



In 1924 Ralph Owen Brewster was elected governor of Maine, despite a widely held conviction that he was the candidate of the Ku Klux Klan. This hotly contested election provides insight into the Klan's role in Maine and its ability to profit from popular ambivalence toward Catholics and French-speaking Mainers. *Photo by Guy T. Kendall Studio, courtesy Fogler Library Special Collections Department, University of Maine.*

PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE KU KLUX KLAN AND RALPH OWEN BREWSTER IN 1924

BY JOHN SYRETT

During the early 1920s the Ku Klux Klan gained considerable support throughout the United States and in Maine. In 1924 Ralph Owen Brewster, later a senator, secured the Republican nomination for governor with the Klan's support. The dominant issue in the election was whether the state should continue to fund parochial schools. Brewster urged that this aid be ended, and the Klan enthusiastically endorsed his candidacy. Brewster narrowly won the primary and then easily won the September election. In this article John Syrett explores the relation between Brewster and the Klan. Mr. Syrett is a Professor of History and former chair of the Department of History at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. He is currently revising his dissertation on the Confiscation Acts during the Civil War for publication. Originally from New York City, he first came to Maine in the 1940s and plans to retire there in the near future.


In September 1924 Ralph Owen Brewster was elected governor of Maine, with the support of the Ku Klux Klan. Many wondered why this respectable lawyer, a Mayflower descendant educated at Bowdoin and Harvard, would accept such support. Detractors claimed he cynically used the Klan to secure the nomination, against the wishes of the Republican organization, and then to defeat Democrat William Pattangall in the September general election. Supporters argued Brewster used the Klan to prohibit state aid for Catholic education on the principle of separation of church and state. While not a member of the Klan, Brewster consistently ignored pleas to condemn it. Moreover, he feigned ignorance of the Klan's methods and did not pursue his goal of denying state aid once in office. But however expedient, Brewster's alliance also confirms what historians have recently argued about the Klan's place in the 1920s and demonstrates that Maine's politics and prejudices were similar to those in other locales where the Klan rose to prominence.

The reassessment of the 1920s Klan demonstrates that it attracted a more diverse and respectable following, including women, than earlier scholarship had discovered. And, unlike the first Klan during Recon-

struction, the second Klan was rarely a vigilante organization, and it had more success in the East, Midwest, and West than in the South. Although the second Klan had a particular animus against African Americans, Catholics, Jews, and modernity in general, it flourished because many average Americans shared such views in the 1920s, and because it responded to more diverse needs and grievances. While it attracted relatively few from the upper class or from the unskilled, the Klan's calls for law and order, prohibition enforcement, immigration restriction, clean government, strict morals, and better schools found favor among a broad category of Americans. This diverse appeal helps explain why Klan support for Brewster did not turn Maine voters against the candidate when he ran for governor in 1924.¹

Brewster was born in Dexter, near Bangor, in 1888, graduated from Bowdoin College in 1909, and received his law degree from Harvard in 1913. He began practicing law in Portland and married the daughter of a wealthy businessman. Elected to the Maine House of Representatives in 1916, he quit to join the army in 1917. After the armistice, he returned to the House and was elected to the State Senate in 1922. Brewster was in many ways a typical Progressive; he supported equal suffrage and prohibition and was deeply religious.² In early 1923, for instance, Brewster sponsored a bill for state control of Maine's water powers. Bitter opposition from large landowners, particularly Great Northern Paper Company, and from hydroelectric power suppliers altered Brewster's stand on the water power issue. By late April 1923 he acknowledged he might run for governor, and already there were rumors that the KKK would support his bid for office.³

The Ku Klux Klan arrived in Maine 1921, but for several months the organization languished. On November 1, 1922, Governor Percival P. Baxter described the Klan "as an insult and an affront to American citizens" and declared that the organization would "never . . . get a foothold in this state." At that time Portland only had about fifty Klan members, and Bangor a few more. In early 1923, F. Eugene Farnsworth became its leader. A native of eastern Maine, Farnsworth had pursued various occupations, including hypnotist, barber, newspaper photographer, and travel lecturer. During the 1919-1920 Red Scare he had been president of the Boston Loyal Coalition, which opposed, among other things, Bolshevism, un-Americanism, and "hydra-headed hyphenism." Farnsworth gave his first Portland speech in January 1923 and then launched a speaking tour of Maine; support for the Klan grew quickly. The Boston Herald later claimed there were over 20,000 Maine Klan members by



Maine's Catholics, about 20 percent of the total statewide population, were highly visible the 1924 campaign, since the most prominent issue of the campaign involved state funding for private schools. Bishop Louis J. Walsh had recently launched an ambitious building campaign to increase the number of Maine parochial schools. *A sketch of St. John's Catholic Church, Bangor, Fannie Hardy Eckstorm Papers, Folger Library Special Collections Department.*

spring 1923. While this figure appears too high, the Klan clearly attracted considerable attention after Farnsworth's appearance. Governor Baxter was obviously wrong when, in his 1924 inaugural address, he claimed that the Klan had "as yet made little headway here."¹ The secret order had already become a part of Maine political life.

The Klan's success coincided with proposals to bar state aid to sectarian institutions. Baxter, Brewster, and Representative Mark Barwise had each introduced bills to end school funding. The bills, obviously

aimed at Maine's 156,000 Catholics—about 20 percent of the population—elicited a response from Bishop Louis S. Walsh of the Diocese of Maine in Portland. After a meeting with Brewster, then chair of the Senate's committee on education, Walsh observed that the senator was "wrongly informed on many aspects of the case."⁵

Public hearings on the Barwise and Brewster bills began on February 7. Among those present were Baptist and Methodist ministers and Klan members, who insisted on the separation of church and state as a "vital principle of Americanism." Walsh asked the legislators "not to throw out a spark at this time of great restlessness," but the conflagration had already begun. Walsh sensed a "wave of Anti-Catholic feeling" behind the bill, and placed his hopes on the opposition from Senate President Frank G. Farrington, who argued against the measure. The defeat of Brewster's bill in early April left Walsh hopeful that there would be no "religious fight" in the upcoming gubernatorial elections, but his hopes proved illusory.⁶

The defeat certainly did not deter Brewster. In mid-May Barwise noted that "anybody who is going to run for office these next two years must make up his mind to reckon with the Klan." Brewster agreed. Anticipating an "avalanche" of Klan-fed opinion, he thought it best "to mark time and let these things . . . take their own course." Many predicted that the campaign would revolve around the water power fight, with Baxter, a champion of public water power, battling against Bangor Mayor Albert R. Day. Brewster, however, saw "the appropriation of public funds for Sectarian purposes" as the defining issue of the 1924 election. This was a prophecy he helped realize.⁷

Brewster's revelation was predicated on the Klan's growing presence in Portland. In April, Farnsworth boasted that the Klan would elect the next governor, and in May a doctor and three businessmen bought an estate on Forest Avenue for \$42,000, upon which the Klan built a 4,000 seat auditorium and a 1,600 seat dining hall. In August 1,500 Klansmen held an initiation for 400 new members; over 10,000 witnessed the ceremony. In September, another 200 members were admitted, and six days later Farnsworth addressed a gathering of 5,000. "We will not permit Catholics on the school board any more," he pledged. Given these developments, Governor Baxter moderated his criticism of the Klan. "The State has nothing to fear from them," he concluded.⁸

Not everyone shared the governor's view. In 1923 a group of prominent citizens began promoting the city manager form of government for Portland. The Klan's endorsement for the new charter was widely



Governor Percival P. Baxter described the Klan as an “insult and an affront to American citizens,” but he later moderated his views when the Klan made a surprisingly strong electoral showing in Portland, Baxter’s home town. *Maine Historical Society photo.*

known, and on election day a 56 percent majority voted for the charter plan, which had been turned down decisively just two years earlier. According to Bishop Walsh, two new wards in Deering, where the Klan was strongest, had “swamped the old city,” suggesting the Klan’s growing presence in city politics. If the Klan was the decisive factor in the victory, Walsh concluded, “the Anti-Catholic feeling is now on top.”

From Bangor, Barwise urged Brewster to announce for governor. The “way the Klan bunch talk over here,” he explained, Day could not be elected. “If I were you I would get in at once.” Brewster replied that he was watching the situation carefully: “The child [his candidacy] has been developing splendidly in the tender air of my silence.” Day supporters,

the “eastern,” or Bangor wing of the Republican party, turned to Brewster to prevent a Baxter candidacy, and the Klan—solidified behind Brewster because of his stand on school aid—would provide statewide support in the fight against the Portland faction of the party.¹⁰ It was politics at its best; principle and expediency were joined.

In October Brewster announced his platform before the Maine State Sunday School Association in Waterville. Many Catholic parents, he claimed, “would prefer to send their children to public schools,” if proper religious instruction were available elsewhere. Public money should not go for parochial schools, but rather children should be excused from public schools periodically to receive religious lessons. While Brewster affirmed the “primary importance” of religious education, he opposed public funds for Catholic schools. With this speech, the “religious dynamite” he had anticipated exploded.¹¹

Upon reading the message, Bishop Walsh confided privately to a colleague that Brewster was “an unscrupulous, barefaced opponent who has skin so thick that even a stilleto [sic] would not go through it.” The Bishop’s public response was hardly more measured. “One would suppose,” he began, “that the know-it-all Mr. Brewster would tell the truth” while speaking to a Sunday school meeting. Instead, his speech was “mere bunk, cheap, political claptrap, camouflage, the evacuation of an addled brain . . . deceiving nobody . . . and is given out to deceive the feeble-minded and stir up religious hatred in our State; in one word: KKK, humbug and malice.” He ended with an attack on Brewster’s mother for accepting a patronage position from Governor Baxter.¹² Reacting to Walsh’s public statements, Brewster began speaking as if he were compelled to seek the nomination. The Bishop’s remarks before the legislature would convince Maine, Brewster thought, “that there is a serious movement on foot” to secure public funds for parochial schools. Duty called. He confided to Charles D. Bartlett, another advisor, that those concerned about the school question had been joined by the eastern party men in urging him to seek the nomination. Interestingly, Brewster did not have the support of Maine’s Republican leaders. Nor did he solicit it.¹³


In early November Brewster dispatched letters to hundreds of Maine people about the school issue and, by implication, his candidacy. Some responded by endorsing the Klan, while others questioned Brewster’s relation to the organization. A municipal engineer in Northeast Harbor reported to Brewster that he expected Farnsworth in Bar Harbor soon, where the KKK leader would “wake more of [the residents] . . . up” about

the Catholics. Alluding to a “prevailing idea” that the Klan is “backing” Brewster, Lillian H. Wright demanded to know whether he was “independent of the Klan.” Brewster’s answer to this kind of question rarely varied. He had never joined a secret organization except his Bowdoin fraternity, he vowed. Nor had he ever attended a Klan meeting; thus he knew “practically nothing except what I have read in the papers from time to time.” He reiterated his platform and claimed to be obligated to no one.¹⁴

Brewster’s November 10 response to Walsh was no less contrived. He refused to acknowledge the “personal attacks,” and he predicted that many Catholics would disavow the bishop’s “untempered pronouncements.” Nor would Maine citizens “indiscriminately condemn” Catholics “for actions and words for which they are in no American sense responsible.” The Bishop, he implied, was un-American. As to the issues, Brewster cited Bar Harbor and Gary, Indiana, as cities where the practice of excusing children from school for religious study had worked. Brewster’s reply appealed to anti-Catholic bigots, but also to those simply anxious to preserve separation of church and state.¹⁵

To attract Day’s supporters, Brewster also tried to separate himself from Baxter’s water-power fight. Privately, he opposed using “a cent of the State’s money” for improving Maine’s water powers. He courted Walter S. Wyman of Central Maine Power and the editor of the Bangor Daily Commercial. Downplaying his behind-the-scenes politicking, Brewster told Governor Baxter that the enthusiasm for his nomination had developed spontaneously, because of the “widespread interest” in his principles, particularly “in connection with the school matter.”¹⁶ As usual, Brewster characterized himself as the vessel for others’ wishes, suggesting that Baxter would be a hypocrite to enter the fray now.

Support for Brewster’s candidacy ranged from the reasoned to the extreme. Typical was Emma Howe of Rumford, a town where half the population was Catholic. Protestants, she thought, were “highly pleased” to have someone like Brewster “who is willing to give time and thought” to the issue.¹⁷ Others were more vocal about the Catholic presence. A minister applauded Brewster’s stand because parochial schools had “increased in number.” This, he opined, was “not [a type of] Americanism of which we are proud.” A clothing company manager argued that if “our Public Schools are not good enough,” Catholics should go without. The pastor of a Hartland Baptist Church was gratified that Brewster was not “bowing down to . . . [Catholics] like a whipped poodle.” Indeed, he continued, “I almost wish you could have been a mouse



By spring 1923 the Ku Klux Klan boasted around 20,000 members in Maine, and rallies drew surprisingly large crowds in urban as well as rural centers. Despite Brewster's rumored associations with the Klan, many Maine voters supported him because he opposed state funding for private schools—a matter of principle for some, expediency for others. *Maine Historical Society photo.*

in the wall at our K.K.K. the other evening.” Although not a Klan member, S.H. Hemphill felt that the Klan stood for “America first-last-and always.” A Democrat, he nevertheless resolved to support Brewster. A Southwest Harbor correspondent informed Brewster that the Klan had awakened many to the necessity of curbing the power of Catholics. The *Portland Evening Express* observed that the Klan would support Brewster, “and whether anyone likes it or not, that [support] is considerable.”¹⁸

Brewster's silence was politically astute. Only a minority of Protestants apparently viewed the Klan's position on the school question with alarm. As in other states, the Klan's views on the separation of church and state found favor, at least in 1923. A United Baptist Church pastor, for instance, opposed spending public funds for any sectarian institution, including hospitals and sanitariums. “I am no Klansman,” he wrote, “but I must assure you that I am surprised (extremely so), to see the sympathy they have in this part of the state.” Brewster's candidacy gave the school funding issue—and perhaps the Klan—an air of re-

spectability. Most of those who wrote Brewster were middle-class citizens, who liked the moderate way he expressed his position. Supporting the separation of church and state was, after all, as the Lewiston Daily Sun observed, “a proper issue.”¹⁹ Those who might otherwise be reluctant to embrace a position taken by the Klan were validated by Brewster’s standing in Maine society as a wealthy lawyer and prominent state senator. Brewster’s credentials provided political cover.

Klan activities between September and December illustrate their growing acceptance in Maine. In September Farnsworth formed a women’s branch, and in October 500 women were initiated into the Portland Klan, along with 1,100 men. Some 8,000 observers attended the ceremony. In November the Klan failed to elect its candidates in close municipal contests in Auburn and Gardiner, but in December the Klan claimed to have prevented the election of any Catholics to the council or school board in Portland. A Klan candidate defeated a Jewish woman for the school board. While Farnsworth’s hopes for a Klan majority on the Portland City Council were denied, the secret order did have considerable support. Klan activities were regularly featured on the social pages of the Portland newspapers. In Bangor the Klan built a meeting hall to hold the 2,000 Klansmen in the area.²⁰

Acutely aware of the Klan’s growing power, Brewster was certainly not above appealing to those who might sympathize with the organization. In early December he sent out a form letter with copies of his Waterville speech, Walsh’s response, and his reply. “If there is anything by which American [sic] is distinguished from the countries of the Old World, it is in the American Public School System and in the complete separation of church and state.” Brewster privately indicated he was willing to probe deeper into Maine’s cultural anxieties. Maine, he told one supporter, should enforce “the attendance laws in our public schools properly and fully.” Such pronouncements echoed the Klan’s desire to Americanize all citizens. As he noted to a principal in Presque Isle, public school growth in Portland had “practically stopped,” whereas the parochial school system had increased by 12 to 15 percent in the past year.²¹ Whether Brewster actually feared the growth of the Catholic population in Maine is not clear, but he was clearly willing to exploit this anxiety for his own ends.

By mid-December the Republican organization had become concerned about Day’s chances, and Brewster had not consulted the leaders about of his candidacy. On December 27, after a meeting of the party leaders, Governor Baxter announced that he would not run for another

term. Senate President Frank G. Farrington quickly announced his candidacy, and Republican leaders backed Farrington.²² Speculation soon arose, however, that Farrington was too far behind to win. As Brewster noted, his opponents were “getting more and more desparate [sic] as they see the situation crystallizing in my favor.” With Baxter’s withdrawal, Brewster began emphasizing his differences with the governor. The Lewiston *Evening Journal* reported that Brewster buttons had appeared Rockland, a city sympathetic to the Klan.²³

To defend himself against charges of bigotry, Brewster denied he had introduced a religious issue into the contest. The question of the campaign was “a public school issue rather than a religious issue.” Moreover, four-fifths of the public money distributed to private schools went to Protestant schools. Nor was his amendment a radical idea; thirty other states had adopted similar measures. Brewster repeated his claim that he belonged to no secret society and represented no single group.²⁴

In private, Brewster was more sympathetic to the Klan. One supporter, a president of a farm supply company, informed Brewster that he was no Klan member, but he confessed that “the principles . . . set forth [in a recent Klan meeting] could not be objected to by any true American citizen.” Brewster agreed. A Republican organization leader told Brewster that his brother was sympathetic to the Klan and wanted to help secure Brewster’s nomination. Brewster wrote to the brother exclaiming that he was “glad to know that [he was] . . . prepared to approve both my principles and my candidacy.” To another correspondent Brewster declared: “I do not see how it is possible indiscriminately to condemn either individuals or organizations.”²⁵ Brewster was careful to deny Klan membership, but he never suggested this meant a criticism of the Klan itself.

The campaign changed dramatically on January 21 when Albert Day died of a heart attack, leaving only Brewster and Farrington. According to Baxter, Farrington did not have the “backbone” to beat Brewster, who was clearly “the candidate of the Ku Klux Klan.” Maine would vote for Coolidge in November, but Baxter worried that Brewster’s nomination would reduce the president’s majority.²⁶ Although Brewster inherited Day’s Bangor support, the Republican party organization still refused to back the leading Republican candidate. From Washington Senator Wallace White explained to the mayor of Lewiston that he wanted no part of state politics, “if questions of race and religion are to be injected.” Bowdoin Professor O. C. Hormell reported to Brewster that “an increasingly large number of your friends,” who agreed with the principle of separa-

tion of church and state, could not support him until he repudiated the Klan.²⁷

In mid-February Governor Baxter tried to minimize the Klan's importance in a speech to the Portland Lincoln Club. With both Brewster and Farrington present, Baxter urged Republicans to unite for the November election under the slogan of "patriotism." The party, he claimed, owed nothing to any one group. Baxter stopped short of reviling the Klan, however. He deplored its secrecy, but he "did not question the good citizenship, the loyalty, or the Americanism" of its members. He had "many friends on both sides" of the issue, he maintained, and he cared not whether his "neighbor worships his God in a Cathedral . . . or Klavern," so long as he was religious and a good citizen.

Reaction to Baxter's speech suggests the Klan's place in Maine's politics. The *Portland Evening Express* thought all "well informed" people knew about the Klan's part in the Republican party, while the *Lewiston Evening Journal* believed the Klan merited "fair treatment, honest discussion and a sensible publicity." According to the *Portland Press Herald*, Klan and anti-Klan were "striving for good laws and their enforcement," and both were responsible for the problems Republicans faced.²⁸ Democrat William Pattangall found this tolerance alarming. Rather than call for an end to fanaticism, he argued, Baxter had simply called for a truce until a Republican governor was elected. The Klan was an "evil influence," Pattangall believed; there could be no straddling the issue.²⁹ Brewster and his advisors expressed no concern over Baxter's speech. Barwise assured Republican leaders that there would be no bolt from the party. Moreover, many Democrats, he predicted, would register as Republicans to support Brewster's position on school funds. At the end of the month Baxter complained to Brewster about criticism he had received in the Maine *Klansmen*. He had been "fair" to the Klan in his Lincoln speech, he insisted; "and they should accord me decent treatment."³⁰

In early March Brewster boasted to the literary editor of the *Boston Herald* of his success. A principled loner, he had not cultivated the friendships that others in his business would have considered customary. "Many honest and sincere people among my associates do not understand me," he proclaimed, "while many of lower standards of life are frankly antagonistic." Yet many important people backed him: "I am introduced rather indiscriminately as the second Roosevelt, with an occasional reference to Abraham Lincoln." The popularity of his principles had forced his opponents to character assassination; they would probably "stop at nothing short of murder" before the primary.³¹ If vain and

messianic, Brewster's analysis was in some ways accurate. He had identified and defined the major issue in the election, and he had garnered considerable support.

With the Klan's support to bolster his constituency, Brewster remained confident. When the executive of the Grange warned its members against "religious prejudice, hatred or strife," Brewster was unconcerned. "Things are going so well that I feel I can well afford to be most charitable" about the Grange. It was clear by mid March that the Republican platform would not mention the Klan, although it would oppose religious and racial prejudice. Baxter welcomed the party's moderation on the Klan issue, recommending that the organization welcome all citizens under the slogan "Patriotism, Tolerance and Americanism." The Lewiston *Evening Journal* approved. "The Ku Klux Klan have a perfect right to take part in political activities."³² The Republican convention in Portland was a triumph for Brewster. The party platform opposed public funds for sectarian schools and gave no official notice of the Klan. The delegates declined to discuss a potentially divisive plank on citizenship. This, in Brewster's analysis, was a testament to the "strong sentiment" he had won across the state.³³

Brewster was clearly using the Klan, but he also believed in the principle that no public funds should be given to sectarian schools. To Max Cohen, a friend, he wrote that he regretted the fact that Jews would probably vote for Farrington, based on "loose talk" that associated Brewster with the Klan. The irony that Brewster's own ambivalent position on the Klan encouraged this "loose talk" was lost on Brewster; he firmly believed he had been indefatigable in behalf of his principle. He resisted the proposal that money be given to academies without religious affiliation on the grounds that the distinction would be "needlessly offensive to our Roman Catholic friends." Hospitals, in his eyes, "should receive aid, whether they are sectarian or not as their work is not of a religious but of a healing nature."³⁴ Brewster understood how to parlay Klan support into votes, but he also believed in the principle that drove his campaign.

Brewster's and his organizers did not deny association with the Klan. As Brewster explained to the Waldo County Klan Kleagle, the strategy was to have "some local Church organization or Men or Women's Club of some character" invite him to speak in the area. He then would "confine" his talk "to such limitations as the local organization wished to impose." Brewster's assistant later asked the Kleagle for a list of names—Klan members presumably—to whom he could send



In an agonizingly close primary that brought charges of voter fraud, recounts, and a state Supreme Judicial Court review, Brewster won the Republican nomination. His success put old-line Republican leaders like Senator Wallace White in a bind. White explained that he wanted no part of state politics, "if questions of race and religion are to be injected." *Maine Historical Society photo.*

campaign literature.³⁵ Brewster retained his contacts with the Klan without offending non-Klan supporters.

Ironically, without any issues beyond the school question, the contest generated little news. Brewster gave numerous speeches, but none of them were newsworthy except for local readers. Many political reporters thought the contest dull. Even the Klan's support of Brewster was no longer news. In late April Farnsworth was ousted from Klan leadership over disputed finances and power, and when Bishop Walsh suddenly died on May 12, at age sixty-six, the two major protagonists in the school

funding issue were removed from the scene.³⁶ With two weeks left in the primary campaign, Farrington closed the gap. Realizing his vulnerability, Brewster increased his attacks on Farrington, claiming his opponent was inconsistent on the school fund issue. Farrington in return claimed Brewster was intolerant for championing the issue. It was unfortunate, Brewster countered, “when a man in public life casts aspersions upon the motives” of citizens who supported the amendment. Brewster nastily added he did not believe Farrington was “in alliance with the Roman Catholics of this State in the position he was taking.”³⁷

Farrington appeared to win the June 16 primary by a narrow margin in a very large turnout. The *Lewiston Evening Journal* proclaimed that Farrington’s victory put the Klan issue “out of the way,” which “should be pleasing to all good citizens.” But four days after the vote, with Farrington in the lead by 481 votes, Brewster learned of polling irregularities. Many Democrats, according to reports, had voted early in some places in order to exhaust the ballots. Brewster asked the secretary of state to authorize a recount, pointing to possible voter fraud in Portland’s Fourth Ward. By law, Brewster’s request required the governor and council to examine the ballots.³⁸


Opinion naturally differed on how to assess this remarkable situation. The *Portland Sunday Telegram* blamed Brewster for the mess and suggested the candidates should remove themselves in favor of Baxter. Brewster, the editor argued, had “foisted” racial and religious matters onto the party to the exclusion of legitimate campaign issues. Both candidates rejected the idea that they should step aside. The *Kennebec Journal* blamed “the feudal spirit” outside the Republican party for the problems.³⁹

Baxter and the Executive Council began recounting the 97,000 ballots in Augusta on July 15, with Brewster and Farrington present. All parties agreed that the Supreme Court would assess any legal matters that arose. Within a week Baxter proclaimed that “extensive frauds had been perpetrated” and asked Attorney General Harlan Stone to authorize the U.S. District Attorney in Portland to prosecute the case. Brewster twice protested the speed and fairness of the recount and then met with the Maine congressional delegation, to which he reportedly made “a very sensational speech” criticizing the governor and council for delaying the process. George Emery, chair of the Republican State Committee, assured Brewster that the governor and council were trying to “expedite the count and that they were acting in perfect fairness.” Brewster remained suspicious.⁴⁰

By August 2 the governor and council had recounted all the ballots, giving Farrington 47,630 and Brewster 47,326. They made two other decisions that the Supreme Court accepted. The St. Agatha vote, in Aroostook County, where 252 had voted for Farrington but not in voting booths as the law required, was thrown out. That reduced Farrington's majority to forty-two. They also decided Portland's Fourth Ward votes, 718 for Farrington and 153 for Brewster, be set aside because of ballot stuffing. Brewster now led by 523. The Court authorized Ward Four voters to reappear and vote again. Ward Four would therefore determine the nominee. No one expected the ward's re-vote to support Farrington.⁴¹

The re-vote in Ward Four went as expected: Brewster won the Republican nomination for governor with a majority of 581 votes. Baxter announced the decision and informed President Coolidge that Maine's Republicans were "divided over the Klan issue and it will not be easy to bring together the contending factions." Brewster's narrow victory came from a heavy lead in Androscoggin, Cumberland, Penobscot, and York, four of the state's five most populous counties, plus majorities in Oxford and Sagadahoc. Geographically, Brewster carried the southern and western parts of the state, while Farrington won the mid-coast, downeast and northern sections. Of Maine's 156,000 Catholics, around 25,000 were eligible voters, but most were Democratic. Farrington failed to attract a large vote in cities like Biddeford, Lewiston, Rumford, and Waterville, where the constituency was largely Democratic. Surprisingly, Brewster did not draw strength from the rural sections of the state, where the Klan was supposedly strong. Instead, he gained support from large urban areas, while Farrington was stronger in smaller cities in more rural counties.⁴²

There were an estimated fifteen to twenty thousand male Klan members in Maine. If, as David Chalmers suggests, wives of Klan members voted like their husbands, then perhaps almost half of Brewster's total of 46,703 came from the Klan, but there is no way to prove this. Although the Republican organization opposed Brewster, we do not know how this translated into votes or how those who resented the Republican leadership voted. In short, it is impossible to determine how much the Klan influenced the choice of Brewster. Yet the Klan was one of the two key issues in the primary, and Klan members probably voted heavily for Brewster. There was also an inherent anti-Catholic bias to Brewster's argument for a separation of church and state, despite his disclaimers that most sectarian schools were Protestant. Perhaps the Klan issue increased



In the general election, Democrat William R. Pattangall faced off against Brewster. Pattangall, pictured here in 1935 as Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, was an early vocal opponent of the Klan. *Mansur Studio photo, courtesy Fogler Library Special Collections Department.*

turnout, as in the Portland elections in late 1923, but the Klan had become less important by the summer of 1924 after Farnsworth left the secret order.⁴³

In the general election, the Klan was the central issue dividing Brewster and William R. Pattangall, the Democratic nominee. Pattangall, a fifty-nine-year-old Kennebec Valley lawyer, had served in the legislature and as attorney general of Maine several times and had lost to Baxter in the 1922 governor's race. At the 1924 Democratic National Convention in New York City, Pattangall had argued against the Klan. He subse-

quently declared it the “one great issue” in the governor’s election. Brewster, according to Pattangall, was the “Republican choice of the Ku Klux Klan,” and whether the people of Maine were “going to allow the state to be governed” by the Klan was the issue. Pattangall’s strategy was to force Brewster to endorse or condemn the Klan, on the assumption that Republicans—the state’s political majority—would abandon Brewster to avoid the Klan association.⁴⁴

Harry Bigelow, the *Portland Press Herald* editor, advised Brewster to ignore the Klan and discuss only the Republican party and Coolidge’s leadership. As the paper argued in a widely reprinted editorial, everyone knew that the Klan backed Brewster in the primary; it would do him no good to discuss the issue. He would either alienate the Klan vote by condemning it, or anger others by endorsing it. In fact, there was “altogether too much of this Klan and Anti-Klan talk in this campaign,” the editorial concluded.⁴⁵ Following this advice, Brewster refused to discuss the Klan until the very end of the campaign.

Vice-President Charles Dawes’s appearance in Maine on August 23 challenged Brewster’s Klan strategy. Reports appeared that Republican organization leaders had invited Dawes to attack the Klan in order to embarrass Brewster. Only shortly before the speech did Brewster learn that Dawes would mention the Klan. In his Augusta appearance, Dawes criticized the Klan for appealing to “racial, religious, or class prejudice” and claimed the organization had “no proper part” in the campaign. Brewster followed Dawes and made no mention of the Klan. Republican newspapers appeared pleased with Dawes’s speech. As the *Lewiston Evening Journal* observed, Dawes would “call back to the [Republican] party in Maine thousands of men and women who had been blinded by other appeals.” In the weeks following Dawes’s speech, Brewster campaigned without mentioning the secret order. A friend from Dexter, Brewster’s home town and a center of Klan activity, commended Brewster for going “far enough” to convince him that he was not “hooked up” with the Klan. “From the standpoint of political expediency I can appreciate your position in not coming out flat-footed in your denunciation of the Klan.”⁴⁶

Other Republicans were less pleased with Brewster’s silence. Several party members and a number of newspaper editors urged him to speak out on the subject. Finally, on September 1, Brewster broke his silence. In a public letter, the candidate said he was not “now nor have I ever been a member of the Ku Klux Klan.” He denied having solicited Klan support and assured Maine he would not be under obligation to any secret or-



What was the role of the Klan in the 1924 election? The Klan-backed school funding issue was not as decisive as Brewster hoped; many voters chose the candidate without Klan connections in the Republican primary, and only voted for Brewster when faced with a Democratic alternative in the general election. Still, in areas where school funding was an important issue, many non-Catholic voters endorsed Brewster. *Maine Historical Society photo.*

ganization if elected. He opposed “any organization” that advocated “taking the enforcement of law into [its] . . . own hands”—although he did not say this was the Klan’s position. It would be, he charged, “as accurate to say” that Pattangall was “a candidate of the Knights of Columbus as it is to say that I am the candidate of any other organization.” Despite Brewster’s refusal to condemn the Klan, Republican papers were delighted with his statement and predicted he would win easily.⁴⁷

On September 8 Brewster was elected governor with a plurality of 36,000 votes in the largest vote to that date in Maine history. Brewster won all counties except Androscoggin, the fifth largest, where Pattangall’s victory was slim, and Oxford. Brewster’s victory margins were large in the other five populous counties. Of twenty-three cities with large parochial enrolments in 1930, Brewster won fifteen and Pattangall eight, again demonstrating Republican success with Klan support even in Catholic urban areas. Pattangall gained large majorities in Biddeford,

Lewiston and Waterville, each with a large parochial enrolment.⁴⁸ In the same election, Republican Senator Bert Fernald also won re-election, exceeding Brewster's victory margin by more than three thousand votes. Fernald received more votes in the cities than Brewster but, with the exceptions of Augusta, Biddeford, and Old Town, the differences were slight. In other words, the impact of the Klan in the general election is not that clear in comparing the two victors. Pattangall's strategy—to attract Republicans angry at the Klan—did not succeed. It is true that many more voted for Pattangall in 1924 than in 1922 and this may have been due to the Klan issue. But this, mixed with the school question, probably cut both ways. Some probably voted for Pattangall because he denounced the Klan, but others may have voted for Brewster because he skillfully mixed Klan anti-Catholicism with his opposition to public funds for sectarian schools.⁴⁹

Three patterns emerge from Brewster's vote in the primary and general elections of 1924 that help explain the Klan's role in Maine. In twelve cities, Farrington beat Brewster and then Pattangall defeated Brewster. These defeats took place either in smaller cities that had little or no parochial enrolment, or in larger cities with large parochial enrolments. In both types of cities voters unsympathetic to the Klan voted for Farrington and then Democratic majorities supported Pattangall. The small cities were Fort Kent, Jonesport, Van Buren, Blue Hill and Wadoboro. Here, Republicans had little reason to sympathize with the Klan. The cities with large parochial enrolments were Bangor, Biddeford, Brunswick, Lewiston, Orono, Rumford, and Skowhegan. Old Town and Waterville were the only cities with large parochial enrolment where Brewster beat Farrington, and only narrowly in both. He then lost both cities by large margins. The parochial enrolment averaged twelve hundred in the cities won by Pattangall.⁵⁰

In the second pattern, Brewster beat both Farrington and Pattangall in forty cities and usually by wide margins. These victories occurred in three cities with large parochial enrolments, five with modest enrolments, and thirty-one with very low or no enrolments. Brewster's largest victories were in Portland, his hometown, and Sanford, both with over one thousand students enrolled in parochial schools. Auburn, where he also won, had over five hundred enrolled, and Bath, Brewer, Mexico, Saco and South Berwick had an average parochial enrolment of only one hundred eighty-eight.⁵¹ The size of Brewster's wins over Farrington and Pattangall in these cities suggests that the Klan was strong, that many felt no anxiety about supporting Brewster because of his Klan affiliation,

that the school question was important, or a combination of these factors.

The third pattern was the most significant. In this Farrington beat Brewster in thirty-four cities, sometimes decisively, and then Brewster defeated Pattangal, often quite handily. Four of these cities had modest parochial enrolments, and the other twenty-nine were either in rural areas or had few children in parochial schools. Republicans in these cities first opposed Brewster and his Klan alliance, but then reversed themselves to support Brewster against the Democrat, Pattangall. They preferred the organization's Republican to a Klan-connected Republican in the primary, perhaps because the Catholic issue did not bother them or because the Klan issue did. They did not object, however, to Brewster and his Klan affiliation when faced with a Democrat. Here again, Pattangall's strategy of winning over Republicans on the Klan issue failed.⁵²

The Klan's importance in the 1924 Maine election arose from a number of factors. As elsewhere, the Maine Klan was in part a group of bigots bent, in this instance, on punishing Catholics because of their faith and their growing presence. Many joined the Klan or sympathized with it because it was a racist, narrow, and vengeful organization that offered false hope that the changes sweeping over society could somehow be stopped. For others, however, the appeal of the Klan was more diffuse. Some worried about moral decline, disregard for the law, or changing definitions of femininity. This larger, more heterogeneous population looked to the Klan for answers, and here Brewster tapped into a reservoir of cultural uncertainty.

Bishop Walsh, Catholics, and immigrants were right to be alarmed by Brewster's tactics. Both the Klan and Brewster were more than willing to exploit these vague cultural fears for their own ends. Brewster's clever use of the Klan to secure his nomination, against the wishes of the Republican organization, was as reprehensible as was the Klan's bigotry. Brewster recognized the anxieties about Catholicism, and he used them to mount a stand against the use of public funds for sectarian education and to become governor. Brewster genuinely believed in the separation of church and state, and many people, from various places, occupations, and levels of society supported him because they agreed with the principle involved. And so they supported the secret order, either by joining it or, like Brewster, remaining silent about its less commendable attributes in order to prevent social change. In this respect the Klan, Brewster, and many in Maine were in step with much of the nation during the Roaring Twenties.

NOTES

1. For a sample of recent books on the Klan, see Kathleen M. Blee, *Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Stanley Coben, *Rebellion Against Victorianism: The Impetus for Change in 1920s America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 136-56; David J. Goldberg, *Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 117-39; Robert A. Goldberg, *Grassroots Resistance: Social Movements in Twentieth Century America* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 65-90; Shawn Lay, *Hooded Knights on the Niagara: The Ku Klux Klan in Buffalo, New York* (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Nancy MacLean, *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Leonard J. Moore, *Citizen Klansmen: The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, 1921-1928* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). See also Leonard J. Moore, "Historical Interpretations of the 1920's Klan: The Traditional View and the Populist Revision," *Journal of Social History* 24:2 (Winter 1990), pp. 341-57.

2. Autobiographical statement for the 1924 campaign, Ralph Owen Brewster Papers, 200.1.1, Box 2, Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine. (Hereafter cited as ROBP.) Brewster (ROB) served two terms as governor, and in 1934 was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served three terms. He then became senator for two terms. He lost in 1952. In the 1940s he dropped Ralph as a first name and went by his middle name, Owen, partly in tribute to his second son who died in the early 1930s. Brewster died in 1962.

3. Neil Rolde, *The Baxters of Maine: Downeast Visionaries* (Gardiner, Maine: Tilbury House, 1997), pp. 158, 195; Garret Schenck to Fred A. Gilbert, February 16, April 10, 1923, October 7, 1924; Gilbert to Schenck, February 19, March 29, April 30, 1923, October 2; Schenck to Gilbert, October 7, 1924, Box 561; Charles B. Carter to Gilbert, January 22, 1923, Box 553, Fred A. Gilbert Papers, Special Collections Department, Raymond H. Fogler Library, University of Maine, Orono (hereafter cited as FAGP); Christopher S. Beach, "Conservation and Legal Politics: The Struggle for Public Water Power in Maine 1900-1923," *Maine Historical Society Quarterly* 32 (Winter-Spring, 1993): 150-73; Charles D. Bartlett to ROB, April 20, 1923, 2.4:5, ROBP; *Portland Press Herald*, March 29, 1923.

4. Norman W. Smith, "The Ku Klux Klan in Rhode Island," *Rhode Island History* 37 (May 1978): 35-45; Lawrence W. Moores, Jr., "The History of the Ku Klux Klan in Maine, 1922-1931," M.A. thesis, University of Maine, 1950, pp. 28-39; Edward B. Whitney, "The Ku Klux Klan in Maine 1922-1928: A Study with Particular Emphasis on the City of Portland," honors thesis, Harvard University, 1966, pp. 24-30; Robert H. Boone, "A Kleagle and His Klan: F. Eugene Farnsworth and the Ku Klux Klan in Maine," honors thesis, Wesleyan University, 1965, pp. 14-20; Rita Mae Breton, "Red Scare: A Study of Maine Nativism, 1919-1925," M.A. thesis, University of Maine, 1972), pp. 171-77; J. Joseph Hutmacher, *Massachusetts: People and Politics 1919-1933* (New York: Atheneum,

1969), p. 88; *Boston Herald*, December 16, 1922, clipping in Diary of Bishop Louis S. Walsh, December 14, 15, 1922, pp. 348-49; January 16, 1923, p. 6; February 10, 1923, p. 41, Diocesan Archives, Portland, Maine (hereafter cited as Walsh Diary); *Boston Herald*, September 6, 1923, 1.1:2, ROBP; William L. Lucey, *The Catholic Church in Maine* (Francestown, New Hampshire: Marshall Jones, 1957), pp. 323-25.

5. Breton, "Red Scare," 186-7; Walsh Diary, January 29, 1923, 29; *Waterville Morning Sentinel*, January 27, 1923, 9.1:1, ROBP; Boone, "Farnsworth," pp. 20-1.

6. *Bangor Daily News*, February 8, 1923, in Brown, "Red Scare," pp. 187-88; Walsh Diary, February 7, March 1, 8, 14, 29, April 4, 1923, pp. 38, 60, 67, 73, 88, 94; *Portland Press Herald*, March 5, 1923; Moores, "KKK," p. 89.

7. Charles B. Smith to ROB, April 25, 1923, ROB to Smith, April 26, 1923, ROB to W.A. Ricker, May 14, 1923, Mark Barwise to ROB, May 12, 1923, ROB to Barwise, May 13, 1923, 1.1:2, ROBP; *Waterville Morning Sentinel*, June 15, 1923; *Portland Press Herald*, May 15, June 26, July 17, 1923; *Bangor Daily News*, June 27, 1923, 9.1:1, ROBP; ROB to Charles D. Bartlett, July 27, 1923, 1.1:2, ROBP; Schenck to Gilbert, July 1923, Gilbert to Schenck, July 30, 1923; Blaine S. Viles to Gilbert, July 26, August 3, 1923, Gilbert to Viles, July 30, 1923, Gilbert to William T. Cobb, July 30, 1923, Cobb to Gilbert, August 1, 1923, Box 553, FAGP; Walsh Diary, July 27, 1923, p. 20.

8. Boone, "Farnsworth," pp. 35-39; Whitney, "KKK," pp. 35-36; Walsh Diary, September 11, 12, 15, 1923, pp. 253-55, 258; *Bangor Daily News*, September 11, 1923.

9. Boone, "Farnsworth," pp. 35-39; Whitney, "KKK," pp. 35-36; Walsh Diary, September 11, 12, 15, 1923, pp. 253-55; *Bangor Daily News* September 12, 1923, 1.1:2, ROBP.

10. Barwise to ROB, September 29, 1923, ROB to Barwise, October 2, 1923, 1.1:2, ROBP.

11. ROB to Alfred O. Elden, October 16, 1923, 2.4:8, ROBP; *Lewiston Daily Sun*, October 17, 1923; *Waterville Morning Sentinel*, October 19, 1923, 9.1:1, ROBP; *Portland Press Herald*, October 19, 1923; Ernest C. Helmreich, *Religion and the Maine Schools: An Historical Approach* (Brunswick: Bureau of Municipal Government, 1960), pp. 43-49.

12. *Portland Press Herald*, October 20, 27, 1923, *Bangor Daily News*, October 27, 1923; Walsh Diary, October 21, 23, 24, 1923, pp. 296-98; Walsh to Justin McGrath, October 28, 1923, Folder 2, Walsh Archives.

13. ROB to Gordon C. Shedd, November 22, 1923, 2.4:7; ROB to Barwise, October 25, 1923, ROB to Charles D. Bartlett, October 23, 1923, 2.4:5, ROBP.

14. [Name withheld] to ROB, November 24, 1923, Lillian H. Wright to ROB, November 27, 1923, ROB to Wright, December 1, 1923, 2.4:7, ROBP.

15. *Portland Press Herald*, November 10, 1923; ROB to Charles D. Bartlett, November 10, 1923, 2.4:5, ROBP.

16. *Portland Press Herald*, November 6, 1923; ROB to J. Sherman Douglas, November 22, 1923, 2.4:6; ROB to Ralph Bass, November 20, 1923, 2.4:5; ROB to Baxter, November 21, 1923, 2.6:7, ROBP; Gilbert to Schenck, November 9, 1923, Schenck to Gilbert, November 23, 1923, Box 561, FAGP.

17. Walsh Diary, November 26, 1923, 330; Holmes to ROB, November 21, 1923, Morris to ROB, November 21, 1923, 2.4:5; Morris to ROB, November 27, 1923, 2.4:6; Howe to ROB, November 25, 1923, 2.4:8, ROBP.

18. [Name withheld] to ROB, November 22, 1923, 2.4:5; [name withheld] to ROB, November 12, 1923, 2.4:9; S.H. Hemphill to ROB, December 25, 1923, 2.4:7; *Portland Evening Express*, December 9, 1923, 9.1:1, ROBP.

19. [Name withheld] to ROB, November 26, 1923, 2.4:8; *Lewiston Daily Sun*, November 26, 1923, 9.1:1, ROBP; Breton, "Red Scare," pp.160-68.

20. Boone, "Farnsworth," pp. 48-51; Whitney, "KKK," pp. 37-38, Moores, "KKK," pp. 52-56; Breton, "Red Scare," pp. 180-83.

21. See ROB to Captain W. H. Parker, December 4, 1923, 2.4:9, for one of the form letters; ROB to Josiah K. Goodwin, December 3, 1923, 2.4:6; ROB to Carl N. Garland, December 10, 1923, 2.4:5; ROB to San Lorenzo Merriman, December 17, 1923, 2.4:8, ROBP.

22. Wallace White to Charles E. Carter, December 13, 1923, Box 45, Wallace White Papers, Library of Congress; *Portland Press Herald*, December 25, 26, 28, 1923; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, January 1, 1924; Schenck to Gilbert, December 31, 1923, Box 561, FAGP.

23. ROB to U.G. Mudgett, January 2, 1924, 2.4:5, ROPB; *Portland Press Herald*, December 28, 1923, January 1, 2, 1924, Scrapbook 12, Percival Baxter Papers, Maine State Library, Augusta (hereafter cited as PBP); Schenck to Gilbert, January 4, 1924, Box 561, FAGP; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, January 18, 1924.

24. *Portland Press Herald*, January 7, 1924, *Lewiston Daily Sun*, January 9, 1924, 8:1925, ROPB.

25. James H. Ames to ROB, January 7, 1924, ROB to Ames, January 9, 1924, 2.4:5; [Name withheld] to ROB, January 26, 1924, ROB to [name withheld], January 22, 1924, ROB to Percie E. Lee, January 26, 1924, 2.4:8, ROBP.

26. Schenck to Gilbert, January 21, 22, 28, 1924, Gilbert to Schenck January 22, 28, 1924, Box 561; Frank G. Farrington to Gilbert, January 25, 1924, Gilbert to Farrington, January 28, 1924, Gilbert to Charles Carter, February 11, 1924, Box 564, FAGP; Baxter to Frank W. Stearns, January 31, 1924, Folder 10, PBP.

27. Wallace White to Louis J. Brann, February 4, 1924, Box 45, White Papers; ROB to Ira M. Cobe, January 21, 1924, 2.4:7; ROB to Alton N. Sanborn, February 12, 1924, 2.4:5; ROB to Willis A. Ricker, January 29, 1924, M. D. Condon to Ralph H. Condon, January 31, 1924; O.C. Hormell to ROB, February 10, 1924, ROB to Hormell, February 20, 1924, 2.6:7, ROBP.

28. *Portland Evening Express*, February 14, 1924, *Biddeford Record*, February

14, 1924, *Kennebec Journal*, February 13, 1924, Scrapbook 12, PBP; *Portland Press Herald*, February 13, 1924; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, February 13, 1924.

29. Pattangall's letter was reprinted in the *Bangor Daily Commercial*, February 1924; *Lubec Herald*, February 21, 1924, Scrapbook 12, PBP.

30. Barwise to ROB, February 24, 1924, ROB to Barwise, February 21, 1924, Charles D. Bartlett to ROB, February 14, 16, 1924, ROB to Bartlett, February 19, 21, 1924, 2.4:5; Baxter to ROB, February 28, 2.6:7, ROBP.

31. ROB to John Clair Minot, March 4, 1924, 2.6:7, ROBP.

32. ROB to Alton N. Sanborn, March 4, 1924, 2.6:7; ROB to V.W. Canham, March 7, 1924, 2.4:6, ROBP; *Portland Press Herald*, March 4, 15, 22, 1924, File 10, PBP; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, March 25, 1924.

33. *Portland Press Herald*, March 31, April 4, 5, 1923; ROB to Melvin D. Chatto, April 4, 1924, 2.6:7, ROBP; Baxter to George L. Emery, April 9, 1924, File 9, PBP.

34. ROB to Max Cohen, April 8, 1924, 2.4:5, ROB to G.W. Mitchell, May 2, 1924, 2.4.6, ROBP.

35. Max Cohen to ROB, May 7, 1924, ROB to [name withheld], May 16, 1924, William K. Sanderson to [name withheld], June 5, 1924, 2.4:5, ROBP.

36. *Portland Press Herald*, May 13, 20, 1924; Boone, "Farnsworth," pp. 67-76; Whitney, "KKK," pp. 53-55.

37. Schenck to Gilbert, April 10, 1924, Gilbert to Walter Gray et. al., June 9, 1924, Box 564, FAGP; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, June 11, 1924, in Breton, "Red Scare," p. 196 note; text of ROB speech, Rumford, May 27, 1924, text of ROB speech in Bangor, June 5, 1924, 1.1:2; Bates E. Stover to ROB, May 20, 1924, 2.4:7, ROBP; *Portland Press Herald*, May 13, 15, June 3, 9, 11, 1924.

38. Clement F. Robinson to ROB, June 17, 1924, 2.4:4; Phil S. Adams to ROB, June 20, 1924, H.B. Blake to ROB, June 20, 1924, 2.4:1, ROBP; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, June 19, 21, 1924.

39. *Portland Sunday Telegram*, July 15, 1924, *Kennebec Journal*, July 16, 1924, Scrapbook 13, PBP; *Lewiston Evening Journal*, July 15, 1924, *Portland Press Herald*, July 7, 17, 1924.

40. *Kennebec Journal*, July 15, 19, 21, 30, 1924; *Portland Press Herald*, June 15, 30, 1924, *Lewiston Evening Journal*, July 26, 1924, *Portland Evening Express*, July 28, 1924, Scrapbook 13; Baxter to Stone, July 21, 1924, File 9, PBP.

41. *Portland Evening Express*, August 5, 1924, *Waterville Morning Sentinel*, August 5, 1924, Scrapbook 13, PBP; *Bangor Daily News*, August 4, 1924.

42. *Lewiston Evening Journal*, August 7, 1924, Baxter to Calvin Coolidge, August 11, 1924, File 15, PBP; *Portland Evening Express*, August 8, 1924, 8:1925, ROBP; *Republican Primary Official Tabulation* [by] *State, District and County*, Maine State Archives, Augusta; James P. Allen, "Catholics in Maine: A Social Ge-

ography,” Ph.d. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1970, pp. 236-61; *Maine Register State Year Book and Legislative Manual*, no. 103 (Portland: Tower Publishing Co., 1971), p. 28.

43. *Boston Herald*, August 7, 1924, 8:1925, ROBP; Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, p. 275. Whitney, “KKK,” p. 53, estimates there were 40,000 Maine Klan members in the spring of 1924, but this figure appears far too high.

44. *Portland Press Herald*, 8, 9, 1924, *Bangor Daily News*, August 11, 1924.

45. ROB to George L. Emery, August 13, 1924, ROB to Max Cohen, August 13, 1924, 2.4:5, ROPB; *Portland Press Herald*, August 16, 1924.

46. Charles G. Dawes, *Notes as Vice President, 1928-1929* (Boston: Little Brown, 1933), pp. 23-28; Dawes speech was reprinted in the *Bangor Daily News*, August 25, 1924; Crosby to ROB, August 26, 1924, 2.4:5; *Biddeford Record*, August 27, 1924, *Portland Evening Express*, August 27, 1924, *Lewiston Daily Sun*, August 29, 1924, 8:1925, ROBP; *Kennebec Journal*, August 27, 1924, Scrapbook 13, PBP; *Bangor Evening News*, August 26, 1924; Dorothy W. Blanchard, “Into the Heart of Maine: A Look at Dexter’s Franco-American Community,” *Maine Historical Society Quarterly* 33 (Summer 1993): 30-31.

47. Byron M. Small to ROB, August 25, 1924, ROB to Edward Tibbetts, September 1, 1924 (public letter), 2.4:5; Mrs. Alice W. Saunders to ROB, August 25, 1924, 2.4:9; *Portland Evening Express*, September 3, 4, 1924, *Piscataquis Observer*, September 4, 1924, *Machias Union*, September 4, 1924, *Biddeford Record*, September 3, 1924, 8:1925, ROB to Barrett Potter, September 6, 1924, 2.6:7, ROBP; George W. Heselton to the editor, *Lewiston Evening Journal*, August 28, September 2, 5, 1924, *Portland Press Herald*, September 2, 3, 5, 1924, *Kennebec Journal*, September 2, 1924.

48. *State Election 1924 Official Tabulation, Governor*, State Archives, Augusta; Allen, “Catholics in Maine,” p. 250. Brewster got 143,926 votes and Pat-tangall 107,908.

49. *State Election 1924 Official Tabulation, Governor*, *Portland Press Herald*, September 9, 1924, *Kennebec Journal*, October 2, 1924.

50. *State Election 1924 Official Tabulation, Governor*, Allen, “Catholics in Maine,” p. 250.

51. *State Election 1924 Official Tabulation, Governor*, Allen, “Catholics in Maine,” p. 250.

52. *State Election 1924 Official Tabulation, Governor*, Allen, “Catholics in Maine,” p. 250.