is beginning to draw from our minds the animus that was natural to the first news of war. We are beginning to contrast the different spirits in which the combatants have undertaken the struggle. We are learning more and more of the petty hysteria that flooded England and France with confusion worse confounded. We are discovering from returned tourists that it did not extend to Germany. It does much to bring back sanity when we learn that Berlin proceeds on almost its normal course, with theatres open, trams running. We must at least respect such signs of civilization in the face of world-wide vituperation and hysteria.⁸⁴

One Maine newspaper on one occasion actually said England was much more dangerous to the United States than Germany, "because of her alliance with Japan and the determination of these two nations to con-

trol the trade of the East.” However their military class might feel, the Germans were not unfriendly to the United States and had much in common with the American people. Following the war, they would assert themselves, demand a greater share in the government, prove that Germany was not hostile to democracies such as the United States, and prevent the following up of a possible German victory with world conquest. “No military class will ever be able to again involve them in conflict because they will have paid too dearly for the mistakes which have already been made.”⁸⁵

Contributing to this change in sentiment were the British blockade and German-American charges of unfairness. Desirous of profiting to the full from the war and of seeing a large American merchant marine, Maine could not but resent any unreasonable trade restrictions. As these multiplied during the winter, resentment increased. Moreover, the newspapers, being acutely conscious of the one-sidedness of war news, could not avoid being touched to the quick by German charges of prejudice and within a few months were bending over backwards, editorially, to achieve impartiality. “Opinion here is still decidedly friendly,” wrote Wilson to House on February 20, “but a tone of great uneasiness is distinctly audible.” The same might have been said of Maine.⁸⁶

Concomitantly with this reduction in the anti-German temper of the people came a growing indifference to the war. Unending newspaper streamers had inured Maine to the news of death and destruction and horror 3,000 miles removed. In September only the state elections and in October only the World Series had been able to displace the war from the leading position on the front page, but by December 1, the *Portland Daily Press* was editorializing:

How little while it takes to get used to a thing! When this war was first declared a little over four months ago, the dispatches concerning it covered the first page of every newspaper in the country and the Associated Press and other news agencies were carrying very little else. Now each paper has its war news on the front page of course, but it has lots of other things there and frequently matters given much great display.⁸⁷

By the end of March a positive sense of boredom had set in. The *Lewiston Evening Journal*, in one of its eloquent front-page cartoons, headed, “It’s All in Getting Used to a Thing!” showed the globe yawning before a bulletin board listing enormous war casualties and remarking, “Ho hum! I’ll be glad when the baseball season opens and something is

doing." A month later another cartoon depicted two "ex-war fans" proceeding down the street absorbed in a discussion of major league baseball, with Miss "European War" exclaiming, after they had passed by, "they never saw me a tall." It was natural, then, that the front-page space devoted to the war by the nation's leading newspaper, the *New York Times*, should sink from a majority of the columns in the fall of 1914 to a minority in January, 1915, and should only achieve parity in the next three months.⁸⁸

The *Lusitania* Crisis

During the second week of May the situation changed. The evening newspapers on Friday, May 7, brought the first news of the torpedoing of the giant British liner *Lusitania* with a loss of 1,198 lives, including those of noted Americans, and for several days following, baseball, politics, and other domestic affairs with which the Pine Tree State had been concerned were forgotten. Editorial writers shifted the spotlight from the glories of spring to the Teutonic villain who had rushed onto the stage. Make-up editors searched for their largest type. No longer was Uncle Sam a grinning spectator or Miss "European War" passed by with indifference. No longer were signs of civilization observed in Germany that required due respect, for sober second thought had been overwhelmed in a crushing disaster that called forth the most powerful epithets discoverable in the lofty editorial sanctum. Said the *Express-Advertiser* on May 8: "German authorities may have inherited from the Vandals their forebears, the spirit which devised the policy that involves atrocities of which the sinking of the *Lusitania* is but one. While that policy is not likely to affect materially the result of the war, it must place 'Germanism' in the vocabulary of all civilized peoples to vie through all the years to come with 'Vandalism' as describing practices which enlightened everywhere must abhor." The attempt of German sympathizers to minimize German guilt by referring to the warning Count Bernstorff had advertised just prior to the *Lusitania's* sailing served but to change anger into madness. "That warning in and of itself was but the insult preceding the injury it predicted," declared the *Express-Advertiser*. "That 'warning' was on a par with other acts that illustrate the contempt in which Germany holds the rights of neutrals. It tends to show how unbearable would be her arrogance should she win in the war she has so ruthlessly forced upon the world." The *Kennebec Journal*, too, at once saw the tragedy as one that would "go farther to convince the whole world that German domination of the world would be relentless, than have all previous acts of war."⁸⁹

Publication of a report on German atrocities submitted by James Bryce, noted British authority on American politics, and six other prominent men, at the height of this excitement was a masterstroke by the British government. The *News*, which had been comparing German cunning with that of the devil, passed a typical judgment on the report: "The character of James Bryce lends authority to this record." No talk of taking the stories with a grain of salt was to be heard, for whatever Lord Bryce's prestige in the United States, these stories fitted in perfectly with the exaggerated views to which the *Lusitania* sinking had given rise.⁹⁰

But however intense might be Maine's anger over the torpedoing, it did not want the United States to rush into the war because of it. Just as throughout the nation only a few newspapers declared themselves for war immediately after the disaster, so in Maine only a few groups might possibly be said to favor such a course. Of the six Maine newspapers that the writer examined, not one wanted war immediately.⁹¹

Most pacific of the lot was the *Lewiston Evening Journal*, which conducted a veritable anti-war campaign on its own account and, together with the *Bangor Daily Commercial*, found occasion to blame Great Britain almost as much as Germany for the *Lusitania* sinking. "Neglect of the British government to protect her Irish coasts at a point notoriously threatened seems to be criminal," it declared. "The British admiralty seems to have banked on respect for American neutrality which Germany in advance declared would not be respected. Did Britain prefer to enjoy the benefits of her own neglect by inviting a tragedy which would turn and does turn the world strongly against the Kaiser?" The *Journal* perceived, however, that British neglect was not quite so great a crime as Germany's aggression and demanded action against Kaiserism.⁹² Nevertheless, to quote in part one of its six May 12 editorials on the crisis:

War with Germany is as unthinkable in reason as it is easily conceivable in emotion. The idea that national honor is best promoted by striking back is as absurd collectively as it is individually. When two bullies meet, fist responds to fist. When two intellectual and self-contained men meet and one is tempted to insult the other, he who deals blow for blow when he is not in it athletically as he is intellectually, subordinates brains to heels. Let David use his sling at the divine moment but recal [*sic*] that David's psalms are more effective than Goliath's conceit.⁹³

That "divine moment" was to come, but meanwhile, how was this hated Kaiserism to be eliminated from the world? The *Journal* had the answer from the beginning: by international action, by referring the prob-

lem to the Hague Court and establishing an international police force. Let the crisis be an occasion for federating all the nations of the world into the Hague organization, and let their armies and navies cooperate in arresting the fracture of solemn treaties and the creation of gigantic military establishments intended for "world-pillage." "We are not to murder and destroy in retaliation against those who are murdering and destroying. On the contrary, should we not help to bring them to book thru cooperation of the many nations whose immigrants are fused in our new nationality?"⁹⁴

Several newspapers of the state, including the *Journal*, had a strange faith in unilateral measures falling short of war, such as the seizure of interned German ships and other Germany property, the mortal isolation of Germany, and so on. For the most part, they suggested no specific measures. Occasionally they lapsed into transient warlike moods. All six of the newspapers examined approved Wilson's sharp note of May 13, and only two of them praised his too-proud-to-fight speech of May 10, which later was to be used so frequently in criticism of the administration's foreign policy.⁹⁵

Seemingly the papers were biding their time, waiting to see what concessions Germany would be willing to offer. When, at the end of May, Germany in effect rejected the president's statement of the issues, they quickly increased their belligerency. "Germany must understand that if she continues assassinating our citizens," said the *News*, "we are not so cowardly nor so divided that we will not fight." The *Daily Press* declared the president now could only take action more strenuous than the sending of notes, first severing all diplomatic relations, then invoking reprisals such as "the seizing of German steamers interned in our ports." The *Express-Advertiser* also looked forward to severance of diplomatic relations, but emphasized that this did not "necessarily" mean war. Apparently, then, the people of Maine had not yet come to the point of actively favoring war—in spite of Count Bernstorff's statement that if President Wilson had acted at this time public opinion in the nation would have been more solidly behind him "than it was later, at the time of the final breach"—but they did want reprisals that might have produced it.⁹⁶

When Secretary of State Bryan, who had been chided for months because of the "watchful waiting" policy, resigned because he felt that he could not sign the second note which the administration decided to send to Germany, a remarkable uproar occurred in Maine. It was led in vigor by the formerly pacific *Lewiston Evening Journal*, which on the very day that the news was carried in the papers, fumed and raged in part as follows:

“His course is factious, unpatriotic and calculated to give Germany the impression that the United States is not enthusiastically with Wilson’s present foreign policy. . . . It is charged that Bryan is in sympathy with those disreputable socialists who are trying to make the Labor Trust a peace-at-any-price contingent.” The *Daily Press* that morning had launched a strong attack on Bryan’s policies and expressed relief that he was out of office, so that the United States might thenceforth be firm, and on the next day it was speaking of Bryan’s “betrayal” of the President at a time when national unity was essential. The *Journal* in the afternoon added further to the personal indictment: “The unicity [*sic*] of Bryan’s performance consists in the fact that it is iniquitous.” Only the *Express-Advertiser* saw fit to praise him as a man of sincerity who was devoted to peace, and even that paper in no way agreed with his policies. The *News* said either he had “become effeminate” or had “something up his political sleeve,” and the *Daily Kennebec Journal* and *Bangor Daily Commercial* railed bitterly against his attitude.⁹⁷

As was to have been expected, Maine did not look upon the note Bryan had refused to sign as at all too firm. The *Express-Advertiser* and *News* were disappointed, indeed, because it did not prove so strong as they had expected it would be. When a Portland clergyman took advantage of his position as a principle speaker at the Flag Day exercised of the local Elks to sound a discordant note amidst this patriotic chorus, indignation raced through editorial veins, and resolutions of condemnation were adopted by Shepley Camp, Son of Veterans.⁹⁸

Maine might be, as the *Journal* expressed it, for the golden mean “between Bryan’s extreme and Roosevelt’s,” but it was moving rapidly toward the fiery colonel’s. Before the end of July, after Wilson had dispatched his third *Lusitania* note, which was enthusiastically approved in all parts of the state, the two Portland dailies were to declare themselves flatly for war unless Germany yielded to American demands.⁹⁹ The *Express-Advertiser* even said there would be no yielding and advised the President to plan for hostilities. To quote:

Germany, drunk with its own success and crazed by its own ambitions, will never give way in the name of humanity to the rights of this or any other country. The murderers of Belgium have not yet realized there [*sic*] own iniquity. And President Wilson and his cabinet may as well begin now to plan for the part which the United States will take in the world’s greatest war. . . . For almost a century and a half of National existence, the Emblem of our liberties has been unsullied, and to this generation the maintenance of its purity is entrusted. And this generation will rise

to the occasion as its father have done before. The principle for which our Government contends, is right. Her loyal sons need no other argument.¹⁰⁰

The *Arabic* Crisis

After reaching this height, Maine's belligerency during the next four weeks steadily subsided, and some attention was given to British infractions of international law, which had been overlooked in the excitement attending the *Lusitania* crisis. But there remained an underlying hatred of Germany which needed but slight stimulation to become an overpowering fever.

That stimulation was not slow in coming, nor mild in content. On August 19, 1915, the British liner *Arabic* was sent to the bottom. Two American citizens died in the disaster. The *Journal* came to the verge of proclaiming the "divine moment" at hand:

No more diplomatic notes, no more protests! These have been exhausted. With rare patience the President has waited. If facts indicate that Germany has sunk an unarmed ship bound for our shores with loss of life of American citizens, there is but one alternative. . . . Newspapers are not, however, the vehicles for declarations of war. That rests with the President and his advisers—the Administration and the People. . . . If Germany torpedoed the *Arabic* without warning, when bound to neutral shores, then the nation must decide a very grave question, right speedily.¹⁰¹

But in the next breath, answering the question, "What shall we do about it?" the *Journal* modified its tone slightly: "Get busier sending munitions to the Allies and helping to turn victorious defeat into conquering victory of Justice and Right."¹⁰²

The other newspapers took positions about equally strong, and there was virtually unanimous demand for immediate severance of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, although it was emphasized throughout the war that such action did not "necessarily" mean war, readiness for this final step was clearly implied in some cases.¹⁰³ The *Daily Press*, for instance, spoke its mind as follows:

The only thing left for the United States to do is to sever all its relations with the nation which has either deliberately, or without regard to our expressions affronted us and proved that it regards neither our friendship

nor our disinterested purpose. The time has come to show by acts, that we meant what we said and are ready to proceed to enforce our rights. What this may mean it is for the President to say. The nation is prepared to support him in whatever action he sees fit to take, but it will agree that the time has passed for the making of phrases or the wasting of words.¹⁰⁴

Maine was to continue to bristle for some time after the *Arabic* sinking, owing largely to what was called Germany's defiant manner, but once again time inexorably softened passions that torpedoes had aroused. Despite occasional darts flung at the administration for its failure to take vigorous action, the dominant sentiment in September was decidedly pacific. The *News* on September 1 spoke of "making up with Germany" and said her "manifestations of friendliness [had] brought a thrill of pleasure to every genuine American." On September 15, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, holding its twenty-first convention, adopted a strong resolution at Skowhegan in favor of "President Wilson's peace policy" and expressed its "gratitude for his efforts to prevent our beloved Country from becoming involved in war." When the German government yielded finally in the first week of October, even the usually intractable *Portland Daily Press* decided to consider the incident at an end, taking time to point out that it was "an example of what can be accomplished by firmness as opposed to the vacillating policy that has prevailed [*sic*] during the administration of foreign office under Secretary Bryan."¹⁰⁵

Such irritation with Germany as did prevail during September—and the opposition to war must not be taken to indicate it was not considerable—largely stemmed from the activities of German agents in the United States. It was in this month that James F. Archibald, an American newspaperman, was seized by the British at Kirkwall on his way to Austria and relieved of the interesting letters written by Captain von Papen, who used the phrase, "imbecile Yankees," and Ambassador Dumba, who described President Wilson as "self-willed." Coming on top of numerous other sensational incidents which had occurred in the past few months, this affair created a great furor and eventuated in the recall of the persons concerned. Maine was not slow in demanding precisely such action, directing its principal fire against Dr. Dumba. Adding to the state's irritation were the reports, circulated at this time, of secret German agents working in Maine, although it is probable that these were considered lightly by more mature minds.¹⁰⁶

Maine Demands War

The hand had circled the dial. A year had passed since Maine had first yawned over the European War. And now, with the *Lusitania* crisis in a state of suspended animation, with the *Arabic* torpedoing settled, and with German submarines relatively idle, Maine yawned again. "The once avid interest of the average man in the day-to-day movements of the armies has given way to a languid boredom," observed the *Portland Express-Advertiser* the day after Thanksgiving. "So far as he retains an interest, it is an interest in the possibility of peace." The war now seemed rather remote, and the endless figures on casualties no longer meant very much. Maine had become callous to distant horrors.¹⁰⁷

Coupled with this aloofness towards the war was a sense of profound relief that the United States had escaped involvement and a tendency to thank the administration for a policy of peace and non-entanglement. "There was a time when many of us deplored our official silence on the many infractions of the laws of humanity openly practised during the war," the *Express-Advertiser* recalled. "We were moved to protest. To have done so might have relieved our feelings, but it can have done no good. . . . Our work has been quiet, and perhaps humdrum, certainly without the theatrical flair of warfare. But it is a work in which we can take more and more pride. We have kept our heads when all the rest had gone mad. And our example will speed their return to health when the fit has passed."¹⁰⁸

A sense of self-satisfaction had settled on Maine, satisfaction with American institutions, American government, American pacifism, and American prosperity. And associated with it was a sense of deep thankfulness.

It must have been with considerable pleasure, then, that city editors in October substituted the World Series for the World War in the leading position on the front page. The war bounced back into place once the Series had ended, but it was not until several days later, when Miss Edith Cavell, the English nurse, was executed for having helped British and Belgian prisoners to escape, that the editorial ire was again aroused. Anger did not prevail long, however, and the editorial page was again placid by November 9, when an Austrian submarine sank the Italian liner *Ancona*. Furious as the reaction in other sections of the nation may have been, Maine displayed a surprising degree of calm. Only the once-pacific *Lewiston Evening Journal* manifested a desire for swift, strong action. Maine regarded the shelling as an act of "wanton brutality" for which there was no legal excuse, but it was not overly upset, and the *Portland Express-Advertiser* actually thought that the administration, for political reasons, was

going too far in its note of protest. The reaction to the sinking of the British liner *Persia* nearly two months later was similar. The *Journal* asserted it brought matters “to a head.” The *Portland Daily Press* blamed Wilson’s “wobbly, weak and cowardly” policy and flung another one of its frequent darts at the chief executive’s notewriting ability. But the *Express-Advertiser* charged that there was no excuse for the sensational manner in which Washington handled the affair and accused the president of “playing politics with our foreign relations.”¹⁰⁹

The *Lusitania* dispute continued to slumber, although the *Daily Press* noted that President Wilson evidently was preparing the nation for an expected break over the case. Typical of the state’s attitude was that expressed by the *Bangor Daily News* on February 19, when it approved the attitude indicated by relatives of the American victims of the *Lusitania* torpedoing, which was that if war was entered upon it should not be over the *Lusitania*. The prevailing sentiment was so calm, indeed, that it was even possible for a German-born professor to obtain “an attentive, if not sympathetic audience” for a fiery pro-German talk at a Colby College reunion.¹¹⁰

The *Sussex* Crisis

Spring brought with it a different atmosphere. On March 1 the *Daily Press* had observed ominously: “Today, Germany renews her submarine attack upon armed passenger ships. . . . Today we are standing upon the very edge of the crater into which a false step may plunge us, or from the brink of which we may crawl away in humiliation and fear.” On March 24 the French cross-channel passenger packet *Sussex* was torpedoed with three hundred on board, about eighty of whom were killed or injured, including a number of Americans. The reaction was not instantaneous, but it was none the less unmistakable. Only the *Daily Press* showed immediate concern, reverting to its favorite pastime of attacking the administration’s foreign policy and then declaring that the issue was clear: either the United States would back down or take action that would command the world’s respect. On April 5 the *News* gave vent to its emotions and demanded the cutting off of relations if the fullest apology and reparation were not offered. Finally, on April 15, the *Express-Advertiser* somersaulted from its position at the height of the *Persia* crisis actually to declare that the United States must break off relations or acknowledge that the president was “playing for the effect at home.”¹¹¹

When Wilson, after the Germans had, in effect, denied the torpedo-

ing, sent a note of protest which threatened severance of all diplomatic relations with the German Empire unless its methods of submarine warfare were changed immediately, Maine voiced general approval of the step and looked forward to the possibility of another American declaration of war coming in the traditionally critical month of April. The *Express-Advertiser* thought the occasion appropriate for another appeal to jingoistic patriotism and trembled on the brink of issuing a call to arms. The *Daily Press* criticized the president for not having prepared the country during the period since August, 1914. The *News* wanted relations severed and noted that, while such action did not necessarily mean war, "a break with Germany would be fraught with greater peril than usual."¹¹²

But Germany's reply was conciliatory, and the cries of jingoists once again fell on deaf ears. Yet it is notable that Maine turned from thoughts of war with more reluctance than had been the case in the past. In the editorials of the *Daily Press*, as a matter of fact, there seemed to run a faint tone of regret that a break had been forestalled. No one, apparently, thought the air greatly cleared or the submarine issue at an end; the feeling was that an impending break simply had been postponed.¹¹³

Campaign Distortions

Meanwhile the editorials took on an increasingly political character, definitely looking forward to the approaching presidential election campaign. It was for this reason, obviously, that the *Express-Advertiser* even in November, 1915, had accused Wilson of playing politics in sending too strong a note regarding the *Ancona* and then had turned around in April to declare he would be playing politics if he did *not* break off relations over the *Sussex*. "Every time President Wilson's political barometer is discovered to be falling," its editor charged in February, "some sort of an international crisis, generally with Germany, is brushed up."¹¹⁴

In the months following the *Sussex* affair politics began to top nearly all other considerations, and basic opinions on foreign developments, in so far as they were perceptible at all during this quadrennial diversion of the American public, had to be detected through a heavy, churning political fog. Maine was Republican, and the virulence of its attacks on administration policy, foreign and domestic, rose to a high peak. In general, the newspapers accused Wilson of lacing the requisite firmness, of practically inviting the violation of American rights, of pursuing a costly "watchful waiting" policy. When Theodore Roosevelt came to Maine for campaign

speeches at the end of August and Charles Evans Hughes a few days later, they received tumultuous welcomes. Then on September 11 the state delivered its verdict. Hughes received 69,508 votes; Wilson, 64,033. A few cities did, however, give Wilson a plurality, such cities as Bangor, Lewiston, and Auburn.¹¹⁵

Nearly all the other states held their elections two months later and in the interval Maine continued its political outbursts. The Portland papers especially laid down unrelenting barrages, doing their best to refute Wilson's he-kept-us-out-of-war slogan; and when the long-delayed returns from California finally indicated that Wilson had won by a narrow margin, the *Daily Press* approached the verge of madness. "America stands today a self-confessed, flabby, soulless, prideless country," it exploded, "where patriotic impulse is a forgotten attribute and manly, courageous, straightforward insistence upon national dignity relegated to the obsolete pages of history."¹¹⁶

To interpret this as a sign of mounting anger towards Germany would be inaccurate. As a matter of fact, once the powerful political motive is taken into consideration in connection with attacks on Wilson's "weak" policy, there appears little basis for saying that Maine desired sharp action against the Central Powers. Indications are, on the contrary, that Maine was relatively pacific during this period and that domestic issues combined with tradition to tip the Pine Tree scale for Hughes.¹¹⁷

Peace Talk

Following the election, with tempers at length cooled, talk of peace swept the United States more than at any other time since the war had begun. There were signs the people in both the Allied and Teutonic camps were tired of hostilities and in a mood to welcome steps in the direction of bringing about their cessation. Rumors that Wilson might offer to mediate the war floated over the nation and met little opposition. Maine, too, seemed receptive to the suggestion.¹¹⁸

But it was from Germany rather than the United States that the first step towards peace was to come. On December 12 the German government addressed a note to the neutral powers for transmission to the Allies which embodied the first formal peace proposal of the war. Whatever might have been Maine's reaction to a mediation offer by the president at this time, few tears of joy greeted the German proposition. Its tone, said the *Express-Advertiser* at the very first opportunity, "sounded like the state-

ment of a victorious nation ready to discuss peace upon terms to be dictated by it." The *Daily Press* said the very suggestion of peace from the Teutonic powers was reason for hope but branded the proposal as insincere, unacceptable, and perhaps inspired solely by a desire to appease the anti-war element in Germany. The *Journal*, however, thought the Allies should take the proposal of a peace conference seriously, heartily approved Germany's hint she might be willing to have the parley evolve "into an internationalism at The Hague," and expressed fear that refusal by the Allies to take up the offer might place them in an awkward position.¹¹⁹

The response to the adverse Entente reply was similar. The *Journal*, still definitely pro-Ally, thought the Entente had lost a tactical advantage by not calling "the kaiser's bluff, if bluff it be." But the *Daily Press* and *Express-Advertiser* fully approved the Allied stand. "There was a note of insincerity in the German proposals which warranted the allies in replying to it as they have," said the *Daily Press*. "Germany boasted too much of the prowess of her armies; assumed to speak as a victor and made no suggestion which gave hope of any reparation being made for the injuries inflicted upon Belgium, Serbia, Rumania and other small countries now prostrate beneath the Teuton's heel." This seemed to represent the dominant sentiment in Maine.¹²⁰

The president's mediation offer, finally made on December 18, obviously was injured by this prior proposal of the German government, which was able to interpret Wilson's move partly as an endorsement of the German peace effort. It would please and strengthen the Germans while embarrassing and antagonizing the Allies, said the Portland dailies, one of which charged: "So far from hastening peace, President Wilson seems to have effectually closed the door for the immediate discussion of the terms of peace and to have wholly eliminated himself and this country as a possible mediator." Despite this prejudicial effect of the German peace proposal, however, America's overture seems, on the whole, to have been favorably, if unenthusiastically, received in Maine. The *News*, which had made no comment whatever on the German proposition, gave its approval to the mediation offer. The *Journal*, which long had proposed that the president take such a step, when into raptures over it. The Portland stand, apparently, was not representative.¹²¹

There was in the state, however, an underling suspicion of Germany's proposals which her speedy and favorable reply to Wilson's offer did anything but allay. The *Portland Daily Press* continued to flay Wilson for his "idealistic essay," and it was joined by the *News* in attributing Germany's "frenzied efforts to arrange a peace conference" to signs that the Central

powers were weakening. In this step, too, the *News* seemed to be moving with the tide.

While the issue of peace was thus being debated, Maine continued to berate Germany for her activities. The principal source of anger was the deportation of Belgian workmen to Germany, an act denounced as “barbarous.” Explosions in munitions plants in January were another source of irritation. It was true, however, that during this period Maine was comparatively calm, although, if the growing sentiment for military training and the less hostile attitude towards war meant anything, this calm probably represented a deep resentment temporarily held in check.¹²²

The “Divine Moment”

The years of the World War were years of unending premonitions, and on November 10, 1916, the *Journal* had a premonition that he who had kept the United States out of war would soon reverse gear. Germany had decided no longer to adhere to the rules of international warfare, according to information received by the State Department, the *Journal* declared, and a “high authority” indicated that President Wilson had decided to send no more notes to Germany. The *Daily Press* on December 23 likewise anticipated renewal of intensive submarine warfare, and on January 31, 1917, it said that this warfare would begin about the last of February and would have for the United States “a most critical aspect.”¹²³

On the next day, February 1, the *Daily Press* carried the following large double-deck banner: “United States Is Facing Grave Possibility of War.” In the evening a steamer in the *Express-Advertiser* advanced the story still farther: “Break With Germany is Believed to be Inevitable.” Germany had announced renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Maine’s editorial writers were not behind time in rendering this verdict: war after the first incident. The reader had but to flip the pages, but to shift from the front-page headlines to the sober editorial-page type, to read the final, unqualified, and instantaneous decision. As with one voice, the *Journal*, *Daily Press*, and *Express-Advertiser* informed their readers that Germany had declared war on the United States. That, they said, was the message which the submarine announcement covering the front page was carrying to America. The *News* let a front-page story which repeated Wilson’s final note on the *Sussex* affair, the so-called ultimatum, speak for its editorial page, and the *Kennebec Journal* joined the war chorus on the next day. The “divine moment” had virtually arrived.¹²⁴

Said the *Journal*: "Germany has been at war with neutral nations from the date of the *Lusitania* horror. Germany now throws the mask off and practically declares war on United States. Bernstorff should no longer be tolerated as German ambassador at Washington. . . . Wilson has done his best to 'keep us out of war.' Germany does its worst to get us into war."¹²⁵

Said the *Daily Press*: "It is virtually a declaration of war against the United States. It admits no other construction. . . . It is simply up to Germany to carry out its threats or withdraw them. Until it does the former we cannot act, but once it has sunk one American ship engaged in the pursuits of peace, or killed one American citizen entitled to the protection of this nation under international law as hitherto understood by the civilized world, we must act. There can be no alternative."¹²⁶

Said the *Express-Advertiser*: "If any spark of our National spirit remains in Washington there will be no further parley, no ore theorizing and idealizing but prompt and efficient action in defense of our own and heretofore unanimously acknowledged rights."¹²⁷

Said the *Kennebec Journal*: "Not so direct and insulting as the present German instructions to the United States was the utterance that opened hostilities in the present European war. . . . Diplomatic relations with Germany should cease in the hour that 'unrestricted submarine operations' against the commerce of the world is launched. We cannot be a party to it; we cannot submit to it; we cannot permit any nation to so far ignore our rights as to instruct us as to what we may do or may not do, within or without the provisions fixed and respected by all world powers."¹²⁸

At no other time in the history of the European war which was to become a world war had there been such spontaneous unanimity with regard to a serious crisis, precipitated, in this case, by a mere announcement. At no other time had Maine said with such finality: it is war. Not one discordant note was sounded by any of the six newspapers examined for this study.¹²⁹

And as the month moved on war fever continued unabated. Editorials by the dozen bespoke a united determination to fight a Germany that would not bend before American threats. In the middle of February sentiment was the same as it had been at the first of the month. "Let us not fool ourselves that we are not at war with Germany," warned the *Journal*, "because there has been no formal declaration of war." At the beginning of March readiness for war was still the prevalent theme song. "Every patriotic citizen must show his colors now," declared the *Express-Advertiser*, "and be ready to take up whatever may develop as his part in the great struggle sure to come against German militarism and its determination to rule the world."¹³⁰

A new development had appeared at this time. The morning papers on March 1 had carried the first news of the famous Zimmerman plot to bring Mexico and Japan into war against the United States and Germany. While it could hardly have intensified very greatly the already intense war sentiment in Maine, the news did serve to prevent its diminution. Maine was not directly affected by the plot to the extent that the southwestern and western sections of the country were affected; yet it was natural for the Pine Tree State to react by flinging a challenge at “any nation in the world, or any group of nations,” that might think of trying to seize American territory.¹³¹

The road to war was further cleared in the middle of March when news of a Russian revolution that at last had been successful reached the United States. “It means that treacherous leaders who have long been suspected of playing into German hands will be cast aside,” the *Daily Press* happily remarked, “and that the Russian armies will be led by men in sympathy with the wishes of the people.” The *Express-Advertiser* thought it meant “the abrupt liberalization of a great people kept under an autocracy for ages.” The *Journal* thought likewise, and when President Wilson recognized the new Russian government, it declared it “fitting that the greatest of the world’s republics should precede all other nations in recognizing the new democracy of Russia.” The one obstacle to proclaiming the war a war to save democracy had been removed. Where all previous efforts to whitewash the Russian nation had brought but meagre results, this sudden overturning of its institutions had completely purified its people in Yankee eyes.¹³²

Accompanying the rise in Maine’s war temper was an increase in the proportion of news given over to the conflagration. H. Schuyler Foster has pointed out that, while “in January, 1917, non-war news received almost as much front-page attention [in the *New York Times*] as did war news,” in “the remaining months of neutrality” news came to dominate the page.¹³³ A similar change appeared in the front pages of Maine newspapers.

Patriotic fervor did not wax altogether undisturbed. There were some pacifist manifestations, although restricted, apparently, to a very small minority. A Methodist pastor, for instance, declared on February 13, at a patriotic meeting under the auspices of Civil War veterans, that he was for “total non-resistance” because there was nothing in the Bible to justify war. Intended as a meeting to arouse the patriotism of veterans, it dumbfounded his listeners, some of whom left the church by a side door to avoid shaking hands with him. A few days later a small group in Portland indicated it would form a permanent organization for the purpose of arousing anti-war sentiment. Further opposition to war was indicated by several



Man marching in World War I parade holds banner that reads “G.A.R. Yankee Boys of 61 to 65,” mostly likely in Bangor, ME, date and photographer unknown. (G.A.R. probably stands for Grand Army of the Republic, a fraternal order of Union Civil War veterans). Image courtesy of Special Collections, Raymond H. Fogler Library DigitalCommons@UMaine, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/univ_photos/3146/, accessed 15 June 2018.

persons who wrote letters to the *Kennebec Journal*, which saw fit to withhold them from publication; and a letter in the *Daily Press* of February 24 presented what was plainly the socialist case against war.¹³⁴

Such pacifistic protestations had but little deterrent effect, however, on Maine’s accelerating war temper. The state was in the grip of an unrestrainable fighting fever, stimulated partly by indications the government was preparing to act. Preparedness talk filled the air. President William Hyde of Bowdoin College urged the students in his institution to fit themselves for service to their country, a mammoth patriotic meeting was held in Portland as an antidote to the efforts of the few pacifists, and recruiting proceeded apace. The thrill of vital, daring action, the spectacle of marching armies and death-defying feats, the opportunity to pit American strength against the German militarism in a holy war to save democracy and the Anglo-Saxon race—all this had possessed the brain of the Maine Yankee, and an irresistible, intolerant urge to sweep all objects of his hate from before him took hold of his being. Teachers favorable to Germany were not to be tolerated. Rumored efforts of the metal trust to keep the United States out of war were to be vigorously overcome. Internal enemies of the nation were to be “dealt with summarily.”¹³⁵

There was no questioning it: the people of Maine had decided on war.

The Teutonic pirate must be taught his lesson. American honor must be vindicated. So strong was this feeling that suspicions that Wilson might once again avoid taking the final step were sufficient to inspire strong attacks on his policy. Raged the *Daily Press* on February 19 with reference to the sinking of the *Lyman M. Law*, a schooner bound from Maine to Italy: "We are not at war with Germany, but such an act, were we not a flabby, cowardly, unprepared and spineless country, would soon bring about war." Said the *Journal* a month later with reference to the torpedoing of the *Algonguin*, an unarmed American ship, the crew of which was saved: "Shall we be as servile to Prussianized tyranny on the Sea as is Belgium to Prussianized tyranny on the land? Mr. President—more ginger please and a little more pep."¹³⁶

At length action was forthcoming. The long-awaited extra session of Congress was called. Even before Congress convened, the patriotic Maine senate passed without a dissenting vote and transmitted to the House for similar action an order asking "the Maine members of Congress to be assembled to use their best efforts to urge unqualified protection of American rights and universal training." When Wilson delivered his message to Congress on Monday, April 2, approval was unreserved in Maine, and on the next day the Maine legislature, in joint session, responded by unanimously authorizing a bond issue of a million dollars to cover expenses incurred "in the suppression of insurrection, the repelling of invasion, or for purposes of war." "At least the chief executive of our government has recognized officially that a government with which we have lived at peace for 100 years, has ruthlessly inflicted wrongs upon us which no self-respecting people can longer fail to resent," said the *Kennebec Journal*. "That war actually exists is through no fault of ours."¹³⁷

The creed of the militarist, that peace comes through war, was firmly embraced. "The way to have peace today is to fight for it," the *News* boldly announced. "Those who do not want war must help to force Germany keep the peace. Today the patriot ready to fight is the true pacifist." Patriotic demonstrations were held throughout Maine. The Custer Post of the GAR, despite the age handicap, offered its services to the President. Gone was all opposition to jingoism, all desire for neutrality, all talk of isolation. The people of Maine had unequivocally committed themselves in favor of war.¹³⁸

Conclusion

To say that Maine wanted war in the spring of 1917 is not to say, necessarily, that public opinion was the primary cause of America's entry into



World War I parade, Hammond Street, Bangor, ME, date and photographer unknown. Image courtesy of Special Collections, Raymond H. Fogler Library DigitalCommons@UMaine, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/univ_photos/3155/, accessed 15 June 2018.

the World War. Perhaps it was the primary cause, perhaps not. It may be that the people of the United States as a whole did not want war; it may be, too, that even if they did, other factors were more important in bringing about America's entry. It has not been the purpose of this paper to explore these questions.

Nor has it been the purpose of this paper exhaustively to examine the spontaneity of public opinion. Propaganda flourished, of course, as propaganda always has flourished. Public opinion does not develop in a vacuum. It is the resultant of complex forces, manifold pressures, innumerable pernicious and commendable propaganda and educational programs. But however created, public opinion was a potent force, the evaluation of which is essential to an understanding of America's World War experiences and as a guide in the shaping of future American policy.

This paper has, however, developed one outstanding fact above all others, namely: that Maine wanted war when the United States entered upon the war, that if the question had been referred to the people of Maine in a national referendum they would have voted for war, that at no time from the day when Austria opened hostilities to April, 1917, did Maine speak so decisively for war as in the weeks following renewal of intensive submarine activity. It might be argued that during the *Lusitania* crisis Maine did not want war, as it did not; it might be argued that following

the *Arabic* sinking Maine did not want war, which likewise seems true, if less definitely; and it might be argued that at that the time of the *Sussex* crisis Maine did not want war, which seems really debatable. But it cannot be denied that on February 1 Maine was united for war and that in the two months which intervened before war actually was declared, this sentiment at no time reversed itself. It was not, therefore, the fever of a day or of a week. It was a fundamental desire and conviction which persisted over a period of more than two months, at the conclusion of which the United States embarked upon its hazardous and costly adventure.

Ancillary to this desire was an increasing nationalism, a strong desire to have the United States rise to greater power and hammer out an unqualified Americanism from a conglomeration of races and allegiances. Maine hankered for a growth of national assertiveness for firm resistance to violation of American rights, and this hankering fed on the outrage to Yankee feelings which the killing of American citizens so powerfully induced.

There is no questioning that what finally tipped the scales of public opinion was the renewal of intensive submarine warfare. Pro-Ally as Maine was, it opposed involvement in hostilities. But it was insistent that the honor of the United States must be preserved and, above all, that the lives of American citizens must be protected. The distinction between property and human rights was clearly drawn, and there was no hesitation in proclaiming the duty of the American government with reference to each. "Peace, but peace with honor, is the guiding principle of the people of this nation," said the *Daily Press*. And the enormity of destroying American lives was such that peace in 1917 could no longer be reconciled with national honor.¹³⁹

When Germany, on January 31 announced her intention flagrantly to violate human rights—for that is what renewal of intensive submarine warfare amounted to—Maine's pro-war reaction was inescapable. It seemed almost as if the state had been waiting with bated breath for the German signal. War headline after war headline over a period of more than two years at length had infected Yankee blood, and a restless belligerency which had been held in abeyance by stronger peace forces broke all bounds. Before it could have been influenced by metropolitan dailies, by the government, or by pressure groups the state virtually proclaimed a state of war.

If the rest of the country reacted to the war as did the people of Maine, then President Wilson led the nation to the battlefield at precisely that moment when it most desired to go. The administration had been watch-

ing public opinion carefully for many months. It wanted to go to war, if at all, with the unreserved support of a united nation. Such support came from the state of Maine. Just as it cannot be said flatly that Maine wanted war at any time in 1914, 1915, or 1916, so it cannot be concluded by any process of reasoning that Maine did *not* want war in 1917. War sentiment had grown slowly; it had not come to full flower during the *Lusitania* crisis, nor during the crises which shortly followed; but by the spring of 1917 it had undoubtedly come into its own. Whatever the rest of the nation may have thought Maine wanted war fervently when war came.¹⁴⁰

NOTES

1. See *New York Times*, 10 September 1919.
2. See *Bangor Daily News*, 16 March, 1916; See *Literary Digest*, 14 November 1914, 939-941. See *Portland Daily Press*, 17 November 1914; Count Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (New York, 1930), 32.
3. Peter Odegard, *The American Public Mind* (New York, 1930), 116-117, 121 (quotation p. 121).
4. Lucy Maynard Salmon, *The Newspaper and the Historian* (New York, 1923), 284, 439; Odeard, 121-122 (first quotation p. 122, second quotation p. 121); Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1930), 356-357 (third quotation).
5. See latter half of article; Salmon, 440; Bernstorff, 121 (first quotation); Odegard, 121 (second quotation), 122.
6. The 1910 Census gave the total population of Maine as less than three-quarters of a million. Portland, the largest city, had but 58,571 inhabitants. Lewiston was second with 26,247 and Bangor third with 24,803. Augusta, capital of the state and home of the *Daily Kennebec Journal*, had but 13,211 inhabitants. Reported in the *Annual Register of Maine*, 1911-1912, 1017-1031.
7. Henceforth these publications will usually be referred to in the text of this study simply as the *Journal*, the *News*, the *Daily Press*, the *Express-Advertiser*, the *Commercial*, and the *Kennebec Journal*; See *Portland Daily Press*, 18 April 1915.
8. See Newton D. Baker, *Why We Went to War* (New York, 1936), 3.
9. James Duane Squires, *British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 1914 to 1917* (Cambridge, 1935), 45; C. Hartley Grattan, *Why We Fought* (New York, 1929), 86; Bernstorff, 48-49.
10. Bernstorff, 39; Testimony of Bernstorff at the post-war German Reichstag hearing. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Official German Documents Relating to the World War* (New York, 1923), vol. i, 432-433 (first quotation p. 432, second quotation p. 433); See *Official German Documents* (testimony of Bernstorff), vol. ii, 745.
11. Grattan, 84; Bernstorff, 52 (quotation); George Sylvester Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate* (New York, 1930), 87-89.
12. Bernstorff, 336-337 (quotation). Entire report printed in *Official German Documents*, vol. ii, 1029-1042.
13. Grattan, 84; Viereck, 82-87.

14. Bernstorff, 91 (first quotation); Grattan, 92 (second quotation); Walter Millis, *Road to War: America, 1914–1917* (Boston and New York, 1935), 147–148; See Captain Henry Landau, *The Enemy Within* (New York, 1937), *passim*.
15. Grattan, 94; See *Bangor Daily News*, 1 April 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 27 November 1914; See *Official German Documents* (testimony of Bernstorff), vol. i, 432 and Grattan, 94–95, 102 ff; Bernstorff, 56–57, 205, 259 (quotation p. 259).
16. Squires, 45, 48–49, 53, 58–61 (first quotation p. 48–49, second quotation p. 53); Bernstorff, 38–39; Grattan, 251–252.
17. See *Bangor Daily News* 7 December 1914 (first quotation), 25 and 26 August 1915, and 3 July 1916 (second quotation).
18. Gilbert Parker, “The United States and the War,” *Harpers* (March 1918), 521–522.
19. H.C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War: The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914–1917* (Norman, OK, 1939), 23–25; See Baker, 32–33.
20. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 22 October 1914; Grattan, 74–75; Harold Dwight Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York, 1927), 199 (quotation).
21. Grattan, 38–40; Charles Seymour, *American Neutrality, 1914–1917* (New Haven, 1935), 149 (quotation). See George E. McReynolds and Eleanor Tupper, *Japan in American Public Opinion* (New York, 1937), Introduction, viii–ix.
22. Lippman, 353 (quotation); Elmer Davis, *The History of the New York Times* (New York, 1921), 359; Grattan, 46.
23. Grattan, 41; Millis, 147 (quotation); See graph, entitled, “Immediate Origin of Front-Page Foreign War Dispatches in Three Maine Dailies for Monthly Periods.”
24. See graph, entitled, “Immediate Origin of Foreign Front-Page *Bangor Daily News* War Dispatches for Tri-Monthly Periods.”
25. The “Immediate Origins” graph presents a similar picture. A survey of which the writer learned after the above graph was completed disclosed that “the direct German news did not exceed 12 percent of the total in any of the five periods” into which the thirty-two months of American neutrality were divided. H. Schuyler Foster, “How America Became Belligerent,” *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1935, 469. Note that Foster’s figures refer only to news received from Germany, while the writer’s refer in the paragraph above to news from the Central and neutral powers. Note, too, that Foster’s figures check with those presented in this paper two paragraphs earlier.
26. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 5, 7, 8, 17, 20, and 28 October 1914; *Official German Documents* (testimony of Bernstorff), vol. ii, 727–728; See O.W. Riegel, *Mobilizing for Chaos: The Story of the New Propaganda* (New Haven, 1934), 31; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 8 July 1915; See Will Irwin, *Propaganda and the News, or What Makes Us Think So?* (New York, 1936), 129–131; See Foster, 468–469.
27. See *Portland Daily Press*, 7 and 8 October and 2 November 1914; See *Bangor Daily News*, 29 August, 2 September, and 15 October 1915.
28. See *Portland Daily Press*, 8 and 17 August, 4 September, 12 October, and 17 and 19 November 1914; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 13 August 1914; Bernstorff, 336–337; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 20 August and 17 and 18 September 1914; See *Bangor Daily News*, 14 and 15 September 1914.
29. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 15 February and 14 April 1915; 12 June, 28 Oc-

tober ("Gompers in Command at Washington") and 11 December 1916; and 22 and 24 March 1917; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 2 July 1914; See *Bangor Daily News*, 6 April, 2 and 4 June, and 11 July, 1914; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 13 and 14 August 1914; See *Portland Daily Press* 1 July 1914; See Millis, 8.

30. See *Portland Daily Press*, 9 September 1916 (quoting from an article by Untermyer in the *New York Herald*, which appeared under a Springvale, ME, date-line).

31. See *Bangor Daily News*, 23 December 1915.

32. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 12 June 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 22 March 1916.

33. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 10 and 12 June, 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 22 May 1914 (quotation) and 22 March 1916.

34. See *Bangor Daily News*, 22 March 1916.

35. See *Bangor Daily News*, 6 April and 8 June (first quotation) 1914, 8 June and 15 July (second quotation) 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 23 August 1915 and 13 March 1916; See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 July 1914 and 4 June 1915; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 24 August 1915; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 8 July 1914 and 11 August 1915.

36. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 1, 6, 9, and 24 (first quotation) July, 12 August, 11 November, and 28 December 1914; 11 February 1915; and 9 March 1916 (second quotation); See *Bangor Daily News*, 1 and 3 July 1914 (third quotation July 3) and 1 January 1915.

37. See *Bangor Daily News*, 29 June 1914.

38. See *Bangor Daily News*, 15 July (first quotation); 16, 21, and 23 October; and 25 December (and almost any issue for second half of December) 1914; See *Portland Daily Press*, 24 October 1914 (second quotation); See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 29 March 1915 (third quotation); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 6 May 1915 (fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh quotations).

39. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 2 and 22 (quotation) July 1915.

40. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 29 October (first quotation) and 16 December (second quotation) 1915, and 14 January 1916; See *Portland Daily Press*, 29 October 1915.

41. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 16 December 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 26 November 1915 (quotation); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 13 December 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 6 January 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 20 December 1915 and 5 January 1916.

42. See *Literary Digest*, 11 March 1916, 619 (first, second, and third quotations); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 3 May and 15 December 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 15 January (fourth quotation) and 2 February 1917.

43. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 8 July and 14 November 1914, and 11 August 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 10 August 1915.

44. See *Bangor Daily News*, 6 and 10 January and 24 February 1916 and 8 (quotation) and 28 February 1917; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 29 December 1915.

45. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 12 (quotation) and 13 May, 18 June, 27 August, 13 September, and 11 November 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 9 June 1916.

46. *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 23 August 1915.

47. *Bangor Daily News*, 2 March 1914 (first quotation); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 1 April (second quotation) and 20 July (seventh quotation) 1914; See

- Lewiston Evening Journal*, 15 and 17 (third, fourth, fifth, and sixth quotations) July 1914.
48. See *Bangor Daily News*, 30 July 1914 (first and second quotations); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 31 July 1914 (third quotation).
49. See *Bangor Daily News*, 5 August 1914 (first quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 27 July 1914; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 25 July 1914; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 29 July (second quotation) and 3 August 1914.
50. See *Bangor Daily News*, 9 September 1914 and 9 January 1915 (quotation).
51. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 15 July 1914 (quotation); See *Bangor Daily News*, 3 and 17 July 1914.
52. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 29 July 1914; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 29 July 1914 (first, second, third, and fourth quotations); See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 1 August 1914 (fifth quotation); See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 29 July and 3 August 1914; See *Bangor Daily News*, 30 July (sixth quotation) and 18 August 1914.
53. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 29 July (quotation) and 28 August 1914; See *Portland Daily Press*, 27 July and 3 August 1914.
54. See earlier sections on war propaganda; See Seymour, 109, 147–148, and Baker, 15–24; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 17 July and 4 August 1914.
55. Bernstorff, 17–21, 23 (quotation p. 18); See *Bangor Daily News*, 2 March 1914; See Charles Callan Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Boston, 1938), 3–9, 13–15; Grattan, 82–83; and E. Malcolm Carroll, *Germany and the Great Powers, 1866–1914* (New York, 1938), 409–418, 474; Jeanette Keim, *Forty Years of German-American Political Relations* (Philadelphia, 1919), 237–243; Clara Eve Schieber, *The Transformation of American Sentiment toward Germany, 1870–1914* (Boston, 1923), 239–284.
56. Tansill, 9–13; Grattan, 40, 75–77; Carroll, 474; Bertha Ann Reuter, *Anglo-American Relations during the Spanish-American War* (New York, 1924), *passim*; See *Portland Daily Press*, 27 January and 6 November 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 5 November 1915 and 5 January 1916; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 11 August 1914.
57. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 25 August 1914 (first and second quotations); See *Bangor Daily News*, 16 September and 5 December (third quotation) 1916.
58. Letter by von Hamel, Counselor of the German Embassy at Washington. See *German Documents*, vol. ii, 869–870. See also Baker, 104; Bernstorff, 19 (quotation); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 27 October 1915.
59. See *Bangor Daily News*, 21 September 1914; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 8 January 1916.
60. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 21 May 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 3 November 1914.
61. See aforementioned Letter by von Hamel; See *Literary Digest*, 12 September 1914, 441–443, and 14 November 1916; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 6 August 1914; See *Bangor Daily News*, 28 September 1914, 26 January and 29 (quotation) 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 12 January and 5 November 1915; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 18 September, 24 November, and 10 December 1914.
62. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 10 August (first quotation) and 17 September (second quotation) 1914; See *Portland Daily Press*, 16 September 1914 (third, fourth, and fifth quotations); See *Literary Digest*, 3 October, 1916, and 14 November, 939–941 (sixth quotation), 1914.
63. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 27 July 1914 (first and second quotations); See *Literary Digest*, 8 August 1914, 215–217; See *Bangor Daily News*, 8 and 13 (third

- quotation) August 1914; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 12 August 1914.
64. See *Bangor Daily News*, 28 October (first quotation) and 14 November (second quotation) 1914; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 5 February 1915.
65. See *Bangor Daily News*, 21 August and 12 September 1914; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 5 August 1914 (first quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 23 January 1915 (second quotation).
66. See *Literary Digest*, 9 December 1916, 1523–1524; See *Portland Daily Press*, 30 June and 13 July 1915; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 7 April and 17 May (quotation) 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 4, 5, and 12 June 1915.
67. See *Bangor Daily News*, 22 February, 21 November, and 12 December 1916; See *Portland Daily Press*, 13 January 1917; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 11 September 1914 and 28 December 1915.
68. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 17 November 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 16 November 1914 and 13 September 1915 (quotation); See *Bangor Daily News*, 9 and 12 February and 23 March 1915.
69. See *Bangor Daily News*, 4 and 14 December 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 15 January 1917.
70. See *Bangor Daily News*, 23 June, 21 August, and 10 December (quotation) 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 10 and 27 September 1915; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 6 December 1916.
71. See *Bangor Daily News*, 21 August and 10 December 1915.
72. See *Bangor Daily News*, 24 and 28 May and 28 September 1915.
73. See *Bangor Daily News*, 15 May (third quotation) and 11 and 17 (second quotation) November 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 3 June 1916; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 2 September (first quotation) and 12 November 1915; Grattan, 74–75.
74. See *Bangor Daily News*, 3 June and 17 November (quotation) 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 20 January 1916.
75. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 14 August 1914, 20 November 1915, and 25 March 1916 (quotation); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 29 July 1914 and 12 May 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 12 October and 14 November 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 29 April 1915.
76. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 6 April 1915.
77. See *Portland Daily Press*, 3 March and 25 November (third and fourth quotations) 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 12 January 1916 (first and second quotations).
78. See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 5 August 1914 and 26 April 1915.
79. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 27 October 1915 and 22 July 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 29 January and 22 November 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 July 1915.
80. See *Bangor Daily News*, 24 September 1914; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 21 September 1914 and 23 August 1915; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 11 May 1916.
81. See *Bangor Daily News*, 22 August and 12 September 1914; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 17 October 1914 and 3 February 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 11 March 1916; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 26 January 1915.
82. See *Portland Daily Press*, 15 June and 4 August (first and second quotations) 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 12 May (third quotation) and 13 April (fourth quotation) 1916; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 13 January 1915 (fifth quotation).
83. See *Portland Daily Press*, 19 November 1914 (quotation).
84. See *Bangor Daily News*, 12 October 1914.

85. See *Portland Daily Press*, 10 December 1914.
86. Grattan, 232 (quoting Franklin K. Lane); See *Bangor Daily News*, 29 January 1915; See *Literary Digest*, 13 March 1915, 529–530; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 29 December 1914; See *Portland Daily Press*, 25 February 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 11 and 22 March 1915; Charles Seymour, *American Diplomacy During the War* (Baltimore, 1934), 60 (quoting letter by Wilson) (quotation).
87. See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 December 1914.
88. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 25 March (first and second quotation) and 27 April (third, fourth, and fifth quotations) 1915; Foster, 467–468.
89. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 6 February and 8 May (first, second, third, and fourth quotations) 1915; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 8 May 1915 (fifth quotation).
90. See *Bangor Daily News*, 11 and 21 (quotation) May 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 14 May 1915.
91. David Lawrence, *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1924), 197; Peterson, 170; including *Portland Daily Press*, *Portland Express-Advertiser*, *Lewiston Evening Journal*, *Bangor Daily News*, *Bangor Daily Commercial*, and *Daily Kennebec Journal*.
92. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 8 (first and second quotation), 10, and 12 May 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 8 May 1915.
93. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 12 May 1915.
94. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 11 May 1915.
95. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 10, 11, 13, and 14 (including column 1 editorial) May 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 14 and 19 May 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 12 May 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 12 May 1915.
96. See *Bangor Daily News*, 5 June 1915 (first and second quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 June 1915 (third quotation); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 3 June 1915 (fourth quotation); Bernstorff, 151 (fifth quotation).
97. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 9 (first and second quotations) and 10 (fourth quotation) June 1915; See *Portland Daily Press*, 9 and 10 (third quotation) June 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 9 June 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 12 June 1915 (fifth and sixth quotations); See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 10 and 12 June 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 9 June 1915.
98. See *Portland Daily Press*, 11, 15, and 16 June 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 11 June 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 11 and 15 June 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 12 June 1915.
99. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 18 June (quotation) and 24 July 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 24 July 1915.
100. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 24 July 1915.
101. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 21 August 1915.
102. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 21 August 1915 (not the same editorial).
103. See *Portland Daily Press*, 21 August 1915; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 21 August 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 21 August 1915 (quoting *Portland Argus*, *Biddeford Journal*, and *Waterville Sentinel*); See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 21 August 1915; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 21 August 1915.
104. See *Portland Daily Press*, 21 and 25 August 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 21 August 1915 (quoting *Portland Argus*).
105. See *Portland Daily Press*, 3, 11, 15, and 27 September and 7 October (fifth quo-

- tation) 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 1 (first and second quotation), 2 September, and 21 September 1915; Peterson, 171 (quoting *American Press Résumé* of 3 September 1915); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 15 September 1915 (third and fourth quotations); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 27 August 1915.
106. Bernstorff, 198–200; Tansill, 371–372; See *Portland Daily Press*, 9 and 13 September 1915; See *Bangor Daily News*, 11 September 1915.
107. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 26 November 1915.
108. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 26 November 1915.
109. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 14 December 1915 and 8 January 1916 (fourth quotation); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 4 January 1916 (second quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 3 (third quotation) and 6 January 1916; See section on counter-imperialist tendencies.
110. See *Portland Daily Press*, 31 January and 11 February (quotation) 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 19 February 1916.
111. See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 (first quotation), 27, and 29 March 1916; Tansill, 492–493; See *Bangor Daily News*, 5 April 1916; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 15 April 1916 (second quotation).
112. Millis, 292–293; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 19 April 1916; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 20 April 1916; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 20 April 1916; See *Portland Daily Press*, 22 April 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 20 and 27 (quotation) April 1916.
113. See *Portland Daily Press*, 6 and 11 May 1916; See *Bangor Daily Commercial* 6 and 10 May 1916; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 6 May 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 6 May 1916 (quoting *Daily Kennebec Journal*).
114. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 16 February 1916.
115. See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 September 1916; See *Bangor Daily News*, 9 September 1916; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 7 November 1916.
116. See *Portland Daily Press*, 17 October and 10 November (quotation) 1916.
117. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 9 October 1916; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 1 November 1916; See *Portland Daily Press*, 4 November 1916.
118. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 21 November and 1 December 1916; Bernstorff, 285–286; Grattan, 382–383; See *Portland Daily Press*, 15 November 1916.
119. See *Literary Digest*, 23 December 1916, 1641–1643; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 13 December 1916 (first quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 13 December 1916; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 15 and 16 (second quotation) December 1916.
120. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 25 January 1917 (first quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 January 1917 (second and third quotation); See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 2 January 1917.
121. See *Literary Digest*, 30 December 1916, 1694–1695; See *Portland Daily Press*, 22 December 1916; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 21 December 1916 (quotation); See *Bangor Daily News*, 22 December 1916; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 21 and 22 December 1916.
122. See *Portland Daily Press*, 13 (quotation), 15, 23, 24, and 30 January 1917; See *Bangor Daily News*, 6 January 1917 (second quotation); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 2 January 1917.
123. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 10 November 1916 (first quotation); See *Portland Daily Press*, 23 December 1916 and 31 January 1917 (second quotation).

124. See *Bangor Daily News*, 1 February 1917; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 1 February 1917.
125. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 1 February 1917.
126. See *Portland Daily Press*, 1 February 1917.
127. See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 1 February 1917.
128. See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 2 February 1917.
129. See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 1 and 3 February 1917.
130. See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 3 and 15 (first quotation) February 1917; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 1 (second and third quotation) and 2 March 1917; See *Bangor Daily News*, 7 February and 3 March 1917.
131. See *Bangor Daily News*, 9 March 1917; See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 1 March 1917; See *Literary Digest*, 17 March 1917, 687.
132. See *Portland Daily Press*, 16 March 1917 (first and second quotation); See *Bangor Daily Commercial*, 17 March 1917; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 16 and 17 (third quotation) March 1917; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 16, 17, and 23 (fourth quotation) March 1917.
133. Foster, 468.
134. See *Portland Daily Press*, 14 (quotation) and 24 February 1917; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 17 February 1917; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 3 April 1917.
135. See *Portland Daily Press*, 26 February and 17, 21, and 29 March 1917; See *Portland Express-Advertiser*, 16, 23 (quotation), 26, 30, and 31 March 1917; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 22 and 29 March 1917.
136. See *Bangor Daily News*, 14 February and 26 March 1917; See *Portland Daily Press*, 19 February 1917 (first quotation); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 14 March 1917 (second quotation).
137. See *Portland Daily Press*, 20 March 1917; See *Literary Digest*, 31 March 1917, 881–882; See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 30 March (first quotation) and 3 April (second quotation) 1917; See *Daily Kennebec Journal*, 4 April 1917 (third and fourth quotations).
138. See *Bangor Daily News*, 5 April 1917 (quotation); See *Lewiston Evening Journal*, 1 and 3 April 1917.
139. See *Portland Daily Press*, 25 November 1915.
140. Robert Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State* (Indianapolis, 1935), 20, 25, 103–104.