




One of the most destructive wars of the colonial period, King Philip's War was named for the nominal leader of the native coalition that fought against the colonists in Massachusetts proper in the mid-1670s. Metacomb (dubbed Philip by the English) was a Wampanoag sachem. Maine Historical Society Collections.

CREATING AN INDIAN ENEMY IN THE BORDERLANDS: KING PHILIP'S WAR IN MAINE, 1675-1678

BY CHRISTOPHER J. BILODEAU

In the borderlands space between New England and Québec, the Wabanaki Indians had their own reasons for getting embroiled in a conflict that started in southern New England, King Philip's War (1675-1678). This essay argues that, ironically, the English vision of a monolithic Indian enemy was the key to Wabanaki success in this war. The Wabanakis were a heterogeneous group when it came to the issue of fighting the English, with many eager to join the fight, others ambivalent, and still others against. The English of Massachusetts Bay and Maine, however, treated the entire Wabanaki population as united under a central authority, and they retaliated against any Wabanaki depredations as if all Wabanakis were geared for war. This blanket attitude toward the Indians, held by many Englishmen from Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Bay, would be self-fulfilling. By assuming all of the Wabanakis were armed for war, English leaders, soldiers, and settlers minimized overtures of peace, fell susceptible to rumor, and retaliated with violence against most of the Indians they encountered. By treating them all as hostile, the English gradually alienated so many different groups of Indians in Maine that they encouraged even the most pacific Wabanakis to join the war. However, that homogenization of the Indian enemy did not lead to the centralization of Indian warriors, as the Wabanakis remained decentralized. Because the Wabanakis had no central army, they did not make a central target, and such diffusion would be critical to their victory in the Maine borderlands. The author is an assistant professor of History at Dickinson College. He researches the history of American Indian-European interaction during the colonial period in the northeastern borderlands.

KING PHILIP'S WAR has been called the most destructive war fought between Indians and Englishmen during the colonial period.¹ Led nominally by the Wampanoag sachem Metacom, or "King Philip," the Nipmucks, Narragansetts, and Wampanoags, all Algonquian-speaking Indians of southern New England, made a series of devastating attacks against Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Rhode Is-



King Philip's War was costly in terms of both lives and money. The native population in southern New England declined rapidly as a result of the war. King Philip was killed in August 1676, as pictured here. Maine Historical Society Collections.

land colonies.² Angry about English encroachment onto their lands by settlers and Protestant missionaries, these Indian groups asserted their sovereignty against what they believed were unjustifiable pressures. Between one and five percent of the total English population of the area was killed.³ The war cost the English over £150,000 in damaged property, and £100,000 for their defense—an enormous burden under which these colonial governments suffered for years. As for the Indians, Philip was killed in August 1676, and through casualties, the massive movement of refugees, and enslavement, the Indian presence in southern New England fell from one-fourth of the overall population to one-tenth. From that point onward, the English maintained a political stranglehold over the area.⁴

Accordingly, this significant event has attracted much scholarly attention in the last couple of decades, and its importance to the develop-

ment of seventeenth-century New England cannot be gainsaid. For the most part, however, scholars have ignored the conflict between the Wabanaki Indians and the English settlers in northern New England, viewing it as an adjunct to the famous conflict to the south.⁵ But the war in Maine, which occurred between 1675 and 1678, deserves attention in its own right.⁶ Only loosely connected with the devastation to the south, the war in Maine presents a curious example of the dynamics of violent conflict between northeastern Algonquian Indians and European colonists. The Wabanakis won an astounding victory, pushing English settlers and traders almost entirely out of the province. They killed 260 English men, women, and children out of a population of 3,500, and destroyed nine out of the thirteen settlements.⁷ By war's end, the Wabanakis had not suffered a fraction of the pain and dislocation that affected the Indians of southern New England, as the Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and Wampanoags experienced disaster at all levels of their societies.⁸ King Philip's War in Maine was an unprecedented victory for the Wabanakis and an unmitigated disaster for the English.

Central to understanding this war in Maine is grasping Indian social and political organization and its importance for Indian warfare. As Wayne E. Lee, Kenneth M. Morrison, and other commentators have noted, many Indian societies, in the Northeast and otherwise, lacked (in Lee's words) the "coercive political structure" necessary to force their warriors to fight in large-scale warfare along European lines. Accordingly, Algonquian warfare was only minimally centralized.⁹ During King Philip's War in Maine, different Wabanaki groups fought, or did not fight, against the English for a wide variety of reasons and different groups and individuals within Wabanaki villages ignored the words and even pleas of their sachems for either war or peace.

Ironically, it was the English vision of a monolithic Indian enemy that was key to the success of Maine's Wabanakis in this war. The English of Massachusetts Bay and Maine retaliated against Wabanaki depredations as if *all* Wabanakis were subject to a central authority, that *all* Wabanakis were geared for war. This blanket attitude toward the Indians, held by many (not all, but many) Englishmen from Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Bay, would be self-fulfilling. As historian Wayne Lee argues, "Europeans...had notions of retaliation [that] were much more thoroughly lethal. The European ideology of revenge presumed that an original violation of norms, however 'small,' authorized a no-holds-barred retaliation."¹⁰ By assuming all of the Wabanakis were armed for war, English leaders, soldiers, and settlers minimized over-

tures of peace, fell susceptible to rumor, and retaliated with violence against most of the Indians they encountered. Many Englishmen, set on crushing the Indians to the north, gradually alienated so many different groups of Indians in Maine and New Hampshire by treating them all as hostile that they encouraged even the most pacific Wabanakis to join the war.

But that homogenization of the Indian enemy did not lead to the centralization of Indian warriors. The Wabanakis did not fight in concert, remaining true to their vision of power within their societies. And that decentralization was crucial to their success. The English could not contend with a dispersed enemy who attacked in small parties at different times and places along the Maine coast. Because the Wabanakis had no central army, they did not make a central target, and such diffusion would be critical to their victory in the Maine borderlands.¹¹

The two fronts of the war—northern and southern New England—were only tenuously linked. The northeastern borderlands consisted of the space that is now northern and central New Hampshire, Maine, and southern Québec, between the English settlements of New England and the French settlements of New France and inhabited exclusively by the various Wabanaki tribes. The Wabanakis in this region had their own reasons for fighting the English of Massachusetts Bay, independent of what southern New England Indians were doing, although it is uncertain if fighting would have occurred in the north without the problems to the south.¹² Clearly there was ample friction between some Wabanakis and English colonists, but that friction did not characterize relations between all Wabanaki groups and English colonists. For at least fifty years, both groups had maintained relations of economic expediency, with periodic clashes that led to small, individual cases of violence. Throughout the seventeenth century the Anglo-Indian fur trade in Maine was characterized by intense competition. That was certainly the case around the mouths of the Kennebec and the Androscoggin rivers, known during the period as Sagadahoc. Interior traders competed with those who patrolled the coast, or “coasters,” trading from their fishing boats from the 1620s up to the 1670s. At times, the fur trade became so competitive that some traders used unscrupulous means—such as cheating Indians of their goods through the use of alcohol—to achieve the most profitable ends. Those situations often led to Indian retaliations and small-scale violence.¹³

During the summer of 1675, a string of events pushed certain Wabanakis to outright violence on the Maine frontier. The first occurred

during the summer of 1675, probably just after the outbreak of warfare to the south, and involved the wife and child of the Saco sachem Squando. According to the Ipswich minister William Hubbard, who wrote the only contemporary work on the war in northern New England, several English sailors abused Squando's wife and infant child by tipping over their canoe in an effort to test the rumor that all Indians could swim from birth. The child sank and was rescued by his mother, but died several days later. Squando, enraged by the death of his son and the treatment of his wife, vowed not to let the act go unpunished, and he convinced a number of Wabanakis of western Maine and eastern New Hampshire (surely his fellow Sacos, but possibly some allied Pigwackets and Androscoggins as well) to join him in harassing English settlements along the northeastern frontier.¹⁴

Each side read this murder differently. Many Indians would have found Squando's desire for revenge justified. The Wabanakis and other Algonquians fought wars for many different reasons, and the murder of a sachem's son would certainly demand retaliation.¹⁵ But Squando's reaction mystified many English colonists. They understood the child's death as a solitary act of murder, possibly accidental, and one that would not justify violence against a whole group. In fact, many Englishmen believed that the Wabanakis had no justifiable reasons to go to war, and if they did so they were vicious and gloried in senseless physical carnage.¹⁶ Hubbard echoed the opinion of these colonists when he declared that the death of Squando's child was "Some little Colour or Pretence of Injury," and was too insignificant to cause the war, and "that this was only an Occasion to vent the Mischief they formerly had conceived in their Hearts."¹⁷ But this "Pretence," he and many like-minded colonists concluded, was not due to any fault of English settlers in Maine. This view probably predominated among the leadership of Massachusetts Bay, who lumped together the natives of Maine and New Hampshire with the newly hostile Wampanoags, Nipmucks, and Narragansetts. The English, facing a crisis that threatened the lives of many, and possibly the existence of the colony, homogenized Indian motives and refused to recognize nuances among Indian groups. That cultural misunderstanding would be crucial to the exacerbation of tensions and the continuation of violence on the Maine frontier.¹⁸

Other Wabanakis heard and responded to Squando's pleas for revenge, but they had reasons of their own to fight the English, reasons that arose almost simultaneously with the abuse of Squando's family. When King Philip's War started in the south, messengers from the three

warring nations traveled to Indian villages across New England, including the Wabanaki villages in Maine, to solicit help in ridding the area of the English. Numerous Englishmen in New England, especially in Maine, cited the pleas of the southern New England Indians as instrumental to Wabanaki involvement in a war that many, especially Kennebecs and Penobscots, hesitated to join. When the war started in September 1675, Thomas Gardiner, a trader with Indians on the coast at Pemaquid, wrote that “the first & Cheefest” reason for war was “the Coming of divers Indianes from the westwards” who persuaded the Wabanakis to undertake “this ungodly Enterprise.”¹⁹ Gardiner, who had traded often with Indians, especially the Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and Penobscots, had come to trust many of them. He had built a good reputation among the Indians on the frontier and would defend the Kennebecs against overzealous Englishmen looking to attack any Indian, friend or foe. In an effort to support and protect the local Indians he had come to respect, Gardiner eventually blamed subsequent Indian attacks on Falmouth (now Portland) not on local Wabanakis but on “stragling persones” from the “southwards,” or the Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and Wampanoags from southern New England.²⁰

But Gardiner understood the problems that plagued the Maine borderlands in ways that colonial officials in Boston did not. He knew more than most about the tensions that had dogged the Anglo-Wabanaki fur trade, and he readily acknowledged that hostilities arose in part from “our owne Acctings.”²¹ A particularly thorny problem stemmed from English demands for Wabanaki guns. News of war in southern New England (the first attacks were on June 24, 1675) arrived in Maine at least by July 11, 1675, when Henry Sawyer of York sent word of it up the Maine coast, and the magistrates in the region of Sagadahoc decided to deploy a military contingent up the Kennebec River to demand that the Wabanakis disarm. If the Indians refused to do so, the council of magistrates decided that the troops should attack immediately. Captains Richard Patteshall and Thomas Lake (an important Indian trader on Arrowsic Island) and a contingent of military volunteers soon met with a group of coastal Androscoggin and Kennebec Wabanakis and asked them to hand over their weapons. The English could only convince a fraction of the small group of Indians present—seven Kennebecs and five Androscoggins, from the area of the Pejepscot River—to give up their arms, ammunition, powder, shot, and knives. Patteshall, Lake, and a Mr. Wiswal suspected that some of the Indians still hid weapons, and lobbied hard for the Indians to hand them over as well. Five more Androscoggins responded by bringing in their guns, but the tense scene



Collectively called Wabanakis, the various bands of native peoples in Maine have been referred to by the river along which they lived – thus, for example, the Sacos, Androscroggins, or Penobscots. This 1605 map by Samuel de Champlain depicts a native village at the mouth of the Saco River. Maine Historical Society Collections.

soon turned violent, as an Androscoggin attacked a settler with an ax. The settler survived unscathed, but the English were furious, and demanded the attacker's execution. The Wabanakis eventually prevailed upon the English to accept forty beaver skins as recompense for the attack, to be paid after the next autumn's hunt.²² The next day, the ancient and respected Androscoggin sachem Rawandagon, whom the English nicknamed Robin Hood, danced and sang in a display of peace, to the approbation of all present. The trader Lake then dispersed rum, tobacco, and other supplies to the Indians, although many English bystanders were disgusted by what they believed was unearned generosity.²³

But many Indians present were disgusted, too, especially a faction of Androscoggins. Angered that the English would abuse Maine's Indians by demanding the Indians give up their weapons, humiliated that some of their fellow Wabanakis would do so, and burning from what many Indians believed was years of abuse in the fur trade, these Androscoggins found Squando's message of raising the hatchet—for entirely different reasons than Squando's—more appealing than the soothing words and dancing of their own sachem Robin Hood.²⁴ The Kennebecs and many other Androscoggins, however, steadfastly supported peace.

The hostile Indians waited until September 1675 to strike. At the beginning of the month, a contingent of Indians, most likely the same disaffected Androscoggins from the parley, attacked the home of the trader Thomas Purchase on the Pejepscot River, where they stole liquor and ammunition and killed a calf and two sheep. Many English people along the coast and in Massachusetts Bay, hearing about the attack, were incensed by what they believed to be Indian duplicity in the face of the recent peaceful negotiations, not recognizing that the Indians might disagree amongst themselves whether to pursue peace or war. The Indians attacked a number of trading houses in the Sagadahoc region on September 9, when they molested two English ships filled with stores of corn.²⁵ But the next day, September 10, the violence started in earnest, when Indians attacked the family of Thomas Wakely at their farm north of Falmouth. Six were killed in a gruesome manner, and three others remained missing.²⁶

So, at this point, the Wabanakis harbored numerous opinions on the war. Those in favor fought for at least four reasons. Many allied with the sachem Squando were bent on revenge for the death of his infant son. Others were incensed at English demands for Indian disarmament. Yet others harbored resentment over decades-old problems related to the fur trade. Finally, some listened attentively to envoys from King Philip,

and wanted to engage the English in what might be understood as a pan-Indian war on New England. And, of course, many Indians were motivated by a combination of these issues. But other Indians remained unconvinced. They pushed for peace, hoping to maintain trade for necessities and skirt the inevitable problems that come from warfare—death, disease, and migration from harm's way. But when the war began, English settlers and government officials elided these nuances and viewed the Wabanakis as a monolithic group that wantonly violated an agreement against violence. This disconnection between Indian motives and English interpretations would profoundly affect how the war unfolded.

More attacks happened in rapid succession after the incident at the Wakely farm, attacks that highlight the complicated Indian-Indian and Indian-English alliances that were beginning to form on the Maine frontier. Thirty-six Saco warriors, led by Squando and goaded into war by representatives of the warring nations to the south, moved down the Saco River to attack the garrison-homes of Captain John Bonithon and Major William Phillips, on either side of the river at the Saco township. But a Saco Wabanaki named Scossaway and a group of pro-peace Androscoggins warned English settlers of Squando's plan. Once Captain Bonithon heard the news, he took his family across the river to Major Phillips' garrison, and had to watch his garrison and other buildings go up in flames the next day.²⁷ The Indians then attacked Phillip's garrison, but failed miserably in their assault, suffering six men dead and eighteen wounded.²⁸ They abandoned the siege, left the Saco River, and headed northeast to Blue Point and Scarborough, where they killed several people and destroyed at least twenty-seven homes. Along the way, they killed five travelers.²⁹ Overall, the mission failed, but the message was sent.

To the east, many Kennebecs heard of these attacks with alarm, but not surprise. By this point they had already experienced tensions with skittish English settlers and traders firsthand. Upon hearing about the skirmish at Falmouth (but not yet of the killings at the Wakely farm), the Kennebecs from the east side of the Kennebec River went to Captain Lake's trading post at Taconic (a point above on the Kennebec River, now Winslow). Before any of the Indian depredations had occurred, Captains Sylvanus Davis and Lake had decided to remove all of the shot, powder, and other trade goods from the post and bring them down river, closer to the coast, as they feared problems with the Indians. Lake then sent a messenger to the Kennebecs, asking them to move down the river and settle there, where they should not harbor any bad feelings toward

the English, and where they could trade. The messenger then told the Kennebecs that if they chose not to come down the river, and not to give up all of their weapons, then, as Hubbard wrote, “the English would kill them.” A situation that had demanded diplomacy and delicacy received only ultimatums, and sending a messenger only highlighted the traders’ distrust. The Kennebecs must have been mystified and angered by this message, as they had, up to this point, made efforts to maintain the peace and encourage good relations. But they recognized immediately that their lives were in danger, refused Lake’s offer, and immediately embarked eastward, toward the Penobscots, to confer with them about the situation.³⁰

The Kennebecs’ refusal to comply, coupled with the violence along the southern coast, led to settler panic, then rage. Any sign of tension between the settlers and the Indians convinced many English colonists that the Indians wanted war. The colonists at Pemaquid—the easternmost English settlement on the coast—immediately abandoned the post and fled to Damarascove and Monhegan Islands. On September 22, Thomas Gardiner wrote to Governor John Leverett of Massachusetts Bay that the people of Pemaquid “ar fled & Left their houses Corne Cattell & all to the Ennimy (if Anny) & Cannot Expekt but the End will be A famin if thay live.” They lacked the basic necessities, especially “Powder & shott for their defence at the Iland.”³¹ Gardiner, a friend of many Indians in the region, had already heard from some Wabanakis of the St. George’s River area that most Indians had fled inland, fearing blanket reprisals by the English. Gardiner wrote that English demands for Indian guns forced the Indians to refuse the offer, as guns had become necessary for their survival. “And seeing these Indianes in these parts did never Apeare dissatisfied untill their Armes wear Taken Away,” Gardiner wrote, “I doubt of such Acctions whether thay may not be forced to go the french for Releife or fight Against us having nothing for their suport Almost in these parts but their guns.” Both Gardiner and his fellow trader John Earthy wanted to maintain peaceful relations with the local Wabanakis, but the majority of English settlers who had fled to the coastal islands “think fitt to go into the woods & Kill or sease on All Indianes thay find,” which to Gardiner would “not only be frutles, but overbalanced with Abundance of Danger.” What they really needed to do, Gardiner believed, was “get our selves into as defensive A posture as we Can.” These new island refugees decided that an appropriate response to the situation was to put a £5 bounty on any Indian’s head, though none volunteered when asked to go on the march.³²

Although this separation of Indians and English settlers made for a tense peace in eastern Maine, the attacks continued in western Maine. As news of the raids began to trickle down the coast to the more populated areas of southwestern Maine, coastal New Hampshire, and Massachusetts Bay, hostile Indians began to target Maine settlements. In October 1675, small groups of Sacos and Androscoggins attacked settlers at Newechewannick (now the region of Berwick) and a house at Oyster River in New Hampshire. Attacks then occurred at Kittery, Falmouth, Black Point, and Wells in Maine, as well as Cocheco (Dover) and settlements near Exeter and Hampton, in New Hampshire.³³ In a fortunate turn for the English, winter hit hard on October 16, and the Indians were forced to retrench. The English attempted to coalesce a militia contingent for winter raids against Indian villages at Pejeboscot, Pigwacket, and Ossipee in December, but by that time four feet of snow had fallen, and the raids were called off.³⁴ The Maine borderlands were quiet for the time being.

That quiet opened the door for a potential peace during the following spring and summer. Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire officials gathered together with a group of Indians from western Maine, New Hampshire, and northern Massachusetts Bay in Cocheco, New Hampshire, to negotiate a peace, which was signed on July 3, 1676, by seven Indians, the most important being Squando. Dony, from the Kennebunk Wabanakis of southeastern Maine, also signed—an indication that they had joined Squando in fighting against the English as well. Representatives of the Pennacooks, who had remained neutral, and the Christian Indians of Wamesit, who had fought for the English, signed the treaty, giving it more legitimacy. It stipulated that any who broke the treaty would be prosecuted under English law as criminals, and that the Indians would give no aid to the southern New England Indians who were still fighting the war.³⁵

But peace did not characterize the deteriorating situation up the coast, and one incident did much to drive many Indians away from the English. When violence broke out on both the southern and northern New England fronts in 1675, the General Court of Massachusetts Bay began to pass declarations and laws in mid-October that limited Indian movement and made it legal “to apprehend and secure” Indians who wandered too close to Boston without English approval. Almost immediately, Henry Lawton and John Leverdure, both of Boston, sailed the ship *Endeavor* up the Maine coast to capture Indians. They traveled up to Machias and Cape Sable, both well outside of the English claims to

territory, and pretended to have goods to trade with the local Indians not involved in the war. They took seventeen natives captive and brought them back to Boston, where they were sold into slavery. Lawton and Leverdure were eventually arrested and tried in 1677; Leverdure was acquitted and Lawton fined £20. No doubt the delay in the trial, and the lightness of the fines, had to do with English attitudes toward Indians during this troubled time. Regardless, the trial occurred well after word of the deed had reached the eastern Maine Wabanakis on the coast. By then, the damage had already been done.³⁶

The slaving expedition highlighted the troublesome nature of Indian-English relations in northern New England during the period. Many Bostonians, and even settlers and traders along the coast of Maine, minimized their interaction with the Wabanakis. Although some traders, such as Thomas Gardiner, understood keenly the differences between Wabanaki groups and befriended many Indians, these men were often ignored when discussions about Indian policy occurred in Boston. Policymakers in Massachusetts Bay lacked nuance in their views toward the Indians and failed to recognize the importance of diplomacy. At times, Bostonians recognized that different Wabanakis held a range of opinions on a variety of subjects, including war. But for the most part throughout the colonial period, Boston officials rarely deviated from certain goals: regulate all trade with the Indians, keep them away from the French, and, after 1693, demand their subjection under the English crown. Thus they remained constantly at odds with the Wabanakis and even English settlers in Maine.³⁷

The slaving expedition infuriated many Indians, including the hitherto peaceful Kennebecs and Penobscots. They had suffered through a harsh winter, cut off from both their English supply of gunpowder, which they needed for hunting, and from their food resources on the coast. During the winter many Kennebecs and Penobscots became angry, and although they continued to push for peace, stories of English slavers running up and down the coast kidnapping peaceful Indians was another thing entirely. By early summer of 1676, many Kennebecs and Penobscots wanted to attack English settlements and property, while other Indian groups, in the words of Hubbard, “were strangely dispersed, and dispirited, so as they from that Time began to separate one from another, and every Nation of them to shift for themselves.”³⁸

Despite the troublesome situation for the eastern Maine Wabanakis, many Kennebecs and Penobscots maintained constant contact with the English settlers who had returned to Pemaquid, and they often brought

presents to show their good intentions and desire for peace. During the spring of 1676, they redeemed a captive, a young English boy, as a gesture of goodwill. But during the summer, when these Indians learned of the slaving raid of Lawton and Leverdure, they traveled to Pemaquid and demanded the English account for their actions. John Earthy and Richard Oliver, leading traders at Pemaquid, knew nothing of the raids, and doubted they actually happened, but they calmed the Indians, and even persuaded them to meet with the still-warring Androscoggins to broker a peace, one that they hoped could dovetail with the treaty signed at Cocheco that month. These Wabanakis agreed to the idea, and a meeting was arranged among some Androscoggins, the Kennebecs, and the Penobscots at Taconic in August, but with sore feelings on both sides.³⁹

Captain Sylvanus Davis negotiated for the English, and tensions between the Wabanaki pro- and anti-war factions began to strain the negotiations almost immediately. The Penobscot Madockawando “sate as Chief” of the proceedings, and the Kennebec Assiminasqua spoke for the Kennebecs and the Penobscots. Assiminasqua confronted Davis about the Indian slavers and about the ultimatum that Captain Lake had made about disarmament or death the previous autumn. Did friends treat each other in this way? Davis acknowledged the injustice of the slave traders, but asserted that the English lacked the authority to do anything about it, as the transgression occurred outside of New England’s territorial jurisdiction. Tarumkin, a man who headed the Androscoggin delegation after the recent death of Robin Hood, soon moved the discussion to less contentious topics by stating that he and the three Androscoggin sachems who had joined him—which included Robin Hood’s son, Hope Hood—wanted peaceful relations with the English. However, he admitted, many other Wabanakis to the west, presumably including other Androscoggins, Sacos, Kennebunks, and Pigwackets, still agitated for war, regardless of the recent treaty signed at Cocheco. But he reasserted his commitment for peace, against the wishes of these bellicose Indians, as did the eight other Androscoggins present.⁴⁰

The talk of peace only angered the Penobscot Madockawando, who bypassed Assiminasqua as speaker and demanded to know why the English insisted on Wabanaki disarmament and refused to trade shot and powder to the Indians. What would the English have us do, he asked, starve during the winter, after all our corn was gone? Or should we travel to Québec to get our goods from the French? Davis replied that he would bring that problem up with Governor Leverett when he returned

to Boston, but in the meantime the English could only permit the Indians to keep some arms to use for their hunt. With so many Indians in western Maine still eager to fight, as Tarumkin had noted, the English could not sell powder to the Kennebecs and Penobscots, for "what do we but cut our own throats?"⁴¹ Davis, like many Englishmen of the time, refused to differentiate between friendly and enemy Wabanakis. Regardless, Davis said, he had no right to make a decision on trading weapons; only the governor and council in Boston could decide that. If the government wanted the Indians to wait ten years to get powder, he declared, then the Indians would have to wait ten years to get powder.⁴² His words infuriated the Kennebecs and the Penobscots, and the Androscoggins were alarmed enough to rethink their position on peace. The talks broke off almost immediately, on August 10.⁴³

The breakdown of negotiations only mirrored events that were already put into motion elsewhere. During the talks, Wabanakis who were uninterested in peace fell upon Falmouth. On August 9, they killed a cow owned by Captain Anthony Brackett. They returned two days later, on August 11, under the leadership of Simon, an Indian from the Piscataqua region who had just been released from Cocheco's prison with the peace in July. They attacked Brackett's farm, stole his weapons, killed his son, and took the rest of the family captive.⁴⁴ They then attacked farm after farm on the outskirts of Falmouth, and by the end of the day they had killed eleven men and killed or captured twenty-three women and children.⁴⁵

On August 13, the Kennebecs and the Penobscots fully joined the war when they attacked the trading post of Richard Hammond, in a probable attempt to gain supplies. No one was injured. These Wabanakis then traveled down to Arrowsic, where they arrived on the morning of August 14, and attacked the fortified trading post of Major Thomas Clarke and Captain Thomas Lake. The Indians killed or captured sixty-three people. Lake was caught and killed; Sylvanus Davis was wounded but escaped; and Clarke fled with his life. The Indians looted the trading post at Arrowsic, taking many thousands of pounds of merchandise.⁴⁶ The war had now shifted decidedly eastward.

These raids demonstrated to the English that the Indians could overrun them in Maine. Word of the attacks spread rapidly to English settlers, many of whom abandoned their coastal settlements. Settlers in the Sagadahoc region fled to Damariscove Island, and then, believing they were still in danger, fled further to Monhegan Island. As they attempted to build a temporary settlement, they saw smoke emanating from their

burning villages on the mainland. They sent messengers to the more-populated areas to the south for help, but when no help came after three weeks, they took as many provisions as they could and sailed for Piscataqua, Salem, and Boston. Others had fled to Jewell Island, only to be attacked there by a group of Kennebecs, but they were eventually rescued by passing fishermen. No English settlements northeast of Black Point now remained.⁴⁷

If any Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and Penobscots still questioned their involvement in the war, news of events happening simultaneously in New Hampshire would have quelled any doubts. Because the war in southern New England was now over (Metacom, or King Philip, was shot to death in August 1676), the English could turn their full attention to the war in the north. One hundred and thirty English militiamen and thirty Natick Indian warriors were sent to Cocheco, all placed under the general command of Major Richard Waldron. There, roughly four hundred Indians had come together to reinvigorate the peace talks. About half were Pennacooks from New Hampshire, who had remained loyal to the English through their neutrality, but many others were refugees from the southern New England Nipmucks, Wampanoags, and Narragansetts, Indians who had recently stopped fighting with the collapse of King Philip's coalition. Emotions ran high. Men on both sides, including Major Waldron, recognized enemy warriors from past battles, and the English were eager to punish King Philip's warriors. Under orders from Boston, Waldron laid a trap for them on September 7, 1676. He brought the Indians together under a flag of truce, and then surrounded them with his soldiers (some of whom had misgivings about the order). All of the two hundred or so Pennacooks under the sachem Wanalancet, whom the English knew were innocent of depredations against English villages, were released, and the rest were deemed enemies of New England. Ten of them were immediately sent to Boston and executed. The rest were eventually sold into slavery.⁴⁸ Waldron and the government in Boston believed he had fulfilled the government's orders, but the Pennacooks were shaken by Waldron's act.⁴⁹

With this blow the war reached a new phase, as it galvanized Indian opposition like never before. As the Kennebecs and Penobscots had recently joined the war, the Wabanakis throughout Maine finally presented a united front against the English. Now, Pigwackets, Kennebunks, Sacos, Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and Penobscots all took part in the violence, and many of the New Hampshire Pennacooks felt alienated, at the least, from their English allies. The homogenizing vision of Massa-

chusetts Bay officials had created the pan-Wabanaki enemy it had always believed existed.

Although a vast majority of Wabanakis began to fight the English, they did not coordinate their attacks on English settlements. Had they coalesced into larger groups, they might have paradoxically given the English a chance to defend themselves in Maine. But the Wabanakis continued to fight the English within small groups, only occasionally raiding with more than twenty warriors at a time. They continued to attack outlying farms and poorly defended villages, never opting for full assaults against English soldiers but only engaging at times they deemed opportune. This new phase of the war pitted relatively coalesced English forces against numerous, tiny, highly mobile groups of extremely skilled Wabanaki warriors who attacked in uncoordinated, minimally planned, minimally strategized, relatively spontaneous raids.

With the frontier so exposed, with the Wabanakis dispersed in such a way as to deny the English any substantial targets (without actually going deep into Indian territory to Wabanaki villages, and even then with only the possibility of finding and destroying tiny groups of Wabanaki warriors), the Wabanakis had ample opportunity to wreak havoc on English villages. They took advantage of those opportunities, suffered minimal casualties, did enormous damage to English settlements, and inched closer and closer to removing all English settlers from Maine by the fall of 1676. When those settlers saw or heard of the destruction, they panicked, and hundreds began to flee further down the coast. With their small, unpredictable fighting forces, the Wabanakis made numerous raids that individually amounted only to superficial wounds but when combined quickly bled English Maine to death.

As word of Waldron's act in Cocheco traveled through Wabanakia, various Indian groups began to work toward eradicating the English presence in Maine, and even beyond. Black Point was now the easternmost point of English settlement, which made it an obvious target. It came under attack, on October 12, 1676, by forces led by an Indian named Mogg Hegen, an important sachem-diplomat who seemed to have ties with the Sacos, the Androscoggins, the Kennebecs, and even the English at different times. The village fell the same day.⁵⁰

The attack on Black Point occurred under the nose of Captain William Hathorne, who had been sent out after the events at Cocheco with a contingent of Massachusetts militiamen and friendly Natick Indians to engage the Indians of Maine. He and his men marched to Falmouth, but succeeded in doing little else. The hostile Wabanakis in the

area of southwestern Maine refused to engage his unit, and instead made small raids nearby that Hathorne's troops were powerless to stop, such as at Black Point.⁵¹ The only success that Hathorne could claim was the capture of one Pigwacket sachem, who told him of thirty or forty Kennebecs who fought from a Pigwacket base at Ossippee. They had twenty captured Englishmen there. "[W]ee found him in many lyes," Hathorne insisted, and he handed the Pigwacket over to a group of "Cochecho Indians," or Pennacooks, to torture and execute.⁵² In his report to his superiors, Hathorne concluded that it was difficult to engage the Indians in war. There were too many rivers and the land was "soe much broken" that the Indians simply receded into the forest. Many of the English settlers in Maine, he continued, wanted to abandon the place, kill their cattle, and cut their corn, but Hathorne ordered them to stay as he did not think it good "for the Interest of the Country." He returned to Massachusetts Bay with very little to show for his efforts.⁵³

One of the "many lyes" Hathorne believed he had been told regarded French involvement in the war, a persistent rumor that reinforced English homogenization of the Indians in Maine. The sachem had denied the rumor, but Hathorne did not believe him, and he was not the only one. He wrote that the inhabitants throughout coastal Maine had told him of French support from the government of the nearby colony of Québec. Many English settlers along the coast simply took that as self-evident, and the topic burned in English minds throughout the war. New Englanders were obsessed with the French, asserting that they propagated a corrupt papist religion, encouraged underhanded politics, and traded arms and ammunition with the Indians. The fact that they could only glimpse French involvement in Maine heightened English anxiety.⁵⁴

There is no evidence of involvement by the French government in King Philip's War. In fact, the French government took particular care to foster good relations with the English during this period. In a *mémoire* to his government in Québec, Louis XIV urged them to build up trade and commercial links with New England in the hopes of solidifying the growth of his much smaller colony. The French crown hoped that trade with the English would not only enhance the successful French fishing industry but would also stimulate French shipping, as France wanted to import timber from New England in exchange for wine and *eau de vie*.⁵⁵ The governor-general of New France, the Comte de Frontenac, met with many of the Wabanaki refugees who fled the fighting in Maine to the Jesuit mission of Sillery, and told them that they were welcomed to stay in

the area on the condition that they would not return to fight the English.⁵⁶ The French government wanted little to do with this Anglo-Indian war.⁵⁷

But other, more independently minded Frenchmen disagreed with Louis's policy. Numerous French traders might have attempted to do their best to support the Wabanaki cause. Many of these men, unlike some of their English counterparts, negotiated deftly with Indians, and some even lived among them. The most prominent French trader in the area of present-day Maine, Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie, Baron de Saint-Castin, lived among the Penobscots for decades, and eventually married the daughter of the head sachem Madockawando.⁵⁸ These *coureurs de bois* forged ties with Indian communities that most Englishmen failed to achieve. They adapted to the protocols of Indian reciprocity within trade, understanding that the Indians viewed trade relations not as simple contractual exchanges but as mutually beneficial relations between kin—literally with Saint-Castin, metaphorically with other French traders. Therefore, they not only stood to gain from supplying the Wabanakis with the materials the Indians could no longer get from the English, but they also had obligations within Wabanaki society that demanded proper reciprocal relations between kin. Shrewd French traders like Saint-Castin merged these two dimensions of trade to profit economically and socially, building both material and social capital.

So it is no surprise that Francis Card, a settler on the Kennebec River who was captured with his family by the Kennebecs and Penobscots in August 1676, reported to Boston officials after his escape that he had overheard “a french man tell the Idenes that casten was very thankful to them for what they had don and tould them that he and his men would help them in the spring and that he would se for powder this winter.”⁵⁹ Or, even more pointedly, that Joshua Scottow, in charge of the garrison at Black Point in 1676, reported that he heard an English settler, hidden in the woods to escape an Indian attack, had seen among the seventy or eighty Indians “two or three Frenchmen with them, one who leads being brave with blue, black & yellow ribbons on his knee, a hat buckled with a silver buckle, brave belt, &c. & heard him inquire in French by an Indian interpreter who spoke very good English of the captives, whether it were difficult to take Richmond Island & Blackpoint, of the number of our men, & that their design is to carry all before as they have done along the Eastern shore.”⁶⁰ Clearly, some French individuals helped the Wabanakis during the war.

That support, although minimal, was enough for rumors to take

hold in northern New England. Many Wabanakis recognized the importance of disinformation, and did their best to spread it, if it helped their cause. They understood that settlers and government officials in New England feared French involvement, and they did not disabuse the English of that possibility. Card went on to report that during his captivity at Pemaquid, four Indian women arrived from Québec and told the Wabanakis in Maine that “the gouverner of canedy did thank them for what they had don and towld them that they would help them with 100: men and amunesion...” Mogg Hegon also bragged to Card that he was soon off to Canada to get Governor-General Frontenac’s support.⁶¹

When false rumors like these were added to the occasional sighting of a Frenchman on the frontier and the English predisposition to believe any allegation of French involvement, the result was widespread panic. Thomas Gardiner, so friendly with Penobscots and Kennebecs prior to the war, was almost immediately accused of trading with the enemy—already both French and Indian—when the war broke out. He was forced to travel to Boston to explain his actions, and he was eventually acquitted.⁶² The council in Boston wrote a letter to the Secretary of State in London in April 1676, which charged that Jesuits and other Frenchmen were helping the Indians fight against them.⁶³ Major Brian Pendleton, commander at Winter Harbor, displayed an acute case of English anxiety over French involvement in his description of the 1676 attack on Black Point. Although an eyewitness to the attack had seen two or three Frenchmen among the seventy or eighty Indians, Pendleton, who was not at Black Point, wrote in a letter to the governor and council that five hundred Indians and three hundred Frenchmen attacked the garrison, and an additional one hundred Indians were attacking farms in the area. He and his men used that information to justify abandoning their post at Winter Harbor.⁶⁴ Rumors played a key role in disorienting the English on the Maine frontier, and the fear of a unified enemy aided by the duplicitous French only enhanced the Wabanakis’ ability to erase the English from more of the coast. By 1676, only Wells, York, and Kittery remained as English settlements in Maine, and isolated farms around Wells came under Wabanaki attack not long after.⁶⁵


Strangely, with the victory at Black Point and the English on the brink of being swept from Maine, Mogg attempted to take the war into a new direction in early November 1676, by meeting with Governor John Leverett in Boston to broker a peace. This decision must have been unpopular for many Wabanakis, especially the Sacos and Androscoggins, who may have known nothing about it at all. Numerous Sacos and An-

droscoggins, whose villages were closest to the remaining English settlements, were probably eager to eradicate English settlement from at least the area east of the Piscataqua River—a natural boundary not only between Maine and New Hampshire, but also between the warring eastern Wabanakis and the neutral Pennacooks. But Mogg was designated to make peace with the English by Madockawando, the Penobscot sachem. His Penobscots were farthest from the English settlements, and maintained the best relations with English traders before the war. Saint-Castin, the French trader, lived among the Penobscots at Pentagouët, and his profitable enterprises—which did much to maintain the general wealth of the Penobscots as a whole—was certainly hurt by the war, as his main trading partners were English. Although this can only be speculated, it seems that Madockawando might have pushed for peace, for it benefited his Penobscots the most.⁶⁶

Governor Leverett eagerly wanted a peace as well. However, he did not understand the subtleties of Wabanaki diplomacy and was arrogant about how he negotiated. He drew up articles that were so favorable to the English that Mogg must have realized that the governor refused to compromise—which also must have shocked him, considering the state of English settlements on the Maine frontier. The peace that Mogg signed on November 6, 1676, was filled with items that most Wabanakis would reject, and some provisions were impossible for the Indians to fulfill. Its major points stipulated that Madockawando would first convince all the Wabanakis to stop hostilities against the English, and that he and his allies would declare war on any Indians that continued them. Second, the Wabanakis would return all English captives, ships, and goods, including arms and artillery, that they took from the English, and the Indians would compensate the English for all injuries, losses, damages to houses, cattle, and estates, either immediately or in yearly fees paid to the government of Massachusetts Bay—if the council even approved that expediency. Third, the English would begin to supply the Indians with powder, firearms, ammunition, and other necessary supplies, but the Wabanakis could only trade for guns and ammunition with traders approved by the governor and council. And finally, as a gesture of Indian goodwill, Mogg was to make himself a prisoner of the English until all of these treaty stipulations were met. No doubt fearing that his refusal might lead to his immediate incarceration, Mogg signed the peace on November 6, 1676, with absolutely no intention of keeping his word.⁶⁷ Once he was released to contact numerous Indians on the coast to inform them of the treaty, he fled, and the peace was stillborn.⁶⁸

It did not take officials in Boston long to realize that Mogg and Madockawando had no intention of abiding by the treaty. On January 29, 1677, the council ordered Major Waldron to lead a contingent of 150 English militiamen and fifty Natick Indians to Maine and either destroy the Wabanakis or gain a lasting peace.⁶⁹ This expedition proved to be almost as inconclusive as Hathorne's. Waldron met and negotiated with Simon to redeem English captives on the coast at Maquoit (near Brunswick) on February 18. Simon promised to return them a day after the goods were handed to the Indians. Waldron wanted to negotiate directly with Squando, who remained nearby. Squando agreed, but on the condition that they meet alone, in a canoe, in the bay—Waldron's reputation had preceded him. Waldron refused, stating that "he would not venture himself in your Leakie canoo, and that if he had no more to say, the Treaty was ended." Squando professed himself eager for peace talks, however, and still agreed to return captives the next morning. But the Indians (most likely Sacos and Androscoggins) came late the next day, without the captives, some miles upriver from the English. They proceeded to burn an abandoned house and taunted English scouting parties, goading them to attack. The truce was broken, fighting began, and several Indians were wounded. The English again raised the white flag, to enquire about the captives, and head scout John Paine parleyed with Simon. Simon explained that a contingent of Wabanakis was uninterested in Squando's attempts at peace, and had decided on their own to attack and burn the settler's home. He promised to bring the captives the next day, as Squando had sent away for them. He finished the parley by accusing the English of initiating the fight with the Indians, and demanding compensation for the two wounded men.⁷⁰

The rest of Waldron's expedition only exacerbated the tension and violence. Waldron waited one more day for Simon to bring the captives, and when they failed to arrive he and his men traveled up the coast to Arrowsic Island, wandering in the area for three days in the snow without seeing an Indian. On February 26, Waldron and sixty of his men traveled farther up the coast toward the mouth of the Penobscot River, leaving the rest of his men under Captain Sylvanus Davis on Arrowsic Island to build a garrison.⁷¹ During the trip, they stopped at Pemaquid, parleying with Indians who had taken over Thomas Gardiner's trading post. The group included the Penobscot sachem Mattahando, who insisted that they had refused to join Madockawando and his men against the English. Three other sachems from the group told Waldron of their intentions for peace. Waldron did not believe them, but he wanted to ne-



Map of English settlements in Maine in the 1670s. Most of these settlements were destroyed by the Wabanakis during King Philip's War. Courtesy of the author.

gotiate for any English captives they had before attacking them. He struck a bargain of a certain amount of goods per captive, including alcohol, and the Penobscots gave him the three they had. He distributed the alcohol first, and he promised to bring the remaining items in the afternoon.

While they drank, Waldron demanded that the Indians hand over those responsible for any depredations against the English. Alarmed, the sachems stated that none were there. Only the young warriors were responsible, they told Waldron, and they were increasingly difficult to control. Under a flag of truce, Waldron brought the Indians some of the ransom goods in the afternoon, but soon accused the Indians of secretly preparing to kill Waldron and his soldiers. The English then attacked, killing seven Indians, including Mattahando. Waldron also took four prisoners, including the Penobscot sachem Megunaway, and Madockawando's sister. He and his men looted the store of goods at Pemaquid, then executed Megunaway. Upon returning to Boston, Waldron and his men hoped that this attack had "scattered and broken" the Wabanakis, and that the Indians would end their depredations on settlers in the area.⁷² That statement alone highlights just how little Waldron understood the situation in Maine.

Although officials in Massachusetts Bay and settlers in northern New England hoped Waldron was correct, the spring of 1677 brought more

war. Truth and rumor of Waldron's expedition into Maine the previous winter would have circulated along the coast, and, at the very least, many Penobscots would have wanted to retaliate for the deaths of Mattahando and Megunaway, among others. A group of Wabanakis, probably local Kennebecs and Penobscots, attacked the fledgling garrison on Arrowsic Island, while small groups of western Maine Wabanakis led by Simon attacked the settlements of York and Wells. The Indians also began to make raids in New Hampshire, against farms within miles of Portsmouth, killing six.⁷³ Boston received a petition from the village of York, pleading for reinforcements.⁷⁴

Obviously the government of Massachusetts Bay recognized that the war would continue, and with the first signs of spring in New England they sent envoys to Albany, New York, to convince the Mohawks to fight against the Wabanakis. The Mohawks had played an important role in New England's destruction of King Philip's coalition.⁷⁵ They had antagonized the Wabanakis for decades before King Philip's War. Now, Massachusetts Bay officials wanted the Mohawks to help them solve the Wabanaki problems to the northeast. The Mohawks received the diplomats kindly, and stated they would send a raiding party eastward, but that they were unable to send a large assault force for some time.⁷⁶ This small contingent soon attacked a group of Pennacooks, killing several of them, including one of their sachems, Blind Will.⁷⁷ That was the extent of Mohawk involvement in the northern front of King Philip's War.

Regardless of how little the Mohawks did on the Maine frontier, the fact that the English were talking with them made an enormous impression on Wabanakia. Many Wabanakis were terrified of the Mohawks because they still remembered the suffering they received at Mohawk hands during the 1660s. Rumors of impending Mohawk attacks began to circulate around northern New England in 1677; few Wabanakis wanted to contemplate a war with both the English and the Mohawks at the same time.⁷⁸ Some began to fear that these Mohawk-English negotiations proved that, in the words of historian Emerson Baker, "the English planned to exterminate them."⁷⁹ Other Wabanakis began to betray their skittishness. When a Wabanaki raiding party captured a delegation of pro-English Indians, the party carried the captives twenty miles inland, set them free, and retreated, for they feared that Mohawks might be in the area.⁸⁰

But rumors of Mohawk involvement did not stop Wabanakis from making their raids on English settlements. On May 16, 1677, they again attacked the garrison at Black Point, which had been reinvested by the

English after losing it to Mogg in 1676. Mogg again led a group of warriors (most likely Kennebecs and Penobscots), but was killed during the three-day siege, and the English rebuffed the attack. The Indians followed this raid with others on York on May 19, Wells on May 23, and Hampton, New Hampshire, on June 13. Nine Englishmen were killed during these raids. When the English counterattacked with a contingent under the command of Captain Benjamin Swett, they suffered their worst defeat of the war, when twenty Natick Indians and forty of the English soldiers, including Swett himself, were killed in an ambush just outside Black Point. The Wabanakis even began to attack English seamen by passing themselves off as fishermen or forcing English crews to sail up to unsuspecting trawlers. By July 15, 1677, news was circulating in the fishing towns of Marblehead and Salem that twenty fishing ketches had been taken by Indians, with crews of five or six men each. With their small, limited raiding, the Wabanakis dominated all of Maine and its coast.⁸¹

But peace was much closer than that incident suggests. It seems appropriate that people unaffiliated with either Massachusetts Bay or the Wabanakis would initiate peace in the region. Governor Edmond Andros of the colony of New York, in a move to reassert the Duke of York's claims to the area of Sagadahoc, sent four ships and one hundred men under Lt. Anthony Brockholst to Pemaquid. Brockholst brought a message of peace to the Wabanakis, and numerous Wabanakis across Maine were eager to hear him out. On July 17, 1677, eight sachems signed a peace agreement. For the time being, all of the Saco and Kennebec Indians put themselves under the leadership of Kennebec sachem Moxes, who led the proceedings. The Sacos, in particular, seemed open for peace, and a majority of them abandoned their sachem, Squando, who fled to Canada. The Androscoggins, Moxes warned the English, were still for war, and were not at the parley. The Wabanakis returned thirty-five English captives to Brockholst.⁸²

New York's interest in Maine made officials in Massachusetts Bay wary. They hoped to maintain a clear and unfettered jurisdiction over the area, and this intrusion certainly countered their claims. They contacted Brockholst before the parley, outlining the demands they believed he should make to the Indians. They insisted that the Wabanakis stop raiding English settlements, return all captives and all fishing ketches, restrict their movements to the west of Casco Bay, and avoid the English settlements. Brockholst told the Indians of Massachusetts Bay's demands, except for the fishing ketches, which he believed was too onerous, and "was like to spoyle all wee had done, & make a new breach." He



The war in Massachusetts proper was more devastating for native groups there than for English colonists, and the war in this southern theatre ended in August 1676 upon King Philip's death. The opposite was true in the District of Maine, as English settlements were nearly wiped out and the war continued until 1678. From Henry E. Chambers, *A Higher History of the United States* (New York and New Orleans: University Publishing Company, 1898), p. 144.

thought that authorities in Massachusetts Bay made these demands because they “had no desire to bee concerned in the Peace, proposing so difficult Termes.”

Brokholst later complained to Boston officials that “yo^r owne people” told the Indians of the demand for the ketches, and it angered “Some of the looser Indyans” so much that they threatened to attack the English contingent and take the Indian captives they had by force. These Wabanakis eventually acquiesced to all of Massachusetts Bay’s demands, but the final treaty ratified in August only stipulated that the Indians would stop fighting the English and return all English captives. Squando, chastised by his fellow villagers, returned in August to join in ratifying the treaty, which was attended by a larger Wabanaki coalition

that included these Indians with Penobscots under Madockawando and a majority of Pigwacket and Androscoggin sachems.⁸³

Massachusetts Bay officials were left on the outside looking in. They eventually had no say over the August 1677 treaty, and they refused to sign it anyway, as doing so would legitimize the Duke of York's claims to the region. However, they recognized the difficulty of maintaining any authority in Maine without peace, so Massachusetts Bay officials pushed for their own diplomatic negotiations with the Wabanakis. The two sides eventually came to terms on April 12, 1678. The Wabanakis agreed to release all English captives, and they gained one peck of corn for every settlement household in Maine. The English settlers were then allowed to go back to their homes. War in Maine was over, for the time being.⁸⁴

Even after the peace treaties of 1677 and 1678, Wabanakis continued to kill cattle, attack fishing boats, and burn down settlers' homes in the Maine borderlands.⁸⁵ Not all Wabanakis took part in the violence, but many Indians remained incensed at how Massachusetts Bay authorities had dealt with them. The colony's hard, unequivocal posture, so prevalent throughout the war, homogenized the complicated interests and constituencies among the Wabanakis, transforming a complex situation that demanded deft diplomacy into a rigid one that encouraged more violence. Many on both sides retained their anger, even years after the war. In 1699, Cotton Mather wrote that the peace in 1678 "Left a Body of Indians, not only with Horrible Murders Unrevenged, but also in the possession of no little part of the Countrey, with circumstances which the English might think not very Honourable."⁸⁶ Numerous Wabanakis, such as the Kennebec sachem Deogenes Madoasquarbet, excoriated Richard Waldron for his wartime acts, complaining immediately after the war that "Major Waldin have bin the cause of killing all that have bin killed this sommer."⁸⁷ The Indians would not forget Waldron's duplicity at Cocheco, or his high-handedness on the Maine coast. When the two groups moved again toward war in 1689, the Wabanakis made a point of attacking Waldron's garrison first. Once inside, they forced Waldron from his bed, sat him at his dining room table, tortured him, then killed him.⁸⁸ The impact of the violence of the 1670s clearly lingered in the minds of these Indians.

One wonders what new readings of violence during King Philip's War could come out of this re-examination of its theater in Maine. Massachusetts Bay officials seemed to create enemies out of peaceful peoples in the north because of the existential threat that the colony faced from King Philip in the south. Because it was an extreme social experience, the

war (like all colonial conflicts in the Northeast) tended toward homogenization at social, cultural, and even psychological levels in order for combatants to justify and rationalize self-preservation. The English would not (and mostly likely could not) break out of that dynamic of homogenization of an Indian enemy in Maine because of the level of devastation wrought by the Narragansetts, Naticks, and Wampanoags. But their relative success against those Indians also no doubt convinced the English of the possibility and justice of a victory against the Wabanakis. Many English and Indian men, women, and children would suffer from that dynamic of violence.⁸⁹

NOTES

1. James Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1678* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), p. 1.
2. The extent of Philip's power over these groups is vague. See Drake, *King Philip's War*, p. 70.
3. Roughly eight hundred to a thousand English men and women died in southern New England, out of a population of thirty thousand. See Douglas E. Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 243-44.
4. Mary Beth Norton, *In the Devil's Snare: The Salem Witch Crisis of 1692* (New York: Vintage, 2003), p. 83; and Drake, *King Philip's War*, pp. 2, 4.
5. For the most important recent monographs, in addition to Drake's, see Daniel Mandell, *King Philip's War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Knopf, 1998); and Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675-1678* (New York: Atheneum, 1990). Out of the above works, only Pulsipher analyzes the situation in Maine in depth. See her *Subjects unto the Same King*, pp. 207-37.
6. Only one published essay focuses solely on King Philip's War in Maine. Kenneth M. Morrison analyzes the inability of the English to comprehend Indian forms of law. See Morrison, "The Bias of Colonial Law: English Paranoia and the Abenaki Arena of King Philip's War, 1675-1678," *New England Quarterly* 53.3 (Sept. 1980): 363-87. As mentioned above, Jenny Hale Pulsipher has a chapter-length study in her monograph. See Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, pp. 207-37. Anthropologists Harald E.L. Prins and Bunny McBride treat the conflict as the first in a series of imperial wars between the French and the English. See Prins and McBride, *Asticou's Island Domain: Wabanaki Peoples at Mount Desert Island, 1500-2000*, 2 vols. (Boston: National Park Service, 2007), I: 161-172. See also Harald E.L. Prins, *The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Pub., 1996), p. 123. Emerson Baker claims that the war in Maine is best understood as a confluence of long-term problems stemming from disputes over the fur trade and the lack of cultural understanding. See Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward: The Failure of Anglo-Indian Relations in Early Maine" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1986), pp. 178-220. John O. Noble has written the most comprehensive narrative of the war in "King Philip's War in

Maine" (M.A. thesis, University of Maine, 1970). See Bruce J. Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp. 148-56; Norton, *In the Devil's Snare*, pp. 83-93; and Mandell, *King Philip's War*, pp. 77-81 and 130-34. The most detailed history of the war is also the earliest: Rev. William Hubbard, *The History of the Indian Wars in New England from the First Settlement to the Termination of the War with King Philip, in 1677*, ed. by Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols. (Roxbury, Mass.: Elliot Woodward, 1865).

7. Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward," p. 179.

8. See Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, pp. 236-37, and Drake, *King Philip's War*, pp. 2, 168-69.

9. See Wayne E. Lee, "Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800," *Journal of Military History* 71.3 (July 2007): 716; Kenneth M. Morrison, "The Mythological Sources of Wabanaki Catholicism: A Case Study of the Social History of Power," in his *The Solidarity of Kin: Ethnohistory, Religious Studies, and the Algonkian-French Religious Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 82, and his *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p. 102; and R. Brian Ferguson, "Violence and War in Prehistory," in *Troubled Times: Violence and Warfare in the Past*, ed. Debra L. Martin and David W. Frayer (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1997), p. 336. See also Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 1-22; and Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., 61.1 (Jan. 2004): 77-106.

10. Lee, "Peace Chiefs," p. 716.

11. In this way, I seem to fall in line with scholars who argue that Indian war in the Northeast could be highly effective and against those who characterize Indian wars as deficient. But the situation in Maine indicates that the limitations of Indian war within the northeastern context could be the asset that permitted the Wabanakis to fight a successful war. See Leroy V. Eid, "'National' War Among Indians of Northeastern North America," *Canadian Review of American Studies* 16.2 (1985): 125-54; Guy Chet, *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), p. 54; Patrick M. Malone, *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991); and Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *The Journal of American History* 74.4 (March 1988): 1187-1212.

12. Just who the Wabanaki Indians were has remained controversial, but I have relied on the works of Emerson Woods Baker, "Finding the Almouchiquois: Native American Territories, Families, and Land Sales in Southern Maine," *Ethnohistory* 51.1 (2004): 73-100; and Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," *Ethnohistory* 36.3 (Summer 1989): 257-84. In this essay, I refer to the entire group of Indians in the area of what is now Maine as the Wabanakis, while identifying specific Indian groups by the rivers with which they were associated, such as the Sacos, the Androscoggins, the Kennebecs, and so on.

13. Norton, *In the Devil's Snare*, pp. 85-86; Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward," pp. 100-102. See, for example, the case of Walter Bagwell, in John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal, "History of New England,"* edited by James Kendall Hosmer, 2 vols. (New York: Scribners, 1908), I: 69.

14. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 134-36.

15. See Malone, *Skulking Way of War*, pp. 7-8.
16. Lepore, *Name of War*, p. 114.
17. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 135-36.
18. In this way, it mirrors the southern arena of King Philip's War, as understood by Jill Lepore, *Name of War*, pp. 71-96.
19. James Phinney Baxter, ed., *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, 2nd Series, Vol. 6, *The Baxter Manuscripts* (Portland, ME: The Thurston Print, 1900), VI: 118 (hereafter cited as *DHSM*); Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 105.
20. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 93.
21. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 91.
22. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 96-99.
23. Harald E.L. Prins, "Chief Rawandagon, Alias Robin Hood: Native 'Lord of Misrule' in the Maine Wilderness," in *Northeastern Indian Lives, 1632-1816*, ed., Robert S. Grumet (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), pp. 112-13; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 99.
24. Prins, "Chief Rawandagon: Alias Robin Hood," p. 113.
25. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 100-02.
26. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 89-90; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 104.
27. George Madison Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War* (Leominster, MA: Private printer, 1891), pp. 247-48.
28. *DHSM*, 2nd Ser., VI: 94; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 105-06; William Durkee Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine.... 2 vols.*, (Hallowell, ME: Glazier, Masters & Co., 1832), I: 522.
29. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 106-10; Williamson, *History of the State of Maine*, I: 522-23.
30. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 92, 147-149.
31. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 91.
32. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 91-93; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 149-50.
33. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 118-28.
34. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 129-30.
35. Massachusetts Archives, Vol. XXX, Indian, 1603-1705: 206. Wamesit is now Lowell, Massachusetts.
36. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., *The Records of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay in New England*, 5 vols. (Boston: William White, 1854), V: 46; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 151; *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 118-19; *Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692*, gen. eds. John Noble and John F. Cronin, 3 vols. (Boston: County of Suffolk, 1901-1928), I: 86-87; Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward," pp. 193-94.
37. Conflicts between Massachusetts Bay officials and English settlers in Maine did not simply stem from Indian problems as Jenny Hale Pulsipher notes. See Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, pp. 208-09.
38. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 130-31.
39. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 151-54.
40. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 154-56.

41. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 156.
42. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 156.
43. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 156.
44. Most likely these raiders were Androscoggins who rejected their sachem Tarumkin and his calls for peace. See *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 116.
45. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 138-39, n167.
46. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 157-61, 163-164.
47. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI, 118-19; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 165-68.
48. Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War*, pp. 226-27, 255-59; Williamson, *History of the State of Maine*, I: 538-39; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 131-33; Norton, *In the Devil's Snare*, pp. 89-90, 351, n19.
49. Williamson, *History of the State of Maine*, I: 539.
50. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 172-73.
51. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 123.
52. This fact is significant, as it highlights the divide within the Pennacooks.
53. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 123-24.
54. Commentators on the war, such as Hubbard, thought that the Indians may have traded with the French for ammunition, but that the main culprits for the war were those English traders who were killed with the shot they had just traded with the Indians. See Hubbard, *History of the Indians Wars*, II: 253.
55. "Mémoire sur le Canada, 1676," in J. Blanchet, ed., *Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, recueillis aux archives de la province de Québec, ou copiés à l'étranger*, 4 vols. (Québec: A. Coté et Cie., 1883-1885), I: 243-44.
56. Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France: 1610-1791*, 72 Vols. (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Co., 1896-1901), LX: 133-35.
57. Kenneth M. Morrison categorically denies French involvement. See his "Bias of Colonial Law," p. 375.
58. *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. 2, 1701-1740, David M. Hayne, gen. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 4-7. Also see Owen Standwood, "Unlikely Imperialist: The Baron of Saint-Castin and the Transformation of the Northeastern Borderlands," *French Colonial History* 5 (2004): 43-61; and Marjolaine Saint-Pierre, *Saint-Castin: Baron français, chef amérindien* (Sillery, Que.: Septentrion, 1999).
59. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 149-50. Also see Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 202-04.
60. Emerson W. Baker, "New Evidence on the French Involvement in King Philip's War," *Maine Historical Society Quarterly* 28.2 (Fall 1988): 87.
61. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 149-50; also in Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 202-04.
62. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 96-97; Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward," p. 188.
63. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 109-13.
64. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 141-42.
65. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 173; *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 124-26.

66. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 175-76. Only Hubbard actually says that Madockawando was involved in the push for peace. However, immediately after Mogg's meeting with Leverett, he went straight to tell Madockawando of the deal, and did not go to the closer Saco villages and their sachem Squando. This leads one to believe that Madockawando and Mogg had discussed the peace beforehand.
67. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 189-92.
68. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 192-93.
69. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 153-55.
70. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 207-15, quotation on p. 214.
71. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 217; *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 164-65.
72. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 215-24, quotation on page p. 224.
73. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 229-31.
74. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 163, 169-70.
75. Drake, *King Philip's War*, pp. 122-23.
76. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 226-27; *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 166-67.
77. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 228. The Pennacooks were allied with the English, but there is some indication that Blind Will retained sympathies for the Wabanaki cause, and encouraged Indians eastward to fight, thereby making him a Mohawk target. See Hubbard, *History of the Indians Wars*, II: 213.
78. Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, pp. 138-40.
79. Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward," p. 211.
80. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 232-33.
81. Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 232-37; James Axtell, "The Vengeful Women of Marblehead: Robert Roules's Desposition of 1677," *William and Mary Quarterly* 31.4 (1974): 647-52.
82. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 177, 189-93; Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, II: 238-39.
83. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 177-179, 186-88, 192, with quotations on p. 192; Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, pp. 235-36.
84. Williamson, *History of the State of Maine*, I: 552-53.
85. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 196-200.
86. Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," in *Narratives of the Indian Wars: 1675-1699*, ed., Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 184.
87. *DHSM*, 2nd Series, VI: 179.
88. Thomas Church, *The History of Philip's War, Commonly Called The Great Indian War, of 1675 and 1676. Also, The French and Indian Wars at the Eastward, in 1689, 1690, 1696, and 1704*, ed., Samuel G. Drake (Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1827), 161n-163n.
89. See Wayne E. Lee, *Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).